United States v. Hinton , 266 F. App'x 297 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5258
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CAMERON LEE HINTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior
District Judge. (5:06-cr-00130-H)
Submitted: February 13, 2008 Decided: February 26, 2008
Before WILKINSON and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas R. Wilson, GREENE & WILSON, P.A., New Bern, North Carolina,
for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne
M. Hayes, Jennifer May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cameron Lee Hinton pled guilty, without the benefit of a
plea agreement, to one count of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924
(2000). On appeal, Hinton challenges the district court’s
imposition of the within-guidelines sentence of 188 months’
imprisonment. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence if it “is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” United States v.
Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2054 (2006). A sentence that falls within the properly calculated
advisory guidelines range is entitled to a presumption of
reasonableness. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th
Cir. 2006); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69
(2007) (upholding application of presumption of reasonableness to
within-guidelines sentence).
Hinton’s sentence was driven by his designation as an
armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (“ACCA”). Hinton does
not challenge this designation. Rather, he claims the district
court committed procedural error by automatically applying the
guidelines enhancements applicable to armed career criminals
without considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007). See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
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§ 4B1.4(b) (2006). Hinton further claims his sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the enhancement of his sentence
pursuant to the ACCA resulted in excessive punishment that is cruel
and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm.
Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
a district court must engage in a multi-step process at sentencing.
The district court must first calculate the appropriate advisory
guidelines range, making any necessary factual findings. Moreland,
437 F.3d at 432. The court should then afford the parties “an
opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate.”
Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596-97 (2007). Then, the
sentencing court should consider the resulting advisory guidelines
range in conjunction with the factors set out in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and determine whether those factors support the sentence
requested by either party. Id.In Hinton’s case, the district court correctly calculated
the advisory guidelines range of 188-235 months’ imprisonment. At
the sentencing hearing, Hinton’s counsel requested the lowest
sentence possible under existing law, but made no specific argument
regarding any of the § 3553(a) factors. In imposing the low-end of
the applicable guidelines range, the district court noted that it
had considered the relevant factors under § 3553(a). This court
has held that a district court need not “robotically tick through
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§ 3553(a)’s every subsection” or “explicitly discuss every
§ 3553(a) factor on the record.” Johnson, 445 F.3d at 345. This
is particularly true when the district court imposes a sentence
within the applicable guidelines range. Id.; see Rita, 127 S. Ct.
at 2468. Because the district court imposed a sentence within the
guidelines range, no detailed statement of reasons was required.
We find no procedural error.
We review the substantive reasonableness of Hinton’s
sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall,
128 S. Ct. at 598. Hinton acknowledges we have repeatedly held
that sentencing under the ACCA is neither disproportionate to the
offense nor cruel and unusual punishment, and thus does not violate
the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 68
(4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Etheridge, 932 F.2d 318, 323 (4th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 331 (4th
Cir. 1989). We find his request for a change to existing law
without merit.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the propriety under
the Eighth Amendment of subjecting recidivists to enhanced
penalties. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 284-85 (1980).
“Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual
in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms
throughout our Nation’s history.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 994-95 (1991).
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Accordingly, we affirm Hinton’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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