United States v. Torres , 319 F. App'x 220 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4466
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARIO ALBERTO TORRES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (2:07-cr-00028-LHT-1)
Submitted: February 26, 2009 Decided: March 23, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Claire J. Rauscher, Raquel K. Wilson, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF
WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mario Alberto Torres pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of distributing methamphetamine, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii) (2006)
(“Count One”), and one count of possession of a firearm during a
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (“Count Two”). The district court
sentenced Torres to a total of 120 months’ imprisonment. Torres
timely appealed. On appeal, Torres alleges that the district
court erred in finding a sufficient factual basis to support his
guilty plea to Count Two.
Before a court may enter judgment on a guilty plea, it
must find a factual basis to support the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(3). The district court “may conclude that a factual basis
exists from anything that appears on the record.” United
States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 660 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). A “stipulated recitation
of facts alone [is] sufficient to support a plea.” United
States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1308 (4th Cir. 1996). In order
to find a factual basis, the court need not establish that a
jury would find the defendant guilty or even that the defendant
is guilty by a preponderance of the evidence. The court must
determine only “that the conduct to which the defendant admits
is in fact an offense under the statutory provision under which
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he is pleading guilty.” United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172,
178-79 n.6 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted) (interpreting an earlier version of Rule 11).
This court reviews “the district court’s finding of a factual
basis for abuse of discretion, and [the court] ‘will not find an
abuse of discretion so long as the district court could
reasonably have determined that there was a sufficient factual
basis based on the record before it.’” United States v.
Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 367 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Mastrapa, 509
F.3d at 660.)
To prove a violation § 924(c)(1) the Government must
establish: 1) that the Defendant committed a crime of violence
or drug trafficking offense; 2) that during the commission of
that offense the Defendant knowingly either used or carried a
firearm, or possessed a firearm; and 3) that the Defendant
either used or carried the firearm “in relation to,” or
possessed the firearm “in furtherance of” the drug trafficking
offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Contrary to Torres’
contention, the evidence supports a finding that he sold the
firearm in relation to the narcotics transaction. See United
States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2000). Our review of
the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in finding a factual basis supported
Torres’ guilty plea to Count Two.
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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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