United States v. Christopher Rodriguez-Soriano , 931 F.3d 281 ( 2019 )

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4291
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER RODRIGUEZ-SORIANO, a/k/a Christopher Soriano, a/k/a
Christopher Soriano-Rodriguez,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. (1:17–cr–00197–LO–1)
Argued: January 30, 2019 Decided: July 24, 2019
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, and DUNCAN, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Conviction reversed and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the
opinion, in which Senior Judge Duncan joined. Judge Richardson wrote a dissenting
opinion.
ARGUED: Caroline Swift Platt, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. James L. Trump, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Geremy C. Kamens, Federal Public Defender, Shannon Quill, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellant. G. Zach Terwilliger, United States Attorney, Christopher K. Grieco, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
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GREGORY, Chief Judge:
Christopher Rodriguez-Soriano was found guilty of knowingly making a false
statement to a licensed firearms dealer in the acquisition of a firearm, stating that he was
the actual purchaser of the firearms when he was acquiring them for another individual.
He appeals the district court’s exclusion of proposed expert testimony at trial, as well as
denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal. Rodriguez-Soriano challenges the district
court’s determination that proposed expert testimony related to false confessions,
excluded pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, was not reliable or relevant, and that
the risk of prejudice outweighed its probative value, and thus it was also properly
excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. We conclude that, for the reasons stated
below, we need not determine whether the expert testimony was properly excluded
because the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to independently corroborate
Rodriguez-Soriano’s confession. We therefore reverse the district court’s judgment of
conviction and remand for the entry of a judgment of acquittal.
I.
On July 25, 2015, Rodriguez-Soriano purchased two firearms, a Ruger P95 9mm
pistol and a Beemiller Hi-Point C9 9mm pistol, from a Northern Virginia location of
Gander Mountain Company, a licensed firearms dealer. At the time of purchase,
Rodriguez-Soriano completed Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”) Form
4473, “Report of Multiple Sale or Other Disposition of Pistols and Revolvers,” which
listed him as the purchaser of both firearms. He marked the box indicating that he was
3
the actual buyer of the firearms listed on the form. 1 Gander Mountain completed another
ATF-required document, a “Multiple Sale Summary,” documenting that Rodriguez-
Soriano purchased both firearms in a single transaction.
In November 2016, a Washington, D.C. homicide detective sought the assistance
of the ATF after receiving information that one of the firearms Rodriguez-Soriano
purchased was used in a homicide. Based on this information, ATF Special Agent David
Burkholder and ATF Task Force Officer Kevin McConnell interviewed Rodriguez-
Soriano on two occasions about his gun purchases. 2
Rodriguez-Soriano initially told the agents that the two firearms he purchased
were stolen sometime in late 2015 and described the circumstances surrounding their
theft. According to Rodriguez-Soriano, he didn’t know exactly when they were stolen,
and didn’t notice they were missing until mid-November. At some point during that time
period he found the closet where he kept the guns in disarray, but its condition did not
alert him to the theft. He then revealed to the agents he suspected that a friend had
broken the lock on his basement door to enter and steal the guns, but he didn’t
1
Form 4473 includes the statement, “You are not the actual buyer if you are
acquiring the firearm(s) on behalf of another person. If you are not the actual buyer, the
dealer cannot transfer the firearm(s) to you.” J.A. 178. Rodriguez-Soriano also watched
a short video on straw purchases entitled, “Don’t Lie for the Other Guy.” J.A. 318.
2
At trial, defense counsel objected to Burkholder’s testimony as to what the
detective revealed to him regarding the homicide. The court overruled the objection and
permitted his testimony because it was not offered for the truth of the matter, but rather to
explain why the agents investigated Rodriguez-Soriano’s purchase of the guns. J.A. 192.
4
immediately notice the lock was broken and could not say which of his friends knew he
had firearms. He later identified one, who he referred to as “D.”
When asked why he purchased two guns, Rodriguez-Soriano responded that the
Hi-Point pistol “kept jamming” at the shooting range, so he returned to purchase the other
firearm. The agents immediately knew this statement was false because the ATF forms
documenting the purchase indicated that the two firearms had been purchased in a single
transaction. The agents then “pivoted,” expressing doubt as to the veracity of his story.
