United States v. George Turner , 608 F. App'x 149 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4870
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GEORGE MICHAEL TURNER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:11-cr-00846-RBH-1)
Submitted: June 25, 2015 Decided: June 29, 2015
Before GREGORY, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John M. Ervin, III, Darlington, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Arthur Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney, Florence,
South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
George Michael Turner pled guilty to possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012),
and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 180 months in
prison. Counsel has filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738(1967), brief, finding no meritorious issues, but questioning
whether: (1) the district court conducted Turner’s plea hearing in
compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and (2) his sentence was
reasonable. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Because Turner did not move in the district court to withdraw
his guilty plea, we review his first issue for plain error. United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525–26 (4th Cir. 2002). In
reviewing the adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this court
should accord deference to the trial court’s decision as to how
best to conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant. United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). Our review
of the record leads us to conclude that the district court
conducted a thorough colloquy, ensuring that Turner’s plea was
knowing and voluntary, and that the plea was supported by an
adequate factual basis. We conclude there was no plain error.
We next review Turner’s sentence for both procedural and
substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We must
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural
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error and then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness
under the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of
any variance from the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Id.
at 51. We presume that a sentence within a properly calculated
advisory Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). A defendant can rebut
this presumption only by showing that the sentence is unreasonable
when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. Id.After reviewing the presentence report and the sentencing
transcript, we conclude that Turner’s statutory mandatory minimum
sentence, imposed within his advisory Guidelines range, is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable and that the district
court properly concluded that Turner was an armed career criminal,
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012). The court listened to both
parties’ arguments, considered the § 3553(a) factors, and
articulated its reasons for giving Turner a sentence within that
range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Turner has not made the showing
necessary to rebut the presumption of reasonableness accorded his
within-Guidelines sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
in this case, including the issue raised in Turner’s pro se
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supplemental brief, ∗ and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Turner, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Turner requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Turner. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
∗ We have held that Turner’s South Carolina burglary
convictions, under S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11-312(A) (2003), are
qualifying felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act, United
States v. Wright, 594 F.3d 259, 266 (4th Cir. 2010), and “we are
bound by prior precedent from other panels in this circuit absent
contrary law from an en banc or Supreme Court decision.” United
States v. Ruhe, 191 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 1999) (citation
omitted). There is no such contrary law.
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