William Couch v. Harold Clarke ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-6526
WILLIAM R. COUCH; SCOTT M. BOGER,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
HAROLD CLARKE; A. DAVID ROBINSON; JOHN A. WOODSON; LYNN
GRAHAM,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at
Roanoke. James P. Jones, District Judge. (7:18-cv-00049-JPJ-PMS)
Submitted: October 10, 2019 Decided: October 29, 2019
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William R. Couch, Scott M. Boger, Appellants Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William R. Couch and Scott M. Boger appeal the district court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of Harold Clarke, A. David Robinson, John A. Woodson, and
Lynn Graham (collectively, “Appellees”) on Couch and Boger’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012)
complaint challenging the constitutionality of the incoming general correspondence policy
at the facility in which Couch is housed. “We review a district court’s decision to grant
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court, and
viewing all facts and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Carter v. Fleming, 879 F.3d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
On appeal, Couch and Boger argue that the district court improperly took judicial
notice of disputed facts from outside the record. “Judicial notice” is a term of art under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, allowing judges to recognize facts not proven in the record that
are “not subject to reasonable dispute.” See Fed. R. Evid. 201. We review evidentiary
rulings, such as a court’s taking judicial notice, for abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Garcia, 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 2017). We have reviewed the record and conclude
that the district court did not err on these grounds.
Couch and Boger also challenge the district court’s grant of summary judgment as
to their claims arising under the First Amendment. “Courts have generally concluded that
the First Amendment rights retained by convicted prisoners include the right to
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communicate with others beyond the prison walls.” Heyer v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 849
F.3d 202, 213 (4th Cir. 2017). “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The four factors courts
consider in determining whether a regulation satisfies this standard are:
(1) whether a valid, rational connection exists between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it, (2) whether
alternative means of exercising the right exist, that remain open to prison
inmates, (3) what impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally, and (4) whether there was an absence of ready
alternatives to the regulation in question.
Heyer, 849 F.3d at 214 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The prisoner
bears the burden of proving the invalidity of the challenged regulation, Overton v. Bazzetta,
539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003), and, in determining the reasonableness of the regulation, “the
right in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively,” Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490
U.S. 401, 417 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have reviewed the record
and conclude that the district court correctly determined that the Turner factors weighed in
Appellees’ favor.
Finally, Couch and Boger challenge the district court’s determination that Couch
did not have a cognizable property interest in his incoming mail that was destroyed
pursuant to the mail policy. In analyzing a claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we first consider whether the inmate has asserted a protectable
interest and, if so, whether he was afforded the minimum procedural protections required
by the Fourteenth Amendment in depriving him of that interest. Incumaa v. Stirling, 791
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F.3d 517, 526 (4th Cir. 2015). To demonstrate a sufficient property interest, an inmate
must have “an individual entitlement grounded in state law.” Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430 (1982). If the inmate does not have such an interest, then the
protections of the Due Process Clause do not apply. See Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245,
248 (4th Cir. 2015). We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment to Appellees on this claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting summary judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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