United States v. Christopher Harris , 545 F. App'x 222 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4101
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER HARRIS, a/k/a Christopher Todd Harris,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. C. Weston Houck, Senior District
Judge. (2:10-cr-01198-CWH-3)
Submitted: October 25, 2013 Decided: November 4, 2013
Before WILKINSON, AGEE, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis H. Lang, CALLISON TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Nick Bianchi, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Harris pleaded guilty to manufacturing and
possession with intent to distribute marijuana plants pursuant
to a plea agreement. The district court sentenced Harris to 240
months of imprisonment, a variance sentence below the Guidelines
range, and he now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
Harris argues on appeal that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to challenge his career offender status
or investigate his predicate convictions. To prove a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
(1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) “that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Moreover,
we may address a claim of ineffective assistance on direct
appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears
on the record. United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239
(4th Cir. 2006). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and
conclude that Harris has failed to demonstrate that ineffective
assistance of counsel conclusively appears on the record. We
therefore decline to address this argument on direct appeal.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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