Morgan County War Memorial Hospital Ex Rel. Board of Directors of War Memorial Hospital v. Baker , 314 F. App'x 529 ( 2008 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1715
MORGAN COUNTY WAR MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, by and through the
Board of Directors of War Memorial Hospital,
Plaintiff − Appellant,
v.
JENNIFER BAKER; JANET HORNER; SHARON HENDERSHOT; BARBARA
JOHNSON; TANYA MANLEY; HELEN MILLER; CHRISTINE MULLEN; RUTH
SMITH; BERNICE STOTLER; DEE ANN STOTLER; LINDA STOTLER;
BARBARA YOST; TERRY KESECKER; CAROL LAYTON; DIANE WARD;
NANCY WAUGH,
Defendants − Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey,
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00066-JPB)
Argued: September 22, 2008 Decided: November 19, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Mark Edward Kellogg, BECKER, KELLOGG & BERRY, P.C.,
Springfield, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark Jenkinson, BURKE,
SCHULTZ, HARMAN & JENKINSON, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard G. Gay, Nathan P. Cochran, THE LAW
OFFICE OF RICHARD GAY, Berkeley, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Lawrence M. Schultz, BURKE, SCHULTZ, HARMAN & JENKINSON,
Martinsburg, West Virginia; William R. McCune, Jr., Martinsburg,
West Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Morgan County War Memorial Hospital (“War Memorial”),
appeals the dismissal of its declaratory judgment action, which
requested a ruling on War Memorial’s ability to unilaterally
terminate its defined benefit pension plan (“the Plan”) and
retain the Plan’s residual assets,1 for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Because War Memorial’s requested relief does not
depend upon a necessary and substantial question of federal law,
we affirm.
I.
War Memorial is a small community hospital created by the
West Virginia legislature in 1947 and located in Berkeley
Springs, West Virginia. Since its inception, War Memorial has
been owned and operated by the County Commission of Morgan
County. In 1972, prior to the enactment of the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), War Memorial
created the Plan for its employees; that Plan remains in effect
today, although its membership was frozen in 1987. The Plan is
funded wholly by contributions from War Memorial and covers
seventy-three employees. To date, fifty-seven employees have
1
Residual assets “are those assets remaining in a pension
plan at the time of termination after payment to the employees
of all accrued benefits under the plan.” Wilson v. Bluefield
Supply Co., 819 F.2d 457, 458 (4th Cir. 1987).
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taken their retirement benefits under the Plan and sixteen
employees have yet to do so.
In or around 2002, War Memorial decided to terminate the
Plan, disburse the remaining assets, and use the residual Plan
assets—estimated to be in excess of $500,000—to begin funding
the construction of a new hospital building. By June 30, 2002,
all participants were fully vested in the Plan, and War Memorial
forwarded its intention to terminate the Plan to the Internal
Revenue Service (“IRS”). On November 3, 2003, the IRS issued
War Memorial a favorable determination letter, stating that
“termination of this plan does not adversely affect [the Plan’s]
qualification for federal tax purposes.” (J.A. at 230.)
The following year, War Memorial’s Board of Directors
issued Written Consent Resolutions, which authorized termination
of the Plan and distribution of the assets, assuming another
ruling from the IRS “upon termination of the plan, to the effect
that the plan is qualified under Code Section 401(a).” (J.A. at
177.) The IRS issued another favorable determination on October
6, 2005, and, buoyed by this news, on December 5, 2005, War
Memorial informed the remaining sixteen participants of its
intention to terminate the Plan and offered them three options
for claiming their benefits: (1) a lump sum distribution
(subject to income tax withholding); (2) an annuity; or (3) a
tax-free rollover of the lump sum made to an Individual
4
Retirement Account. The sixteen participants rejected these
proposals and claimed a right to all of the Plan assets,
including the residual assets.
In response, War Memorial’s Board of Directors reinstated
the Plan and filed a declaratory judgment action against the
sixteen Plan participants (the “Appellees”) in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. War
Memorial’s six-count complaint requested a declaratory judgment
on War Memorial’s right to unilaterally terminate the Plan,
distribute the assets, and retain the residual assets for its
own use. War Memorial stated that its action arose under ERISA,
the tax laws of the United States, and the district court’s
review of IRS determinations.
