United States v. Reggie Beckton , 740 F.3d 303 ( 2014 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4037
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
REGGIE ANDRE BECKTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt,
Senior District Judge. (7:11-cr-00061-BR-1)
Argued: December 12, 2013 Decided: January 21, 2014
Before MOTZ, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Keenan and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Richard Croutharmel, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Kristine L. Fritz, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
A jury convicted Reggie Andre Beckton of two counts of bank
robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Beckton appeals,
contending that the district court abused its discretion in
refusing to permit him to testify in narrative form, and erred
in forcing him to choose between his right to testify in his own
defense and his right to represent himself. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
I.
In May 2011, a grand jury indicted Beckton on two counts of
robbery of federally insured banks in Wilmington, North
Carolina. A year later, after a two-day trial, a jury convicted
him on both counts.
In the months leading up to Beckton’s trial, the district
court appointed three different public defenders to represent
him. Because Beckton alleged conflicts of interest and
personality with the first lawyer and made crude sexual remarks
to the second, the court permitted each of them to withdraw.
A week before trial, Beckton made an oral motion to
disqualify his third court-appointed attorney, Thomas Manning.
The district court denied the motion after determining that
Beckton’s objections to Manning did not constitute a conflict of
interest warranting appointment of a fourth public defender.
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The court also denied Beckton’s eleventh-hour request to
postpone his trial. Rather than proceed with Manning as his
lawyer, Beckton stated that he wanted to represent himself at
trial. The court acknowledged that Beckton had the right to
appear pro se, but strongly cautioned him against doing so.
Explaining that Beckton would be bound by the same rules of
evidence and procedure as trained lawyers, the court advised
Beckton that self-representation was not in his best interest.
When Beckton insisted, the court permitted him to proceed pro
se, with Manning serving as standby counsel.
On the first day of trial, the court again warned Beckton
about the inadvisability of appearing pro se. But Beckton
responded that he was “confident about [his] decision.” The
court then reviewed the basics of courtroom procedure for
Beckton’s benefit, stressing that Beckton needed to “follow all
of th[e] rules,” and warning him that “outbursts or comments
addressed to the jury or to the [c]ourt are not permitted by the
rules and w[ould] not be tolerated.”
The court’s warnings went unheeded. Beckton repeatedly
sought to present to the jury inadmissible evidence and improper
arguments. Indeed, in the course of his opening statement
alone, he impugned the honesty of the prosecutor; claimed that
the State charges against him, based on the “same evidence”
about to be put to the jury, had been dismissed “for a reason”;
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and argued –- after repeatedly asserting to the district court
his desire to appear pro se -- that he had been denied his
constitutional right to counsel.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, Beckton indicated
that he wished to take the stand in his own defense. Without
the jury present, the court advised Beckton that of course he
could do so, but if he did, he would not be permitted to present
narrative testimony. Instead, like all other witnesses, Beckton
would have to proceed in question-answer form so opposing
counsel could object to a question before it was answered.
In response, Beckton proposed that he draft questions that
Manning, his standby counsel, would ask him. The court rejected
this plan, stating that Beckton could not “have it both ways.”
The court explained: Either Manning would assume control of the
case and question Beckton, or Beckton would retain control and
present his testimony by questioning himself. Beckton could
not, however, both represent himself and have standby counsel
pose questions to him. Beckton opted to continue pro se and
question himself. When the jury returned, the court explained:
[The defendant will] have to ask himself a question
and then answer the question, and the reason for that
is the evidence is presented in a question-and-answer
format. It allows the opposing party to object to the
question because it may be an improper thing for the
jury’s consideration –- you’ve seen that throughout
this trial –- so obviously the defendant is not
allowed to do any different from any other witness.
He can’t just get up on the witness stand or where he
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is now and make a narrative statement to you -– he
can’t do that. So it may be a little awkward, but
we’ll get through it.
