United States v. Randy Jones , 547 F. App'x 186 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4242
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RANDY WESLEY JONES, a/k/a Shabba-J,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever, III,
Chief District Judge. (5:12-cr-00004-D-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2013 Decided: November 21, 2013
Before WYNN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lewis A. Thompson, III, BANZET, THOMPSON & STYERS, PLLC,
Warrenton, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-
Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randy Wesley Jones pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute powder cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and was sentenced to 228 months in prison.
Jones’ counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in counsel’s
view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court committed reversible
error when it accepted Jones’ guilty plea and during Jones’
sentencing hearing. Jones has not filed a pro se supplemental
brief, despite receiving notice of his right to do so, and the
Government has declined to file a responsive brief. We affirm.
The purpose of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy is to
ensure that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily enters the
guilty plea. See United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58 (2002).
Thus, before accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must inform
the defendant of, and determine that he understands the nature
of, the charges to which the plea is offered, any mandatory
minimum penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the
various rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b). The court also must determine whether there is
a factual basis for the plea. Id.; United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
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There is a strong presumption that a defendant’s
guilty plea is binding and voluntary if the Rule 11 hearing was
adequate. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th
Cir. 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea in the district court, we review for
plain error the adequacy of the guilty plea proceeding under
Rule 11. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
2002). “To establish plain error, [Jones] must show that an
error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Jones satisfies
these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Jones has not presented any evidence or argument to
demonstrate plain error. Indeed, the record reveals that the
district court fully complied with Rule 11’s requirements during
the plea colloquy, ensuring that Jones’ plea was knowing and
voluntary, that he understood the rights he was giving up by
pleading guilty and the sentence he faced, and that he committed
the offense to which he was pleading guilty. Jones also
attested during the hearing that he fully understood the
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ramifications of his guilty plea, and that no one made promises
to him outside those made by the Government in his plea
agreement. We conclude that Jones’ plea was knowing, voluntary,
and supported by a sufficient factual basis. Accordingly, we
affirm Jones’ conviction.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an
abuse of discretion standard. See Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 51 (2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d
330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009). This review requires consideration of
both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We first assess whether the
district court properly calculated the advisory Guidelines
range, considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012), analyzed any arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at
49–51; United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–76 (4th Cir.
2010). If the sentence is free of significant procedural error,
we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza–Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010).
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In this case, the district court properly calculated
Jones’ Guidelines range, granted the Government’s substantial
assistance motion, treated the Guidelines as advisory, and
considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, the
record establishes that the district court based Jones’ sentence
on its “individualized assessment” of the facts of the case.
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009).
Accordingly, we conclude that Jones’ sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Jones, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Jones requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jones. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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