The Appellees filed a timely answer, admitting jurisdiction
and venue and asserting counterclaims against War Memorial for
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. See 29 U.S.C.A. §
1104(a)(1) (West 1999). Following discovery, the Appellees
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. In particular, the Appellees alleged that, as a
governmental plan, the Plan was exempt from ERISA under 29
U.S.C.A. § 1003(b)(1) (West 1999). The district court agreed
with the Appellees and, on June 25, 2007, entered an order
granting the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. War Memorial filed a timely notice of appeal, and
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we possess appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291(West 2006).
II.
On appeal, War Memorial argues that the district court
erred in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction
over War Memorial’s complaint. We review questions of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo. Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457,
460 (4th Cir. 1999). War Memorial filed its complaint pursuant
to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201(a) (West
2006), which provides: “In a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction, . . . any court of the United States, upon the
filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
sought.” We have explained that “a claim under the Declaratory
Judgment Act . . . does not confer jurisdiction.” Interstate
Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 249 F.3d 215, 221 n.7 (4th Cir. 2001)
(en banc); see also Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950) (noting that in enacting the
Declaratory Judgment Act “Congress enlarged the range of
remedies available in the federal courts but did not extend
their jurisdiction.”). War Memorial thus contends that
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jurisdiction over its declaratory judgment action is proper
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West 2006).
Section 1331 grants district courts “original jurisdiction
of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331. In
determining whether War Memorial’s complaint satisfies § 1331,
we apply the well-pleaded complaint rule; that is, we
“ordinarily . . . look no farther than the plaintiff’s [properly
pleaded] complaint in determining whether a lawsuit raises
issues of federal law capable of creating federal-question
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.” Custer v. Sweeney, 89
F.3d 1156, 1165 (4th Cir. 1996).
Our application of this rule is slightly different in
declaratory judgment actions. In Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 (1983), the
Supreme Court noted that “[f]ederal courts have regularly taken
original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits in which,
if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action
to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a
federal question.” Accordingly, we have explained that, “if the
declaratory judgment plaintiff is not alleging an affirmative
claim arising under federal law against the declaratory judgment
defendant, the proper jurisdictional inquiry is whether the
complaint alleges a claim arising under federal law that the
7
declaratory judgment defendant could affirmatively bring against
the declaratory judgment plaintiff.”2 Columbia Gas Trans. Corp.
v. Drain, 237 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2001). See also New
Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 329 (5th
Cir. 2008) (noting that, “in applying the well-pleaded complaint
rule we ask whether if the declaratory judgment defendant
brought a coercive action to enforce its rights, that suit would
necessarily present a federal question”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); Samuel C. Johnson 1988 Trust v. Bayfield County,
520 F.3d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
And, “[i]f the answer to this question is yes, federal
question jurisdiction exists.” Columbia Gas, 237 F.3d at 370.
In this regard, the Declaratory Judgment Act permits a party “to
bootstrap its way into federal court by bringing a federal suit
that corresponds to one the opposing party might have brought.”
Household Bank v. JFS Group, 320 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir.
2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
This rule has its limitations, however, because “[a] plaintiff
cannot evade the well-pleaded complaint rule by using the
2
We note that both War Memorial and the Appellees failed to
identify our decision in Columbia Gas Trans. Corp. v. Drain, 237
F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2001) as controlling our inquiry and instead
center their arguments around War Memorial’s declaratory
judgment action. Our analysis follows Columbia Gas, which
provides a straightforward mechanism for applying the well-
pleaded complaint rule to declaratory judgment actions. Id. at
370.
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declaratory judgment remedy to recast what are in essence merely
anticipated or potential federal defenses as affirmative claims
for relief under federal law.” New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry.
Co., 533 F.3d at 329.
War Memorial’s complaint does not contain an “affirmative
claim arising under federal law,” Columbia Gas, 237 F.3d at 370,
so we are left to ask whether the Appellees could bring an
affirmative claim arising under federal law against War
Memorial. In making this inquiry, we are hardly flying blind
because, subsequent to the district court’s dismissal of War
Memorial’s declaratory judgment action, the Appellees filed just
such an action in the Circuit Court for Morgan County, West
Virginia. In that complaint, the Appellees allege a state-law
claim for breach of fiduciary duty against War Memorial.
This fact bodes poorly for War Memorial, because most
lawsuits “arise under the law that creates the cause of action.”
