United States v. Wayne McDuffie , 454 F. App'x 624 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                            FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             OCT 24 2011
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-30307
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00102-RHW-1
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    WAYNE D. MCDUFFIE,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                        No. 09-30370
    Plaintiff - Appellant,             D.C. No. 2:08-cr-00102-RHW-1
    v.
    WAYNE D. MCDUFFIE,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Washington
    Robert H. Whaley, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 14, 2011
    Seattle, Washington
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    Before: BEEZER and PAEZ, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS,** District Judge.
    The government appeals the district court’s orders granting Defendant
    Wayne McDuffie a new trial and suppressing drug-related evidence. We affirm
    the grant of a new trial, but reverse the order suppressing evidence.1
    In granting McDuffie a new trial, the district court concluded that the
    government violated Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963), when it failed to
    disclose in a timely manner certain fingerprint evidence. To establish a Brady
    violation, a defendant must show that “[t]he evidence at issue [is] favorable to the
    accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence
    [was] suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice . . .
    ensued.” United States v. Price, 
    566 F.3d 900
    , 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting
    Strickler v. Greene, 
    527 U.S. 263
    , 281-82 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted).
    **
    The Honorable Raner C. Collins, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for Arizona, sitting by designation.
    1
    We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for a new trial
    based upon a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). United States v.
    Price, 
    566 F.3d 900
    , 907 (9th Cir. 2009). We also review de novo the denial of a
    motion to suppress and whether the exclusionary rule applies to a given case.
    United States v. Crawford, 
    372 F.3d 1048
    , 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The
    underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. 
    Id.
    Page 2 of 5
    The evidence at issue here showed that Detective Barrington’s fingerprint
    was on a drug scale, which was found in the Ash Street apartment. This evidence
    supported McDuffie’s theory that Barrington sought to frame him in order to
    pressure him to cooperate with one of Barrington’s on-going murder
    investigations. This evidence was disclosed during trial, despite the fact that the
    government learned of it some five days prior to trial.
    The fingerprint evidence is favorable to McDuffie and potentially
    impeaching of Barrington, the government’s key witness. Because the
    government’s disclosure of this evidence near the end of its own case in chief
    prevented McDuffie from presenting his theory of the case in a coherent manner,
    the government effectively suppressed it. McDuffie was unable to retain his own
    experts in forensics or police procedure, or to do any pre-trial discovery into the
    CD scale’s chain of custody. In light of its late disclosure, the evidence was of no
    “substantial value” to McDuffie. United States v. Woodley, 
    9 F.3d 774
    , 777 (9th
    Cir. 1993).
    The government’s failure to disclose this evidence was also prejudicial,
    again because it prevented McDuffie from presenting a coherent version of his
    theory of the case. See United States v. Bagley, 
    473 U.S. 667
    , 683 (1985).
    Detective Barrington was the government’s key witness, and had McDuffie been
    Page 3 of 5
    able to present a coherent theory of evidence tampering, there is a reasonable
    probability that the jury would have discredited Barrington and reached a different
    conclusion in the case. The prejudicial effect of the government’s late disclosure is
    therefore “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Price,
    
    566 F.3d at 911
    . The district court did not err in granting a new trial on the basis
    of the Brady violation.
    McDuffie’s motion to suppress evidence sought to exclude items seized
    from searches of McDuffie’s car and Walnut Street apartment. The Supreme Court
    recently held in Davis v. United States that “searches conducted in objectively
    reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the
    exclusionary rule.” 
    131 S.Ct. 2419
    , 2423-24 (2011). The search of McDuffie’s car
    after the police had already handcuffed him and placed him in a patrol car clearly
    violated Arizona v. Gant, 
    556 U.S. 332
     (2009), which was decided after the search
    of McDuffie’s car but while McDuffie’s case was on appeal. The car search,
    however, did not violate New York v. Belton, 
    453 U.S. 454
     (1981), which was
    binding precedent at the time of the search. Therefore, the search of McDuffie’s
    car—although unconstitutional under Gant—does not invoke the exclusionary rule
    and the evidence found in his car is admissible.
    Page 4 of 5
    The items seized from McDuffie’s Walnut Street apartment, which the
    district court deemed “fruit of the poisonous tree” and excluded, are also
    admissible. The exclusionary rule’s “sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth
    Amendment violations.” Davis, 
    131 S.Ct. at 2426
    ; see also Hudson v. Michigan,
    
    547 U.S. 586
    , 596-99 (2006) (discussing deterrence as a necessary but not
    sufficient condition for applying the exclusionary rule). There is no deterrent
    effect when the police are not culpable. See Davis, 
    131 S.Ct. at 2428-29
    ; see also
    United States v. Leon, 
    468 U.S. 897
    , 922 (1984). Here, the police obtained a
    search warrant on the basis of an affidavit that relied, in part, on the evidence
    found in McDuffie’s car, and searched his apartment pursuant to that warrant.
    Because the police relied on binding appellate precedent when they seized
    evidence from McDuffie’s car, and then properly obtained a warrant before
    searching his apartment, there would be no deterrent effect from excluding the
    evidence found in the apartment. We therefore reverse the district court’s order
    granting McDuffie’s motion to suppress.
    AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.
    Page 5 of 5