Sue Jones v. City of Orange Cove , 454 F. App'x 601 ( 2011 )

FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 20 2011
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SUE JONES, No. 10-16507
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 1:08 cv-0775 DLB
v.
MEMORANDUM *
CITY OF ORANGE COVE,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dennis L. Beck, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 11, 2011
San Francisco, California
Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Sue Jones appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Defendant City of Orange Cove. Summary judgment was based
solely on Jones’ failure to file a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus to
challenge the City Council’s decision. The district court concluded that this failure
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
renders the City Council’s decision res judicata. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.
Under California law, a party challenging an administrative decision “made
as a result of a proceeding in which by law a hearing is required to be given,
evidence is required to be taken, and discretion in the determination of facts is
vested,” is generally required to file a petition for a writ of administrative
mandamus in order to challenge that decision. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5(a).
Orange Cove Municipal Code § 15.17.070 required the Orange Cove City Council
to hold a hearing and take evidence when considering Jones’ appeal. Under
California law, if a party fails to file for a writ of administrative mandamus when
one is required and, instead, collaterally attacks the administrative decision in
court, the administrative decision is final under the doctrine of res judicata.
Patrick Media Grp., Inc. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 839-40
(Ct. App. 1992). We generally afford collateral estoppel effect to municipal
decisions made within California. See Eilrich v. Remas, 839 F.2d 630, 633 (9th
Cir. 1988).
In response to an order that her building be repaired or razed, Jones filed two
complaints. In one, Jones sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging, inter
alia, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the second, Jones filed a pleading entitled
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“Writ of Prohibition.” Despite its title, we conclude that this “Writ of Prohibition”
serves the purpose of a writ of administrative mandamus. California law provides
that when a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus is filed, “[t]he inquiry
in such a case shall extend to the questions whether the respondent has proceeded
without, or in excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether
there was any prejudicial abuse of discretion.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1094.5(b).
Jones’ “Writ of Prohibition” touches on all three of the inquiries permitted on
administrative mandamus. In this pleading, Jones alleges that the City Council
lacked jurisdiction for its decision. She also alleges that the City Council’s
decision was politically motivated, reasonably prompting an inquiry into whether
her trial was fair and whether the City Council abused its discretion. Jones also
requests that “the court issue a peremptory writ . . . commanding respondent to
refrain from enforcing” the decision that she challenges.
Under California pleading rules, “neither mislabeling nor a defective prayer
will bar relief justified by proper allegations and proof.” Peck’s Liquors, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 735, 736 (Ct. App. 1963). Thus, where the substance
of the petitioner’s argument for relief is misclassified as a petition for the wrong
writ, the petition should be treated as a petition for the appropriate writ. See, e.g.,
Broden v. Marin Humane Soc’y, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 237 & n.3 (Ct. App. 1999).
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Therefore, Jones’ “Writ of Prohibition” should be treated as a petition for a writ of
administrative mandamus.
The district court erred in refusing to treat this pleading as a petition for a
writ of administrative mandamus. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court
is reversed and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this disposition.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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