J.A. 420. The agents informed Rodriguez-Soriano that straw purchasers often say that
guns they have purchased were stolen and informed him it was a crime punishable by up
to five years in prison to lie to federal agents. They revealed that they knew he had
purchased the guns for someone else because the person had told them so, the situation
was very serious because one of the guns had been used in a homicide, and they were
giving him the opportunity to “come clean.” J.A. 420-21. They characterized the
purchase of the gun as “minimal” compared to what had been done with it, but warned
him about continuing to “go down the path” of lying about the guns being stolen. J.A.
421.
Rodriguez-Soriano then confessed to the agents that he purchased the two 9mm
handguns at the request of an acquaintance named “Ron.” He revealed that Ron
approached him in late May 2015 about buying two handguns for him. Rodriguez-
Soriano did not immediately accept Ron’s offer, but when their paths crossed again,
Rodriguez-Soriano told him, “I can do that favor for you.” Ron gave Rodriguez-Soriano
$650 to buy two guns. After the purchase, Rodriguez-Soriano met Ron and his friend,
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“D,” in the parking lot of a convenience store where Rodriguez-Soriano entered their car,
showed them the guns, and left the guns on the back seat.
After Rodriguez-Soriano confessed, the agents reviewed Form 4473 with him. He
admitted it was his name, information, and mark in the box indicating that he was the
actual buyer of the firearms. At a follow-up interview conducted eighteen days later,
Rodriguez-Soriano confirmed the statements he made in his prior interview. Rodriguez-
Soriano was indicted on one count of knowingly making a false statement to a licensed
firearms dealer in the acquisition of a firearm, stating that he was the actual purchaser of
the firearms when he was acquiring them for another individual, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(A).
Agent Burkholder, an ATF records management employee, and Gander
Mountain’s former general manager, as the representative of the licensed firearms dealer,
testified for the government at trial. But the homicide detective and the men who,
according to Rodriguez-Soriano’s confession, gave him the cash for and took possession
of the guns he purchased did not. The gun used in the homicide was not introduced into
evidence. Rodriguez-Soriano did not present any evidence in response to the
government’s case. He instead moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 29, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction because the only evidence of criminal activity was Rodriguez-Soriano’s own
uncorroborated statement to the ATF agents. The district court denied the motion,
finding that “given the other evidence surrounding his confession,” further corroboration
was not “legally necessary” because the government produced sufficient evidence as to
6
each of the elements of the offense. J.A. 233-34; 239. The jury found Rodriguez-
Soriano guilty of the offense charged.
This appeal followed.
II.
This Court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of the motion for acquittal
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93
(4th Cir. 2001); Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, an appellate court must ask whether “there is substantial evidence, taking the
view most favorable to the Government, to support” the conviction. Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); see also United States v. Kasai, 736 F. App’x 414, 415 (4th
Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Cowden, 882 F.3d 464, 474 (4th Cir. 2018).
“[A]ppellate reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence . . . will be confined “to cases
where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862 (citing Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); see also United States v. Palomino-Coronado, 805 F.3d
127, 130 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 562 U.S. 913 (2010). The government may rely on circumstantial evidence and
inferences, but it still must prove each element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858–59.
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III.
Rodriguez-Soriano contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for
acquittal because the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
We agree. The government presented no evidence other than Rodriguez-Soriano’s
uncorroborated confession that his statement to a licensed firearms dealer regarding the
identity of the actual buyer of the firearms was false.
A.
Section 924(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[W]hoever knowingly makes any false statement or representation with
respect to the information required by [Chapter 44 of Title 18 of the United
States Code] to be kept in the records of a person licensed under this
chapter or in applying for any license or exemption or relief from disability
under the provisions of this chapter . . . shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A).
Section 924(a)(1)(A) prohibits individuals from knowingly making any false
statement or representation with respect to the information required to be kept in the
records of a federally licensed firearms dealer. It applies to “straw purchases,” in which
an ineligible buyer uses a “straw man” to purchase firearms. See United States v. Nelson,
221 F.3d 1206, 1209-10 (11th Cir. 2000) (affirming § 924(a)(1)(A) conviction of
defendants who hired individuals to purchase firearms by falsely representing themselves
to be the actual buyers when defendants supplied the money for the purchases and
intended to possess the firearms). A false statement or representation on an ATF Form
4473 as to the identity of the actual buyer of a firearm constitutes a violation of
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§ 924(a)(1)(A). Nelson, 221 F.3d at 1209–10; United States v. Abramski, 778 F. Supp. 2d
678, 681 (W.D. Va. 2011), aff’d, 706 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013).
