United States v. Vaughan , 319 F. App'x 283 ( 2009 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4517
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WALTER DEANGELO VAUGHAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:98-cr-00219-REP-l)
Submitted: February 23, 2009 Decided: March 26, 2009
Before TRAXLER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Valencia Roberts-Brower, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg,
United States Attorney, S. David Schiller, Assistant United
States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Walter D. Vaughan pled guilty in March 1999 to being a
drug user in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3)
(2006), and to two counts of misdemeanor possession of marijuana
and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (2006). He was sentenced to
fifteen months on the firearms offense and twelve months on each
of the drug offenses, followed by a term of supervised release.
In April 2008, the district court revoked Vaughan’s supervised
release and imposed a twenty-four month sentence, followed by an
additional two-year term of supervised release. Vaughan
appeals.
Vaughan first claims that the twenty-four month
sentence imposed by the district court was unreasonable. We
will affirm a sentence imposed following revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and is not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437-39 (4th Cir. 2006). While the
district court must consider the Chapter 7 policy statements and
statutory requirements and factors applicable to revocation
sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583 (2006), the district
court ultimately has “broad discretion” to revoke the previous
sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory
maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439 (citation omitted).
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We have reviewed the record and find that the district
court’s sentence, although beyond the advisory guidelines range,
was not unreasonable. The court implicitly considered the
guidelines range and the applicable § 3553(a) factors, and
provided a proper basis for imposing the statutory maximum
sentence; namely, the number and type of violations occurring
within a short time after Vaughan began serving his original
term of supervised release. Accordingly, we affirm as to the
twenty-four month sentence of imprisonment.
Vaughan also claims that the district court erred by
imposing an additional term of supervised release following the
sentence of imprisonment. Because he did not object at
sentencing as to this aspect of the district court’s judgment,
our review is for plain error. United States v. Maxwell, 285
F.3d 336 (4th Cir. 2002). Post-revocation penalties for
violations of supervised release are treated as part of the
penalty for the original conviction. Johnson v. United States,
529 U.S. 694, 700-702 (2000). Thus, the penalties that can be
imposed for revocation relate back to the date of the original
offense.
The version of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) in effect on the
date Vaughan committed the underlying offense read: “[w]hen a
term of supervised release is revoked and the defendant is
required to serve a term of imprisonment that is less than the
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maximum term of imprisonment authorized under subsection (e)(3),
the court may include a requirement that the defendant be placed
on a term of supervised release after imprisonment.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(h) (1998). Thus, the plain language of § 3583(h) in
effect at the time Vaughan committed his underlying offense
permitted reimposition of supervised release only if the
district court imposed less than the maximum prison term for his
supervised release violation.
Because Vaughan received the statutory maximum term of
imprisonment for violating his supervised release, the
imposition of an additional two-year term of supervised release
was plain error that affected his substantial rights. See
Maxwell, 285 F.3d at 342. Accordingly, we exercise our
discretion to correct the error. United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 736 (1993). We vacate this portion of the district
court’s order and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately addressed in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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