In re Richardson ( 2022 )

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
No. 20-CM-241
IN RE WILLIE RICHARDSON, APPELLANT.
Appeal from the Superior Court
of the District of Columbia
(2019 CCC 00052)
(Hon. Maribeth Raffinan, Trial Judge)
(Argued Feb. 17, 2022 Decided March 24, 2022 ∗)
Annamaria Kimball, appointed by this court, for appellant. Christine
Pembroke was on the brief for appellant.
Caroline Tan for appellee. Janice Y. Sheppard, Assistant Attorney General,
Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan,
Solicitor General at the time, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor
General, and Ashwin P. Phatak, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief for
appellee.
Before GLICKMAN, EASTERLY, and DEAHL, Associate Judges.
∗ The decision in this case was originally issued as an unpublished
Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. Upon consideration of motions to publish
filed by the District of Columbia and the Legal Aid Society of the District of
Columbia, we grant the motions and publish this Opinion.
2
DEAHL, Associate Judge: Willie Richardson was convicted of four counts of
contempt for violating a temporary protection order (TPO). The TPO directed
Richardson not to contact his ex-girlfriend, Michelle Hargrove, and he was found
guilty of contempt for each of four Facebook messages he sent to Hargrove over the
course of a single day. On appeal, Richardson argues that his convictions should
merge because sending four messages on a single day amounts to just one offense,
not four. He also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly
admitting prior bad acts evidence in the form of several hostile voicemails he had
left on Hargrove’s phone before the issuance of the TPO. We are unpersuaded by
Richardson’s arguments and affirm.
I.
Richardson and Hargrove were in a relationship from January 2018 until May
2019. Shortly after their relationship ended, Hargrove sought and the Superior Court
issued a TPO ordering Richardson “not [to] contact [Hargrove] in any manner,”
including via “electronic or social media.” Weeks later, and while the TPO was in
effect, Hargrove received four messages via Facebook Messenger, all sent on a
single day from Richardson’s Facebook account. The messages were time-stamped
2:09 PM, 3:39 PM. 7:49 PM, and 9:34 PM, and read as follows:
3
[2:09 PM] So you in a relationship with your new boo and
you got pictures all over [your Facebook] page you and
him been here and there? Damn I was a fool for you but
God bless you so you got his picture on both page as your
profile huh? I waste my time and pain over you and then
you gave him my things and sit at the patio with him like
he or you brought it but what woman you know of can say
that she are around something that you brought me or gave
me not none because I loved you enough to respect your
things I’m not being around another woman with it on or
at my house. Have a blessed day and then the law suit I
put you down with you share and spend it on another man
and your kids wow [] but that’s the thanks that I get and
favor for being a dumb old ass for you
[3:39 PM] Damn I missing your ass
[7:49 PM] Look I love you more then anything and I have
not been with nobody I just wish you would had really
believed me but I know your new number I just did not
call it? It’s 883 25 ha ha I’m not telling you the last two
of your number I just gave you your space and his respect
as your man because I do not want you to cheat on him
just like you did me and treated me! My love for you is so
powerful to me!
[9:34 PM] I’m not here against you or betrayed you either
but why you won’t text back huh I love you I’m not on
your time in turning people in to the law like you do I love
you once again with all my heart
Hargrove testified that the first message referred to a patio furniture set that
Richardson insisted he had purchased for her and was angry about her using with
another man. The partial phone number in the third message was from a number
Hargrove acquired after the TPO was issued—a number she did not know
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Richardson had and did not want him to have. Hargrove understood the fourth
message (“turning people in to the law”) to refer to her obtaining a TPO against him.
