United States v. Kalife Crenshaw , 486 F. App'x 379 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4326
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KALIFE CRENSHAW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:11-cr-00456-RDB-1)
Submitted: October 26, 2012 Decided: November 2, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Sapna Mirchandani, Staff
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kalife Crenshaw pled guilty to one count of possession
of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2006), and was sentenced as an armed career criminal to 180
months’ imprisonment, the mandatory minimum sentence prescribed
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2006). Crenshaw appeals his sentence,
arguing that the mandatory minimum sentencing scheme in § 924(e)
conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). We affirm.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo.
United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir. 2010).
Section 924(e)(1) requires a minimum sentence of 180 months’
imprisonment for a violation of § 922(g) by a person with three
or more previous convictions for either violent felonies or
serious drug offenses. Section 3553(a), the general sentencing
statute, sets forth factors for the district court to consider
during sentencing and mandates that a court “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” Section 3551(a)
defines the scope of § 3553(a) so as to eliminate any conflict
with mandatory minimum sentences, providing that sentencing
shall be effected pursuant to § 3553(a) “except as otherwise
specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2006).
Courts have rejected the assertion that § 3553(a)
conflicts with statutorily-mandated sentences, finding that the
“otherwise specifically provided” language of § 3551(a) includes
2
mandatory minimum sentences. E.g., United States v. Sutton, 625
F.3d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Kellum, 356 F.3d
285, 289 (3d Cir. 2004) (mandatory minimum sentences “clearly
fit within the ‘except as otherwise specifically provided’
exclusion of 3551(a)”). In addressing a similar issue, we have
likewise recognized that “a district court has no discretion to
impose a sentence outside of the statutory range established by
Congress for the offense of conviction.” United States v.
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005).
Applying this reasoning, we conclude that no conflict
exists between § 3553(a) and the statutorily-imposed mandatory
minimum sentence in § 924(e). Crenshaw’s challenge to his
sentence thus fails. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
3