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260
(1916) (Holmes, J.); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478
U.S. 804, 808 (1986). When, as here, the cause of action is
created by state law, we possess jurisdiction only in the “small
class of cases where, even though the cause of action is not
created by federal law, the case’s resolution depends on
resolution of a federal question sufficiently substantial to
arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.A. §
9
1331.” Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799, 806 (4th
Cir. 1996). Thus, “a case may arise under federal law ‘where the
vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on
some construction of federal law,’” Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808(quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9), but “only [if] . . .
the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on a
substantial question of federal law,” Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. at 27-28.
The Supreme Court has summarized the inquiry as follows:
“the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily raise a
stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any
congressionally approved balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue
Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005).
Within the context of this case, War Memorial points us to
what it believes are three necessary sources of federal law—
ERISA, the Internal Revenue Code, and federal common law. We
address each in turn.
A. ERISA
We first consider whether a breach of fiduciary duty claim
by the Appellees necessarily depends upon a substantial issue
involving ERISA. Congress enacted ERISA to “protect . . . the
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their
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beneficiaries, . . . by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries . . . and by
providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal courts.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001(b) (West 1999).
While ERISA’s scope is broad, Congress also chose to exempt
certain benefit plans from compliance with ERISA’s mandates. In
particular, “Title I of ERISA specifically excludes from its
coverage any employee benefit plan that is a governmental plan.”
Gualandi v. Adams, 385 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2004); see also
Cliburn v. Police Jury Ass’n of La., Inc., 165 F.3d 315, 316
(5th Cir. 1999) (noting ERISA is inapplicable to governmental
plans); 29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(b). This governmental plan
exemption is rooted “in part based on principles of federalism.”
Rose v. Long Island R.R. Pension Plan, 828 F.2d 910, 914 (2d
Cir. 1987). In addition:
[I]t was generally believed that public plans were
more generous than private plans with respect to their
vesting provisions, . . . that the ability of the
governmental entities to fulfill their obligations to
employees through their taxing powers was an adequate
substitute for both minimum funding standards and plan
termination insurance. . . . [and] [f]inally, there
was concern that imposition of the minimum funding and
other standards would entail unacceptable cost
implications to governmental entities.”
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
ERISA currently defines a governmental plan as a “plan
established or maintained for its employees by the government of
11
the United States, by the government of any state or political
subdivision thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any
of the foregoing.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(32) (West 1999).
During this litigation, War Memorial has conceded, as it
must, that it is a governmental plan. This concession leads to
the inescapable conclusion that a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against War Memorial does not depend upon ERISA. Our conclusion
is compelled by the simple fact that federal courts have
routinely found that they lack subject matter jurisdiction over
actions by ERISA benefit plan participants against governmental
plans for breach of fiduciary duty and other similar claims for
benefits. See, e.g., Gualandi, 385 F.3d at 245; Fromm v.
Principal Health Care of Iowa, Inc., 244 F.3d 652, 653 (8th Cir.
2001); Cliburn, 165 F.3d at 316. In so ruling, these courts
recognized that Congress specifically declined to intervene in a
state’s decision to fund a pension plan. See Gualandi, 385 F.3d
at 243 (“One Senator commented that ‘State and local governments
must be allowed to make their own determination of the best
method to protect the pension rights of municipal and state
employees.’”). The Appellee’s breach of fiduciary duty claim
against War Memorial simply cannot depend upon the resolution of
any issues involving ERISA because ERISA does not even apply to
governmental plans.
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B. Internal Revenue Code
We also believe that a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against War Memorial does not necessarily depend upon resolution
of substantial questions of federal tax law. War Memorial
correctly notes that it must comply with Title II of ERISA—
actually an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A.
§§ 401 et seq.—which contains requirements pertaining to the
qualification of pension plans for favorable tax treatment. War
Memorial is also correct that the IRS issued two favorable
determination letters regarding War Memorial’s intention to
terminate the Plan. These facts do not, however, permit the
inferential leap that War Memorial would have us make—that the
Appellee’s rejection of War Memorial’s interpretation of the
Plan creates a federal question.
Indeed, War Memorial’s argument here paints too broadly.