Richardson was charged with four counts of contempt under D.C. Code
§ 16-1005(f)(1) (2021 Supp.). Before trial, the government notified Richardson of
its “intent to use evidence of other crimes or prior bad acts pursuant to Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).” Specifically, the government sought
to introduce portions of three voicemails that Richardson left on Hargrove’s phone
between the end of their relationship and the issuance of the TPO. The government
argued the voicemails were admissible as evidence of Richardson’s identity as the
person who sent the Facebook messages. It contended that the voicemails were
relevant to Richardson’s identity because, like the Facebook messages, they show
the speaker was “upset by Ms. Hargrove’s new relationship, and by Ms. Hargrove’s
continued use of the patio furniture.” The government also argued the voicemails
were admissible as evidence of motive because “[c]omparing these voicemails to the
charged Facebook messages will demonstrate the defendant’s determination to
contact Ms. Hargrove to express these feelings despite her requests to end all
contact.” The court ruled that the voicemails were admissible as evidence of identity
and motive. The court stressed that the question of identity was of particular
importance because Richardson planned to argue that the Facebook messages,
5
though concededly sent from his account, were written by somebody else. 1 Three
excerpts from the voicemails were eventually introduced at trial. 2
After the close of evidence, Richardson moved to merge the four counts of
contempt into a single count, contending that the four messages—“sent within a
single day, within a fairly short amount of time”—amounted to a single offense. The
court denied Richardson’s motion, noting that although the messages were sent on
the same day, they remained “distinct messages that were sent at these four different
times . . . . at least an hour apart.” After a two-day bench trial, Richardson was
1
The sole witness for the defense testified she had received multiple messages
from Richardson’s account but did not believe Richardson had sent them.
2
In the three admitted voicemail excerpts, a man who Hargrove identified as
Richardson can be heard saying as follows:
The one thing I better not come through that alleyway over
there any time when cutting in people’s yard, when I’m
cutting the yard down the street and see some dude sitting
at that table. I know that for sure. You know I’d go to jail
for that.
Because you are not going to allow no man sitting at my
motherfucking table. I’ll take chair by chair if I have to
put them in my truck, every day I’ll come and grab one,
but I’m going to drag that table out there first.
I’ll tell you that you think I’m going to lie. I don’t give a
fuck. I’ll go to jail and I’ll be happy in jail, but you and
another fucking nigger is not going to sit at that
motherfucking table and act like a motherfucking couple.
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convicted of four counts of contempt for violation of a TPO. He was sentenced to
four concurrent 180-day terms of incarceration.
II.
Richardson argues that the trial court erred by failing to merge the four
contempt convictions into one, and abused its discretion by admitting Richardson’s
voicemails into evidence. We consider these arguments in turn.
A.
On merger, Richardson makes two arguments. First, he argues that the four
Facebook messages were part of a “single continuous episode” and should be
charged as one offense under our traditional fork-in-the-road analysis. Second, and
more ambitiously, he argues that the relevant provision of the Intrafamily Offenses
Act prohibits multiple convictions for separate violations of a single protection
order.
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i.
“There is no double jeopardy bar to separate and cumulative punishment for
separate criminal acts, even if those separate acts do happen to violate the same
criminal statute.” Sutton v. United States, 140 A.3d 1198, 1205 (D.C. 2016) (quoting
Brown v. United States, 795 A.2d 56, 63 (D.C. 2002)). Criminal acts are “factually
separate” when they “have occurred at different times and were separated by
intervening events, when they occurred at different places, when the defendant has
reached a fork in the road and has decided to invade a different interest, or when the
first act has come to an end and the next act is motivated by a fresh impulse.” Gray
v. United States, 544 A.2d 1255, 1257 (D.C. 1988) (internal citations omitted). “An
interval of time between two criminal episodes may be quite brief but still show that
a defendant had reached a fork in the road or had acted in response to a fresh
impulse.” Cullen v. United States, 886 A.2d 870, 873 (D.C. 2005) (quotation marks
omitted); see also Maddox v. United States, 745 A.2d 284, 294 (D.C. 2000)
(“[W]hen there is an appreciable period of time between the acts on which two
criminal convictions are based, there is no merger, even if the interval is quite brief.”