Beckton then began to testify, but did so in narrative
form. The court stopped him and provided sample questions he
might ask. When Beckton replied that he was given only a few
days to prepare his case and demanded to know why he had to
“keep quiet about this corruption,” the court asked the jury to
leave the room.
A lengthy discussion ensued. Ultimately, the court asked
Beckton: “Do I have your assurance that if I bring the jury
back that . . . [you will] ask the question and then give the
government an opportunity to object and then, depending on my
ruling, answer the question?” Beckton reluctantly agreed, and
the court reconvened the jury. But when Beckton again began to
testify in narrative form and accused the court of “favor[ing]
one party,” the court removed the jury. The court then
presented Beckton with the choice of continuing to represent
himself -- without testifying on his own behalf -- or allowing
Manning to assume control of the case and direct his testimony.
Beckton responded that he “definitely” did not want Manning to
represent him. The court confirmed that Beckton had no other
witnesses to call, marked the evidence closed, and recalled the
jury for closing arguments. The following day, the jury
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convicted Beckton on both counts of bank robbery. Beckton
timely noted this appeal.
II.
Beckton argues that the district court abused its
discretion in refusing to allow him to testify in narrative
form. He maintains that the court’s requirement that he proceed
in question-answer format “served only to make [him] appear
schizophrenic” and damaged his credibility with the jury.
Appellant’s Br. at 6, 9.
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s
rulings on matters of trial management. See United States v.
Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2013). Trial management
includes “such concerns as whether testimony shall be in the
form of a free narrative or responses to specific questions.”
Fed. R. Evid. 611 advisory committee’s note. District courts
enjoy broad latitude in this realm, because “[q]uestions of
trial management are quintessentially the[ir] province.” United
States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 332 (4th Cir. 2006); see also
Woods, 710 F.3d at 200. So long as restrictions on a
defendant’s right to testify are not “arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve,” a
district court will not be held to have abused its discretion.
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55-56 (1987).
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In this case, the district court’s refusal to allow Beckton
to testify in narrative form was not “arbitrary or
disproportionate” to its purpose. As the court explained to
both Beckton and the jury, the court simply required Beckton,
like all other witnesses, to testify in this manner to assure
opposing counsel the opportunity to lodge any objection prior to
Beckton’s answer. We find this rationale eminently reasonable,
particularly given Beckton’s repeated attempts during the trial
to present inadmissible evidence to the jury. Indeed, the
Federal Rules of Evidence direct trial courts to “exercise
reasonable control over the mode . . . of examining witnesses
and presenting evidence so as to make those procedures effective
for determining the truth.” Fed. R. Evid. 611(a). This duty is
no different for pro se litigants. Rather, like all other
litigants, they must comply with substantive and procedural
courtroom rules. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834
n.46 (1975) (explaining that self-representation is not a
license to ignore “relevant rules of procedural and substantive
law.”).
Accordingly, the district court “was well within the proper
exercise of [its] discretion” in denying Beckton’s “request[]
that, as a pro se [litigant], he be permitted to testify in
narrative form.” Hutter N. Trust v. Door Cnty. Chamber of
Commerce, 467 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 1972); cf. United States
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v. Gallagher, 99 F.3d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in “restrict[ing]
defendant’s right to testify [] when defendant attempted to
proceed in a narrative fashion”); see generally United States v.
Young, 745 F.2d 733, 761 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting that “a trial
judge has broad discretion in deciding whether or not to allow
narrative testimony”). ∗
To be sure, it may be uncomfortable for a pro se litigant
to question himself, and a court could, in its discretion,
permit a pro se litigant additional time to formulate questions.
