Calvin Norton v. Jeffrey Rosier , 638 F. App'x 204 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1383
CALVIN TYRONE NORTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY ROSIER, in his individual capacity; CITY OF
WHITEVILLE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Wilmington. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (7:14-cv-00260-BO)
Submitted: November 24, 2015 Decided: January 7, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Calvin Tyrone Norton, Appellant Pro Se. Clay Allen Collier,
CROSSLEY MCINTOSH COLLIER, Wilmington, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Calvin Tyrone Norton filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action
against Jeffrey Rosier, Chief of Police of Whiteville, North
Carolina, and the City of Whiteville (collectively,
“Defendants”). Norton alleged that Rosier violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting a traffic stop of his vehicle in
South Carolina, without justification or lawful authorization as
a certified police officer, and that the City of Whiteville had
facilitated Rosier’s actions. The district court granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the alleged
encounter with Rosier was so de minimis as to fail to constitute
a constitutional violation; that Norton failed to allege an
official policy, practice, or custom of Whiteville that would
permit municipal liability under § 1983; and that it lacked
jurisdiction over Norton’s pendent state law claims.
On appeal, Norton challenges the dismissal of his § 1983
claim against Rosier and Whiteville.
As a threshold matter, we address the jurisdictional issues
raised by Defendants in their informal brief, which rely on a
prefiling injunction imposed against Norton in the North
Carolina state courts. We review questions of law related to
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See Home Buyers Warranty
Corp. v. Hanna, 750 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2014). We find no
error in the district court’s conclusion that neither the
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Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine nor the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1738 (2012), deprived the court of authority to decide
Norton’s claims. See Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456, 464 (4th
Cir. 2006) (discussing Rooker-Feldman); Davani v. Va. Dep’t of
Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Davenport v.
N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 3 F.3d 89, 92 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing
Full Faith and Credit Act).
Turning to the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
determination, we review de novo the dismissal of a complaint
for failure to state a claim, accepting factual allegations in
the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party. Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep’t
v. Montgomery Cty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012). To
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint’s “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007).
The temporary detention of an individual during a traffic
stop, even if only for a limited time or purpose, constitutes a
Fourth Amendment seizure. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
1 D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983);
Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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809-10 (1996). Because a routine traffic stop is more like an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest, we evaluate a
traffic stop under the test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968). United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275, 279 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 207 (2014). Under this inquiry, the
officer’s decision to stop the vehicle must be both “justified
at its inception” and adequately “limited both in scope and
duration.” United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506-07
(4th Cir. 2011). A police officer is entitled to initiate a
Terry stop only where it is “supported by a reasonable and
articulable suspicion that the person seized is engaged in
criminal activity.” United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his complaint, Norton alleged that Rosier stopped him
despite the fact that he was not speeding or violating any law
at the time of the stop. Moreover, he alleged that Rosier did
not charge him or warn him that he had violated a law.
Accepting these allegations as true, as we must on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion, we conclude that Norton has alleged a violation
of the Fourth Amendment. See Digiovanni, 650 F.3d at 506
(noting that a vehicle stop must be “justified at its inception”
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment); id. (noting that stopping an
automobile is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if there is
a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred).
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While we have reviewed the alternative arguments Defendants have
proffered in support of the dismissal of Norton’s Fourth
Amendment claim, we find them unpersuasive. Thus, we conclude
that the district court’s dismissal of Norton’s § 1983 claim
against Rosier must be vacated.
We find no error, however, in the district court’s
conclusion that Norton failed to allege an official policy,
practice, or custom sufficient to state a claim against the City
of Whiteville. See Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th
Cir. 1999). Additionally, we note that Norton’s state law
claims were dismissed solely due to the absence of a cognizable
federal claim; as we reinstate the federal claim against Rosier,
dismissal of the pendent state law claims on this basis cannot
stand. In reinstating Norton’s state law claims, we express no
opinion as to the merits of these claims or the propriety of
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over them, leaving that
determination to the district court in the first instance.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment in
part, insofar as it exercises subject matter jurisdiction over
the action and dismisses Norton’s § 1983 claim against the City
of Whiteville; vacate the district court’s judgment in part,
insofar as it dismisses Norton’s § 1983 claim against Rosier and
his pendent state law claims; and remand for further
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proceedings. 2 We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
2 We have reviewed Norton’s supplemental reply briefs but
find no basis for imposing sanctions against Defendants or their
counsel.
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