United States v. John Kanios , 624 F. App'x 97 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6175
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
JOHN KANIOS,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-hc-02188-BR)
Submitted: November 20, 2015 Decided: December 8, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Diana H. Pereira,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John Kanios appeals the district court’s order committing
him to the custody of the Attorney General in accordance with
18 U.S.C. § 4246(d) (2012). We affirm.
A person may be committed under § 4246 “[i]f, after [a]
hearing, the [district] court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental
disease or defect as a result of which his release would create
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d). The
district court’s finding that the Government has established
dangerousness under § 4246 by clear and convincing evidence will
not be overturned on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.
United States v. LeClair, 338 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir. 2003);
United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992).
Dr. Maureen Reardon — a staff psychiatrist at the Federal
Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”) —
evaluated Kanios and issued a report. She concluded that Kanios
suffers from schizophrenia and that his mental illness is such
that his release would pose a substantial risk of bodily injury
to another person or serious damage to the property of another.
Dr. Reardon based her opinion on several observations: Kanios’
symptoms included “prominent paranoia, behavioral disturbances
(e.g., aggression, social withdrawal), probable hallucinations,
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mild thought disorder, and mood disturbances, to include
expressions of overt hostility,” (J.A. 58); * Kanios’ past history
of violence included two incidents of domestic violence,
damaging property, and aggravated burglary; Kanios had an
extensive history with firearms; and Kanios did not have any
support from family or friends. Independent evaluator Dr. Logan
Graddy likewise concluded, after interviewing Kanios and
reviewing relevant records, that Kanios suffers from
schizophrenia and presented several risk factors associated with
an increased risk of future violence.
At a hearing, Dr. Reardon testified as an expert in
forensic psychology. She testified regarding the nature of the
underlying charges against Kanios, the reasons behind her
diagnosis, and Kanios’ mental health history, criminal history,
and institutional adjustment. Finally, Dr. Reardon testified
that an FMC Butner risk-assessment panel concurred in her
opinion that Kanios represented a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another and destruction to the property of another if
released into the community. Based on this testimony and the
expert reports prepared by Dr. Reardon and Dr. Graddy, the
district court found by clear and convincing evidence that
Kanios satisfied the criteria for commitment under § 4246(d).
* “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties.
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Kanios argues on appeal that his substantial dangerousness
was not established by clear and convincing evidence because he
had not received any incident reports at FMC Butner and that the
experts’ conclusions were based on conjecture and speculation.
As Kanios acknowledges, overt acts of violence are not required
to prove substantial dangerousness in a § 4246(d) case. United
States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 673, 677 (8th Cir. 2002).
Additionally, “a finding of ‘substantial risk’ under [§] 4246
may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine possibility
of future harm to persons or property.” United States v.
Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 1990).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in
its determination that Kanios suffers from a mental disease as a
result of which his release would create a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another or serious damage to the property of
another. Kanios has a long history of engaging in violent
conduct, a propensity to possess firearms, symptoms of paranoia,
and is known to make threats. See Williams, 299 F.3d at 677-78
(affirming commitment decision under § 4246 where defendant had
minimal history of violence and problem-free incarceration but
also had underlying convictions evincing potential risk of
danger, harbored vengeful intentions toward certain individuals,
and had periods of incarceration marked by episodes of “bizarre,
defiant and explosive” behavior). And while Kanios attacks Dr.
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Reardon’s report as speculative, it was supported by Dr.
Graddy’s independent conclusions, relied on specific
observations of Kanios’ behavior, and included a detailed
analysis of Kanios’ mental health and criminal history.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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