But our task is “not to decide whether the court below chose the
best, or tidiest, means of effecting the defendant’s direct
examination.” United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1121 (1st
Cir. 1989); see also id. at 1122 (explaining that self-
examination “adequately permit[s] a [pro se] defendant to tell
∗
At oral argument, counsel for Beckton maintained that the
district court’s refusal to permit narrative testimony was an
abuse of discretion because Beckton “could not get his head
around” how to proceed in question-answer form. This argument
has no footing in law and no basis in fact. Appearing pro se
does not relieve a litigant of his obligation to follow
legitimate rules. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; Woods, 710
F.3d at 200. Beckton, moreover, apparently had the ability to
follow the rules when he chose to do so. A high school graduate
with an associate’s degree in criminal justice and another 400
hours of training through correspondence study, Beckton
repeatedly demonstrated his ability to formulate questions
appropriate for witness examination when he cross-examined the
prosecution’s witnesses.
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his side of the story”). Rather, we review for abuse of
discretion only, and here there was none.
Furthermore, rather than question himself, Beckton had the
option of permitting standby counsel to assume control of the
case and elicit testimony from him. But Beckton would not
consent to this arrangement, insisting instead that he continue
to control the defense pro se and that standby counsel question
him. As with its denial of Beckton’s request to testify in
narrative form, the district court was well within its
discretion in rejecting this proposal. See Nivica, 887 F.3d at
1121-22 (holding that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in requiring a pro se defendant to question himself,
rather than permitting standby counsel to do so).
Although a criminal defendant has both a right to counsel
and a right to represent himself, those rights are “mutually
exclusive.” United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1100
(4th Cir. 1997). In other words, a pro se defendant has no
right to standby counsel when he chooses to proceed pro se. See
id. It follows, therefore, that a district court has “broad
discretion to guide what, if any, assistance standby, or
advisory, counsel may provide to a defendant conducting his own
defense.” United States v. Lawrence, 161 F.3d 250, 253 (4th
Cir. 1998). And certainly, “[a] defendant does not have a
constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by
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counsel,” as Beckton wished to do here. McKaskle v. Wiggins,
465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).
III.
Beckton also argues that the district court impermissibly
forced him to choose between his right to represent himself and
his right to testify in his own defense when it compelled him to
choose between testifying pro se in question-answer form and
testifying in response to questions from standby counsel who
would then control the case. We are not persuaded.
As Beckton himself acknowledges, this argument rests on the
contention that the district court’s requirement that he testify
in question-answer format “was not an option authorized by law.”
Appellant’s Br. at 15 (“Beckton assumes he has established that
questioning himself using a question-and-answer format was an
arbitrary and disproportionate restriction on his right to
testify.”). As we have explained, however, this restriction was
well within the district court’s discretion. Beckton was free
to testify pro se in his own defense; he simply could not do so
in narrative form.
Beckton maintains that United States v. Midgett, 342 F.3d
321 (4th Cir. 2003), lends him support. In Midgett, the
defendant sought to provide testimony his lawyer believed to be
false. Although Midgett’s lawyer was not certain that Midgett
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intended to perjure himself, the lawyer nonetheless sought to
withdraw his representation. Midgett, 342 F.3d at 323. Instead
of permitting the lawyer to withdraw, however, the district
court “offered Midgett the choice of either acceding to defense
counsel’s refusal to put him on the stand or representing
himself without further assistance from counsel.” Id. Midgett
reluctantly chose to continue with counsel and forgo his chance
to testify. We held that under these circumstances, the
district court impermissibly forced Midgett “to choose between
two constitutionally protected rights: the right to testify on
his own behalf and the right to counsel.” Id. at 327.
Midgett is no help to Beckton. Midgett was denied the
chance to exercise in tandem two constitutional rights -- the
right to testify and the right to assistance of counsel. In
this case, by contrast, the district court expressly afforded
Beckton the opportunity to simultaneously exercise both
constitutional rights he asserted -- the right to testify and
the right to represent himself. Beckton lost that opportunity
only when he repeatedly defied the court’s instruction to use
the same question-answer procedure required of all other
witnesses. Therefore, unlike Midgett, Beckton was not compelled
to choose between two constitutionally protected rights.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
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