Although cliché, it remains true that “nothing can be said to be
certain, except death and taxes.” Letter from Benjamin Franklin
to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 The Writings of
Benjamin Franklin 69 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907). Every
pension plan, family trust, and economic decision must comply
with federal tax laws. As the district court aptly noted during
its oral hearing:
I used to draft trust agreements, you paid attention
to what the IRS rules were. You made sure that it
conformed to IRS rules. But it was your document, and
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the fact that IRS rules governed how you wrote it, I
don’t think makes the interpretation of that document
a federal issue.
(J.A. at 264.)
A breach of fiduciary duty claim against War Memorial
involves interpreting a trust document, the Plan, that is a
creature of state law, and Appellees can prove a breach of
fiduciary duty claim without resolution of any issues of federal
tax law. We have made clear that “[i]f a plaintiff can
establish, without the resolution of an issue of federal law,
all of the essential elements of his state law claim, then the
claim does not necessarily depend on a question of federal law.”
Pinney v. Nokia Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005).
War Memorial places its strongest reliance on the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Grable, but a comparison to Grable
illustrates that this case is “poles apart.” Empire
Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700
(2006). In Grable, the IRS had seized property belonging to
Grable to satisfy a federal tax deficiency. Following an
auction, the IRS sold the property to a third party. Five years
after the fact, Grable sued the third party in state court to
quiet title, contending that the IRS failed to comply with the
federal statute governing notification of parties subject to a
tax deficiency. The Supreme Court found federal jurisdiction
appropriate, noting “[t]he meaning of the federal tax provision
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. . . is an important issue of federal law that sensibly belongs
in a federal court.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 315. The Supreme
Court further noted that the case involved a “pure issue of law”
and the existence of federal jurisdiction would not affect the
federal/state balance because “it is the rare state quiet title
action that involves contested issues of federal law.” Id. at
319.
Perhaps seizing on the fact that the Plan is a “qualified”
plan under the Internal Revenue Code, and Grable was about taxes
as well, War Memorial presses that Grable provides a clear basis
for jurisdiction. We disagree. As the Seventh Circuit recently
explained, “[t]he only contested issue in [Grable] was one of
federal law, and the main effect of the suit if Grable should
prevail would be to require the federal government to reimburse
the parcel’s buyer.” Bennett v. Southwest Airlines Co., 484
F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007). Moreover, any view that Grable
expanded upon the small class of cases recognized in Franchise
Tax Board was “squelched” in Empire Healthchoice. Id. The
Empire Healthchoice Court in fact rejected the specific type of
argument made by War Memorial in this case, explaining that
“Grable emphasized that it takes more than a federal element to
open the arising under door . . . [and] [t]his case cannot be
squeezed into the slim category Grable exemplifies.” Empire
Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701.
15
In Empire Healthchoice the Court explained the factors
underlying its decision in Grable:
The dispute there [1] centered on the action of a
federal agency (IRS) and its compatibility with a
federal statute, [2] the question qualified as
‘substantial,’ and [3] its resolution was both
dispositive of the case and [4] would be controlling
in numerous other cases.
Id. at 700.
Applying these factors in this case makes clear that any
breach of fiduciary duty claim by the Appellees cannot be
squeezed into Grable’s slim category. The current dispute
centers on the actions of private parties, resolution of any
question of federal tax law is not “dispositive” of a breach of
fiduciary duty claim, and it is hard to see how resolution of
any federal tax law issue in this case would be controlling in
“numerous” cases.
At bottom, the fact that federal tax implications may arise
from the distribution of the Plan’s assets, and that the
Appellees rejected a proposed distribution that was approved by
the IRS, cannot be a basis for federal jurisdiction. Such a
conclusion would shift virtually every business transaction and
trust distribution into federal court, violently upsetting the
federal/state balance. To this end, War Memorial points to no
provision of the Internal Revenue Code which provides for such
causes of action. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 319 (noting
16
Congressional failure to provide private right of action
relevant when deciding if finding federal jurisdiction would
“materially affect, or threaten to affect, the normal currents
of litigation”). The fact that the Plan is a “qualified” plan,
standing alone, is simply too thin a hook upon which to rest
federal jurisdiction. Cf. Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp.,
501 F.3d 55 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding no federal
jurisdiction over a state law claim implicating an accounting
rule in the federal tax code); New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co.,
533 F.3d at 338 (rejecting a railroad’s “broad argument . . . to
establish federal jurisdiction on the basis of the general
federal interest in interstate railroad transportation.”).
