First American Title Insurance v. Western Surety Company , 491 F. App'x 371 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1802
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
FIRST ALLIANCE TITLE, INCORPORATED,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:09-cv-00403-LO-IDD)
Argued: May 12, 2011 Decided: August 8, 2012
Before DUNCAN and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and David C. NORTON,
United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Richard Thomas Pledger, WALLACEPLEDGER, PLLC, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. David H. Cox, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas J. Moran,
Erick F. Seamster, WALLACEPLEDGER, PLLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Paul D. Smolinsky, JACKSON & CAMPBELL, PC,
Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
The factual and procedural background of this case are
discussed in our prior order, First American Title Insurance Co.
v. Western Surety Co., 447 F. App’x 437 (4th Cir. August 2,
2011) (unpublished) (hereinafter “FATIC Cert. Order”). In that
order, we certified to the Supreme Court of Virginia (“SCV”),
pursuant to Rule 5:40 of the Rules of the SCV, the following
three questions:
1. Does the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement
Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.19 et seq.
(recodified at Va. Code Ann. § 55-525.16 et. seq.)
(“CRESPA”) 1 recognize a private cause of action that
may be asserted against a surety and the surety bond
issued pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.21(D)(3)
(recodified at § 55-525.20(B)(3)) by a party other
than the State Corporation Commission?
2. If Question 1 is answered in the negative, does
Virginia law nonetheless permit a cause of action
against a surety and the surety bond issued pursuant
to Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.21(D)(3) (recodified at § 55-
525.20(B)(3)) by the assertion of a common law claim
such as for breach of contract as in this case?
3. If Questions 1 or 2 are answered in the
affirmative, does a title insurance company have
standing, either in its own right or as a subrogee of
its insured, to maintain a cause of action against a
surety and the surety bond issued pursuant to Va. Code
Ann. § 6.1-2.21(D)(3) (recodified at § 55-
525.20(B)(3))?
1
At the time of its promulgation in 1997, CRESPA was
codified at Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.19 et seq. After the entry of
final judgment below, CRESPA was amended and recodified at Va.
Code Ann. § 5-525.16 et seq. Because the former section numbers
were used by the district court in its rulings and the parties
in their briefs, we also utilize them.
3
See generally id.The SCV accepted our certification request and answered all
three questions. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Western Sur.
Co., 722 S.E.2d 637 (Va. 2012). Specifically, the SCV answered
the first question in the negative, concluding that CRESPA does
not itself provide a cause of action against a CRESPA bond. Id.
at 640. In answering the second and third questions, the SCV
first concluded that a common law breach of contract action is
permitted against the surety of a CRESPA bond. Id. at 641-42. It
then held, however, that “FATIC, as SunTrust’s title insurer in
this case, was not one of the parties the CRESPA bond is meant
to protect.” Id. at 642. Thus, FATIC did not “have standing in
its own right to maintain a cause of action against a surety and
the surety bond issued pursuant to [CRESPA].” Id. at 642.
Nonetheless, the SCV recognized that “a title insurance company,
such as FATIC in this case, may have standing as a subrogee of
its insured to maintain a cause of action” against a CRESPA
bond. Id. at 643.
In view of the SCV’s answers to the certified questions, it
is now clear that the district court’s ruling, which was that
FATIC had standing in its own right to maintain a cause of
action against Western Surety, is not correct. The SCV expressly
left open the possibility, however, that FATIC could recover on
4
its alternative theory asserted in Count II, i.e., that it could
recover as a subrogee of its insured, SunTrust.
While this Court could remand the case for the district
court to determine, in the first instance, whether FATIC can
recover as SunTrust’s subrogee, we decline to do so. The
subrogation issue was briefed by the parties as part of the
cross-motions for summary judgment and was also fully briefed
and argued before this Court. 2 Additionally, the three arguments
that Western Surety presents in opposition to FATIC’s
subrogation claim already have been rejected by either this
court or by the SCV. 3
2
See Resp. Br. at 16-18; Reply Br. at 20-24.