(quotation marks omitted)). However, when a series of criminal actions are so close
together as to become “a continuous stream”—for example, a “continuous stream of
threats against a single person” or “a succession of physical blows in a continuing
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attack on a single victim”—those actions “coalesce into a single . . . offense.”
Williams v. United States, 981 A.2d 1224, 1227 n.8 (D.C. 2009). “Whether two
charged offenses merge into one is a question of law,” which we review de novo.
Ellison v. United States, 919 A.2d 612, 615 (D.C. 2007).
We find that Richardson’s messages were not part of a “continuous stream”
of communication so as to constitute only one offense. The messages were separated
by an “appreciable period of time,” Maddox, 745 A.2d at 294, with each message
following the preceding message by an hour-and-a-half or more. Richardson cites
to no case where we have found that actions committed so far apart constituted a
“continuous stream.” See Ellison, 919 A.2d at 616 (declining to merge two counts
of sexual abuse where the two sex acts were committed about fifteen minutes apart).
Moreover, nothing about the content of the messages suggests that they expressed a
single, continuous thought (in the way a series of punches might constitute a single,
continuous attack). See Williams, 981 A.2d at 1227 n.8. We agree with the trial
court that after Richardson sent each message he had completed a criminal act and
stood at a “fork in the road” as to whether to commit another. Gray, 544 A.2d at
1257. He could have chosen to stop contacting Hargrove, but instead each time
acted on a fresh impulse to contact her again. Id. Thus, under our traditional
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analysis, each of Richardson’s messages is punishable as a separate offense, and his
convictions do not merge.
ii.
Our analysis does not end there because Richardson also argues that our
traditional analysis does not apply to this case. In his view, the Intrafamily Offenses
Act is ambiguous on the question of whether violating a single court order multiple
times amounts to one or multiple offenses. The provision at issue states that
“[v]iolation of any temporary protection order or civil protection order issued under
this subchapter . . . shall be punishable as criminal contempt.” D.C. Code
§ 16-1005(f)(1). Given the ambiguity he ascribes to that provision, Richardson asks
us to apply the rule of lenity to interpret the Intrafamily Offenses Act as authorizing
just a single conviction attendant to any given court order, no matter how many times
an individual violates it.
“Because the substantive power to prescribe crimes and determine
punishments is vested with the legislature, the question under the Double Jeopardy
Clause whether punishments are ‘multiple’ is essentially one of legislative intent.”
Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984) (internal citations omitted); see also Byrd
v. United States, 598 A.2d 386, 388-89 (D.C. 1991) (en banc) (“The role of the
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constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy is limited to assuring that the court
does not exceed its legislative authorization by imposing multiple punishments for
the same offense.” (quotation omitted)). Determining the appropriate unit of
prosecution is a question of statutory interpretation, Lennon v. United States, 736
A.2d 208, 210 (D.C. 1999), to which the rule of lenity may apply. See Hammond v.
United States, 77 A.3d 964, 968 (D.C. 2013); Heard v. United States, 686 A.2d 1026,
1028 (D.C. 1996). “The rule of lenity states that ‘criminal statutes should be strictly
construed and that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the defendant.’”
Coleman v. United States, 202 A.3d 1127, 1141 (D.C. 2019) (quoting Whitfield v.
United States, 99 A.3d 650, 656 (D.C. 2014)). However, this rule of statutory
construction is triggered only if we can first say that a given “penal statute’s
language, structure, purpose and legislative history leaves its meaning genuinely in
doubt.” Holloway v. United States, 951 A.2d 59, 65 (D.C. 2008) (quoting United
States Parole Comm’n v. Noble, 693 A.2d 1084, 1104 (D.C. 1997)).
According to Richardson, § 16-1005(f)(1) can (and therefore must) be read to
define the unit of prosecution as the protection order itself, so that any number of
violations of a single protection order amounts to just one offense. Although we
have previously upheld separate punishments under § 16-1005(f)(1) for multiple
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violations of a single protection order, see, e.g., In re Shirley, 28 A.3d 506, 509 (D.C.
