Lejuana Morgan v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA , 585 F. App'x 152 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1258
LEJUANA ALICE MORGAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WELLS FARGO BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Samuel G. Wilson, District
Judge. (7:13-cv-00137-SGW-RSB)
Submitted: October 31, 2014 Decided: November 6, 2014
Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas E. Strelka, STRICKLAND, DIVINEY & STRELKA, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Michael J. Finney, James J. O’Keeffe,
GENTRY LOCKE RAKES & MOORE LLP, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lejuana Morgan appeals from a district court order
granting summary judgment against her in a civil action for
employment discrimination and retaliation brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (2012). Morgan also challenges the district
court’s denial of her motion for leave to amend her complaint in
order to add a claim for failure to accommodate her disability.
We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv.
Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996). In doing so, we construe
the facts in the light most favorable to Morgan and give her the
benefit of all reasonable inferences. See Carnell Constr.
Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 745 F.3d 703, 716
(4th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). Summary judgment will be granted unless “a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” on the
evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). “Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the nonmoving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power
Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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Because Morgan presented no direct evidence of
discrimination or retaliation, we analyze her claim under the
familiar burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Heiko v.
Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 248 (4th Cir. 2006)
(discrimination); Hooven–Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 271–74
(4th Cir. 2001) (retaliation). The sole issue on appeal
relating to summary judgment is whether Morgan demonstrated that
Wells Fargo’s proffered reasons for her termination were
pretextual. A plaintiff can prove pretext by showing that the
defendant’s “explanation is unworthy of credence or by offering
other forms of circumstantial evidence sufficiently probative of
. . . discrimination [or retaliation].” Mereish v. Walker, 359
F.3d 330, 336 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[A] plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with
sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude
that the employer unlawfully discriminated.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000).
Morgan failed to establish that Wells Fargo’s
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for terminating her
employment were pretext for discrimination or retaliation. The
record reveals that Morgan violated Wells Fargo’s clearly
articulated attendance policy. Although Morgan’s termination
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occurred shortly after she informed Wells Fargo that she
suffered from alcoholism, the record indicates that Wells Fargo
decided to terminate her employment before she revealed her
alcoholism. Moreover, temporal proximity alone is not
sufficient to establish that her alcoholism was a “but for”
cause of her termination. Dugan v. Albemarle Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
293 F.3d 716, 722 (4th Cir. 2002). We thus affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment.
Morgan next contends that the district court erred in
denying her motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to
add an additional claim for failure to accommodate. We review
the district court’s denial of a motion for leave to amend a
pleading for abuse of discretion. Public Employees’ Ret.
Ass’n v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 551 F.3d 305, 313 n.3 (4th Cir.
2009). “[L]eave to amend a pleading should be denied only when
the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there
has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the
amendment would have been futile.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d
404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006).
We use the same burden-shifting framework as in
Morgan’s discrimination and retaliation claims to analyze her
proposed claim for failure to accommodate under the ADA. See
Hooven-Lewis, 249 F.3d at 267-71 (4th Cir. 2001). Just as
Morgan’s discrimination and retaliation claims fail for lack of
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pretext, so too would her failure to accommodate claim. We
therefore find that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in refusing to grant Morgan leave to amend her
complaint to add a claim for failure to accommodate because such
a claim would have been futile.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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