United States v. Daniel Pineda-Zelaya ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4124
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DANIEL EDUARDO PINEDA-ZELAYA, a/k/a Daniel Edgardo
Rodriquez, a/k/a Sarco,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (7:09-cr-00100-D-5)
Submitted: October 25, 2011 Decided: November 4, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark E. Edwards, EDWARDS & TRENKLE, PLLC, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Ethan A. Ontjes, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Eduardo Pineda-Zelaya appeals his conviction
for robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2006); conspiracy
to commit robbery, using and carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2006); aiding and abetting, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2 (2006); and illegal entry, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a) (2006). On appeal, Pineda-Zelaya argues that the
district court erred in excluding testimony from both his gang
expert and a co-conspirator. Finding no error, we affirm.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert witness
testimony if the expert’s “specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.” “Rule 702 is broadly interpreted, and helpfulness to
the trier of fact is its touchstone. Testimony from an expert
is presumed to be helpful unless it concerns matters within the
everyday knowledge and experience of a lay juror.” Kopf v.
Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 377 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). However, expert witnesses may not
“state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did
or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an
element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto.” Fed. R.
Evid. 704(b). Applying these standards, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
2
testimony from the expert witness. See United States v. Wilson,
484 F.3d 267, 273 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating standard of review
for district court’s ruling on admissibility of expert witness
testimony).
Turning to the co-conspirator’s testimony, Federal
Rule of Evidence 608(b) allows cross-examination regarding
“[s]pecific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the
purpose of attacking or supporting the witness’ character for
truthfulness . . . in the discretion of the court, if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness.” See United States v. Leake,
642 F.2d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1981) (“Rule 608 authorizes inquiry
only into instances of misconduct that are clearly probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness, such as perjury, fraud,
swindling, forgery, bribery, and embezzlement.”). However, even
if testimony is relevant and admissible, “the probative value of
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its
prejudicial effect.” United States v. Wilson, 624 F.3d 640, 651
(4th Cir. 2010), petition for cert. filed, ___ S. Ct. __ (Feb.
4, 2011) (No. 10-8807); see Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .”).
“[I]n reviewing the trial court’s decision, [this court] must
look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent,
3
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial
effect.” United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157 (4th Cir.
1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon a thorough
review of the record, we cannot conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in excluding testimony from the co-
conspirator. See United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 155
(4th Cir. 2006) (discussing standard of review for district
court’s evidentiary rulings).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4