2011), we have never squarely considered the argument Richardson advances here.
We do not perceive the ambiguity Richardson assigns to § 16-1005(f)(1), and
thus have no cause to apply the rule of lenity. Instead, the provision unambiguously
permits separate punishments for each violation of a court order. The provision
defines the unit of prosecution as a “violation” of a protection order. A “violation”
is a discrete act, capable of repetition. See Freundel v. United States, 146 A.3d 375,
383 (D.C. 2016) (contrasting voyeurism, a discrete act that can give rise to separate
punishments, with stalking, which is specifically defined, via statute, “as a ‘course
of conduct.’”). It is a basic assumption of double jeopardy jurisprudence that
repeated violations of a single provision may be punished separately. See, e.g.,
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302 (1932) (holding that each in a series
of successive drug sales to the same individual is “a distinct offense, however closely
they may follow each other”); see also Ellison, 919 A.2d at 616; Brown, 795 A.2d
at 63; Gardner v. United States, 698 A.2d 990, 1002 (D.C. 1997). 3
3
Nor are we persuaded by Richardson’s argument that “violation” does not
indicate a discrete act because it is not preceded by an “article or qualifier” such as
“a,” “the,” “every,” “any,” or “each.” Section 16-1005(f)(1)’s statutory phrase,
“[v]iolation of any temporary protection,” suggests a discrete act even absent a
preceding article or qualifier. Consider Ellison, 919 A.2d at 616, in which we upheld
separate punishments for discrete violations of a provision criminalizing
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Nor can Richardson point to any authority, in any jurisdiction, where a court
has invoked lenity to prohibit separate punishments for subsequent violations of the
same statute. The only authorities cited by Richardson concern whether
simultaneous violations could be punished separately. See Bell v. United States, 349
U.S. 81, 83-84 (1955) (only one Mann Act offense where defendant simultaneously
transported two women across state lines “for the purpose of prostitution or
debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose”); United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d
385, 390 (4th Cir. 1998) (only one offense where the defendant simultaneously
possessed multiple firearms). The question in Bell, whether a “single transaction”
can be subdivided into “multiple offenses” and punished separately, 349 U.S. at 84,
is very different from the question here—whether discrete transactions may be
misdemeanor sexual abuse, despite the fact that the provision does not explicitly
criminalize “a,” “the,” “every,” “any,” or “each” sexually suggestive act. Indeed,
the language at issue in Ellison was even more amenable than here to a reading
permitting only a single violation per victim. See D.C. Code § 22-3010.01(a) (2021
Supp.) (“Whoever, being 18 years of age or older and more than 4 years older than
a child . . . engages in sexually suggestive conduct with that child or minor shall be
imprisoned for not more than 180 days.”). Moreover, a subsequent subsection of
§ 16-1005 refers back to “establishing a violation under subsection[] (f),” § 16-
1005(h) (emphasis added), further cutting against Richardson’s argument. Although
it is true that in Hammond, 77 A.3d at 967-68, we pointed to the word “the” in “the
firearm” as evidence the legislature intended the possession of each firearm to be a
separate offense, that was only one piece of evidence, which we considered together
with the statute’s other requirements. Nothing in Hammond suggests that the
omission of the word “the” would have been decisive the other way, especially in a
case where (as here) the offenses were separated by an appreciable amount of time.
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punished separately. See also United States v. Mullins, 698 F.2d 686, 687 (4th Cir.
1983) (distinguishing, under the same statute at issue in Dunford, between multiple
weapons acquired in a single transaction (one offense) and weapons acquired at
different times or places (separate offenses)). We are unaware of any case where we
have found a statute to be ambiguous as to that second question.
Because we do not find § 16-1005(f)(1) ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not
apply. We therefore agree with the trial court that separate violations of a single
TPO may be punished separately, and that Richardson’s convictions do not merge.