3
Western Surety argues the following in opposition to
FATIC’s contention that it is entitled to final judgment now on
its subrogation count: (1) that “no private party may maintain a
cause of action against a CRESPA bond”; (2) SunTrust never had
any rights against the CRESPA bond because “its claim was
strictly related to a defect in title,” and thus there is no
right to the CRESPA bond of subrogation for FATIC to acquire as
subrogee; and (3) as a matter of equity, FATIC should not be
entitled to recover as subrogee because First Alliance acted as
an agent of FATIC. See Reply Br. at 20-21.
The first of these arguments was squarely rejected by the
SCV, the second was rejected by the reasoning of the SCV, see
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 722 S.E.2d at 643 (holding that a
title insurance company “may have standing as a subrogee of its
insured to maintain a cause of action” against a CRESPA bond),
and the third we rejected in our order of certification, just as
the district court did below. See FATIC Cert. Order, 447 F.
App’x at 440 n.4 (noting we would affirm the judgment of the
district court on various issues); J.A. 804-11 (district court’s
opinion explaining reasons why First Alliance was not acting as
FATIC’s agent for purposes of settlement). Thus, we conclude
(Continued)
5
Accordingly, rather than remand the case, we will decide
the subrogation issue on the complete record before us. Jackson
v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1322 (4th Cir. 1993) (“In reviewing the
grant of summary judgment, we can affirm on any legal ground
supported by the record and are not limited to the grounds
relied on by the district court.”). In this case in particular,
in which the proceedings have been ongoing now for several
years, a remand to the district court for initial consideration
of this issue “would be an unnecessary waste of judicial and
litigant resources.” See O'Reilly v. Bd. of Appeals, 942 F.2d
281, 284 (4th Cir. 1991); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (“[I]n reviewing the decision of a lower
court, it must be affirmed if the result is correct although the
lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.
The reason for this rule is obvious. It would be wasteful to
send a case back to a lower court to reinstate a decision which
it had already made but which the appellate court concluded
should properly be based on another ground within the power of
the appellate court to formulate.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).
that none of these grounds bar FATIC’s entitlement to recovery
as a subrogee of SunTrust.
6
Turning to the merits of FATIC’s subrogation claim under
Count II, 4 Virginia law provides that “when any insurer pays an
insured under a contract of insurance which provides that the
insurer becomes subrogated to the rights of the insured against
any other party the insurer may enforce the legal liability of
the other party.” Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-207; see also First Am.
Title Ins. Co., 722 S.E.2d at 642 (quoting same). It is
undisputed, and indeed the SCV recognized in its opinion in this
case, that the title insurance policies between FATIC and
SunTrust expressly render FATIC subrogated to the rights of
SunTrust. Id.; see also J.A. 363, 375 (pertinent language in
policies). Additionally, Virginia has long recognized that an
insurer who pays a loss on an insured’s behalf has an equitable
right to be subrogated to that insured. See First Am. Title Ins.
Co., 722 S.E.2d at 642 (collecting authority); see also, e.g.,
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jewel Tea Co., 118 S.E.2d 646, 649-
50 (Va. 1961) (allowing claim by insurer as subrogee to its
insured).
4
To be clear, we conclude herein that FATIC is entitled to
recover as a subrogee of SunTrust, as asserted in Count II of
its Complaint. We do not award FATIC relief under Count III of
its Complaint, in which it asserted a claim as assignee of First
Alliance, based on a settlement agreement in a separate action.
The district court dismissed Count III and our holding does not
affect that dismissal.
7
In short, FATIC has succeeded to SunTrust’s right to
recover under the CRESPA bond, as recognized by the SCV in this
case. See First Am. Title Ins. Co., 722 S.E.2d at 642-43
(“FATIC, as a subrogee of SunTrust, has succeeded to SunTrust’s
relevant rights . . . [and] may have standing as a subrogee of
its insured to maintain a cause of action against a surety and
the [CRESPA bond].” Id. at 643. Furthermore, as we explained
supra at note 3, we have carefully considered Western Surety’s
arguments to the contrary and find them to be meritless.
Accordingly, we affirm the award of summary judgment by the
district court in favor of First American Title Insurance
Company, although for reasons different than those stated by the
district court.
AFFIRMED
8