C. Federal Common Law
Finally, we also believe the Appellees’ breach of fiduciary
duty claim against War Memorial does not depend upon a necessary
and substantial question of federal common law. We start from
the premise that federal common law is an even narrower basis
for federal jurisdiction. Of course, “[i]t is well settled that
[§ 1331] will support claims founded upon federal common law,”
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 850
(1985), and the Supreme Court has suggested that federal
jurisdiction may exist over the extremely small class of cases
governed by federal common law, but only when the operation of
state law would significantly conflict with uniquely federal
17
interests. Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 693 (noting that,
“[u]nless and until” party could demonstrate “a significant
conflict . . . between an identifiable federal policy or
interest and the operation of state law[,] . . . there is no
cause to displace state law, much less to lodge this case in
federal court” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In the
specific context of ERISA, we have indicated federal question
jurisdiction based upon the federal common law may be found
“where the issue in dispute is of ‘central concern’” to the
statute. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d
985, 990 (4th Cir. 1990).
On this point, War Memorial argues that the Plan is not
subject to West Virginia’s analogue to ERISA, the West Virginia
Public Employees Retirement Act, W.Va. Code Ann. § § 5-10-1 to
-55 (2006). That Act covers political subdivisions of West
Virginia which “ha[ve] elected to cover its employees, as
defined in this article, under the West Virginia Public
Employees Retirement System.” W.Va. Code § 5-10-2(17). War
Memorial notes that it did not elect to include its Plan under
the West Virginia Act, and it accordingly contends that this Act
does not apply to the Plan. Thus, argues War Memorial, federal
common law, specifically caselaw interpreting ERISA, must apply
in the absence of an affirmative state law.
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We find significant irony in War Memorial’s position.
Assuming War Memorial is correct that the West Virginia Public
Employees Retirement Act does not govern the Plan or define the
fiduciary duties War Memorial owed the Appellees, a state court
would most likely look to the common law of trusts in deciding
whether War Memorial’s decision to unilaterally terminate the
Plan and retain the residual assets constituted a breach of
fiduciary duty. Of course, many of the rules of decision
interpreting ERISA borrow from the common law of trusts.
Indeed, a fiduciary’s substantive duties under ERISA “draw much
of their content from the common law of trusts, the law that
governed most benefit plans before ERISA's enactment.” Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996). Even today the common
law of trusts “will inform, but will not necessarily determine
the outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA’s fiduciary
duties.” Id. at 497. The federal common law that War Memorial
contends must apply would, more likely than not, be derived from
the common law of trusts.
Moreover, War Memorial cannot show that pursuing this
action in state court would significantly impact unique federal
interests. Instead, the opposite is true: Congress exempted
“governmental plans” from ERISA, indicating a lack of federal
interest in the operation of such plans. To the extent a state
court wishes to look to ERISA for determining how to define a
19
fiduciary’s duty in the context of employee benefit plans, it is
free to do so, without any threat that its action will undermine
federal policy. After all, “state courts correctly apply
federal law every day,” Blue Cross Blue Shield Health Care Plan
v. Gunter, 541 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2008), and West
Virginia has experience addressing just the type of claim raised
by the Appellees here. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Fairmont,
655 S.E.2d 563, 569 (W. Va. 2007) (considering breach of
fiduciary duty claim against an ERISA-exempt governmental plan).
At bottom, War Memorial’s argument that Appellees’ breach
of fiduciary duty claim necessarily depends upon federal common
law turns upside down the entire notion of federal jurisdiction.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They
possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute,
which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(internal citation omitted). “A court is to presume, therefore,
that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and
until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper.” United States
v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008). See also Turner v.
Bank of N. Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 11, 1 L.Ed. 718 (1799)
(same). The absence of relevant state law does not create
federal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we also conclude that
20
Appellees’ breach of fiduciary duty claim does not necessarily
depend upon federal common law.
III.
This case centers around War Memorial’s attempt to
unilaterally terminate an ERISA-exempt plan and keep the Plan’s
residual assets for its own uses. It is “basically a state case
gone awry,” Waybright v. Frederick County, 528 F.3d 199, 209
(4th Cir. 2008), and we believe West Virginia state courts have
the right to resolve this dispute. For the foregoing reasons,
the district court’s decision, dismissing War Memorial’s
declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction, is
AFFIRMED.
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