Harold Hodge, Jr. v. Douglas Gansler , 547 F. App'x 209 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1994
HAROLD H. HODGE, JR.,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DOUGLAS F. GANSLER, Attorney General, Maryland Department
of State Police; CHRISTOPHER ESNES; LT. RANDY L. STEPHENS;
STATE OF MARYLAND; CALVERT COUNTY, (local government).
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:13-cv-01949-AW)
Submitted: November 21, 2013 Decided: November 25, 2013
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harold H. Hodge, Jr., Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Harold H. Hodge, Jr., appeals the district court’s
order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) civil rights action
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2006) for failure to state a
claim on which relief could be granted, confining his appeal to
the district court’s dismissal of his claim against Defendant
Christopher Esnes for racial profiling 1 in connection with a
traffic stop. We affirm. 2
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a
claim for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted. Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005). Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to
be construed liberally, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151
(4th Cir. 1978), his complaint must contain factual allegations
sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative
1
Although there exists no federal claim for “racial
profiling,” in adherence to our obligation of construing the
filings of a pro se party liberally, Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151,
we construe Hodge’s claim as one for a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2
In his informal appellate brief, Hodge does not present
any specific arguments challenging as error the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint as to his remaining claims and the
remaining Defendants. Accordingly, Hodge has forfeited
appellate review of these issues. 4th Cir. R. 34(b); Wahi v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 562 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir.
2009); Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 430 n.4
(4th Cir. 2004).
2
level” and that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570
(2007). This “plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193
(4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). He must
articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate he has
stated a claim entitling him to relief. Id.
To state a claim under § 1983 for a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff
must allege facts sufficient to show that he has been treated
differently from others with whom he is similarly situated and
the unequal treatment resulted from intentional or purposeful
discrimination. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 654
(4th Cir. 2001). Hodge’s complaint, however, does not
articulate facts demonstrating that a racially discriminatory
intent or purpose was a factor in Esnes’ decisions to stop his
vehicle, to issue a citation for his failure to possess a valid
change-of-address card, or to issue a warning ticket for his
failure to yield the right-of-way. Accordingly, as Hodge did
not state a plausible claim under § 1983 for an equal protection
violation, we affirm the district court’s order. Hodge v.
Gansler, No. 8:13-cv-01949-AW (D. Md. July 18, 2013).
3
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
4