B.
Finally, we turn to Richardson’s argument that the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted as evidence the voicemails he left on Hargrove’s phone.
“It is fundamental that evidence of prior bad acts independent of the crimes charged
is inadmissible to show the defendant’s disposition or propensity to commit the
charged offenses.” Harrison v. United States, 30 A.3d 169, 176 (D.C. 2011); see
also Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not
admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular
occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”). Nonetheless,
evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when used for a “substantial, legitimate
14
purpose” that outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Johnson v.
United States, 683 A.2d 1087, 1092 (D.C. 1996) (en banc) (quoting Drew, 331 F.2d
at 89-90). We review the admission of other-crimes evidence for abuse of discretion.
Sanders v. United States, 809 A.2d 584, 590-91 (D.C. 2002).
On the threshold question of whether the voicemails even qualified as prior
bad acts, the trial court reasoned that they did so marginally because they were
“minimally in the nature of a criminal offense” given that they were threatening. We
agree, and so agree that Drew’s strictures apply. 4 However, we also agree with the
trial court that (1) the voicemails were relevant to Richardson’s motive and “the
identity of the person” who committed the offense, Drew, 331 F.2d at 90, and (2)
the prejudicial effect of admitting them did not outweigh their probative value, id.Richardson contends, to the contrary, that the voicemails were not relevant to
the issue of identity because his identity could have been sufficiently established by
Hargrove’s testimony alone. Richardson confuses relevance with strict necessity. It
is true that the government had plenty of evidence that Richardson sent the Facebook
4
It is Richardson who argues that the voicemails do not qualify as prior bad
acts, even though that argument works against his interests as it would deprive him
of Drew’s heightened protections against admitting such evidence. He is perhaps
operating under the mistaken impression that if the evidence were not covered by
Drew, it would somehow raise the bar to admissibility, but the opposite is true.
15
messages without introducing the voicemails as further evidence of that fact—the
messages came from his Facebook account, after all. But that is beside the point.
The government is not confined to presenting the bare minimum of evidence
sufficient to support its charges. In assessing relevance, a trial court may consider
the availability of “less risky alternative proof,” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.
172, 183 (1997), but “the mere fact that two pieces of evidence might go to the same
point would not . . . necessarily mean that only one of them might come in”—
particularly where such a limitation would compromise the “evidentiary richness”
or “narrative integrity” of the case. Id.; see also McFarland v. United States, 821
A.2d 348, 353 (D.C. 2003).
Here, the government had every reason to fully develop its evidence, beyond
the bare minimum, that Richardson sent the Facebook messages in question.
Richardson’s defense to the charges was one of misidentification, specifically, that
he was not the author or the Facebook messages. See Jackson v. United States, 623
A.2d 571, 582 (D.C. 1993) (there “must be a legitimate, contested issue in the case”
that the other crimes evidence is probative of before it may be admitted (emphasis
added)). The voicemails thus spoke to the central dispute in the case, as they tended
to corroborate the government’s narrative that Richardson sent the Facebook
messages (similar in content to the voicemail messages he left). “[W]here the
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accused denies that he committed the act[,] the prosecutor is permitted, as part of his
effort to prove that the particular accused did commit the act, to prove that the
accused had a motive . . . .” Bacchus v. United States, 970 A.2d 269, 275 (D.C.
2009) (ellipses and quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “where one . . . partner in
a relationship commits a crime against the other, any fact or circumstance relating
to ill-feeling; ill-treatment; jealousy; prior assaults; personal violence; threats, or any
similar conduct or attitude by [that partner] are relevant to show motive . . . .” Id. at
276 (quoting Mitchell v. United States, 629 A.2d 10, 13 (D.C. 1993)). Finally, we
do not think the voicemails were particularly prejudicial, but share the trial court’s
assessment that they were only “minimally” in the nature of other crimes evidence.
III.
We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
So ordered.