To establish a violation of § 924(a)(1)(A), the government must prove: (1) the
dealer was a federally licensed firearms dealer at the time the offense occurred; (2) the
defendant made a false statement or representation in a record that the licensed firearm
dealer was required by federal law to maintain; and (3) the defendant made the false
statement with knowledge of its falsity. United States v. Abramski, 706 F.3d 307, 316–17
(4th Cir. 2013), aff’d, 573 U.S. 169 (2014). Thus, to convict Rodriguez-Soriano under
this statute, it was the government’s burden to prove that he falsely stated to the licensed
firearms dealer that he was purchasing the firearms for himself with the knowledge that
the statement was false. But the government has failed to meet its burden. Rodriguez-
Soriano’s confession, without additional corroborative evidence, was insufficient to find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
B.
“It is a settled principle of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts that a conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the uncorroborated admission
or confession of the accused.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 234 (4th Cir.
2008) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1963)); see also United
States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 672 (4th Cir. 2007) (criminal defendant’s conviction
cannot rest entirely on an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession). The requirement for
corroboration “is rooted in ‘a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in
the realization that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend
9
beyond the words of the accused.’” Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 489 (quoting Smith v. United
States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954)). This is so because “the doubt persists that the zeal of
the agencies of prosecution to protect the peace . . . or the aberration or weakness of the
accused under the strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of the confession.” Id.
at 489 (citing Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1954)). Moreover, “there can
be no conviction of an accused in a criminal case upon an uncorroborated confession,”
where the corroboration “wholly fails to include any substantial evidence of the corpus
delecti.” Yost v. United States, 157 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1946). Thus, courts require
corroboration to “prevent confessions to crimes never committed and ‘convictions based
upon untrue confessions alone.’” Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 234 (quoting Warszower v. United
States, 312 U.S. 342, 347 (1941)). But “since this corroboration rule ‘infringe[s] on the
province of the primary finder of facts, its application should be scrutinized lest the
restrictions it imposes surpass the dangers which gave rise to them.’” Id. (citing Smith,
348 U.S. at 153).
“Independent evidence adequately corroborates a confession if it ‘supports the
essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth;’ the facts
admitted ‘plus the other evidence besides the admission must, of course, be sufficient to
find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 235 (citing Opper, 348 U.S.
at 93); Stephens, 482 F.3d at 672. The corroborative evidence does not have to prove the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance. But there must be
substantial independent evidence that the offense has been committed in the first
instance, and that the evidence as a whole proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
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defendant is guilty. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 235 (citing Smith, 348 U.S. at 156); Kasai, 736
F. App’x at 415. Only after a defendant’s admissions have been corroborated by
sufficient independent evidence may the government “prove the offense through the
statement of the accused.” Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 235; Kasai, 736 F. App’x at 415. “The
government must establish each element of an offense, but may do so ‘by independent
evidence or corroborated admissions,’ and ‘one mode of corroboration is for the
independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense
through the statements of the accused.’” Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 235 (citing Smith, 348 U.S.
at 156).
C.
Applying these legal principles and the appropriate standard of review to the case
at hand, we find that the government has failed to meet its burden to prove that
Rodriguez-Soriano knowingly made a false statement to the firearms dealer as to the
identity of the actual buyer of the firearms. There is no corroboration demonstrating that
the transaction was a straw purchase, and accordingly no substantial independent
evidence that, together with the confession itself, proves Rodriguez-Soriano’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither party refutes that Rodriguez-Soriano was eligible to
acquire firearms at the time he purchased them. And the ATF forms and the testimony of
the representative of the licensed firearms dealer, at best, prove only that he made a
facially legal purchase of two firearms. It was the government’s burden to prove that
Rodriguez-Soriano knowingly committed a crime by falsely stating that he was buying
the guns for himself. The government contends that additional independent evidence
11
presented at trial sufficiently corroborated his confession, and this corroborating
evidence, together with the confession itself, was sufficient to sustain his conviction. We
disagree.
In reaching this conclusion, we find the facts in Stephens, 482 F.3d 669,
particularly instructive. There, an officer on patrol heard four to five gunshots coming
from a nearby street. He turned in the direction of the shots and within thirty seconds
observed a man, later identified as Stephens, crossing the street. Stephens ran when he
saw the officer, and was later apprehended inside a nearby house. The officer retraced
the path of pursuit and found a revolver containing five spent shell casings lying in the
grass near where he first saw Stephens. Id. at 671.
Upon being taken into custody, Stephens was interviewed by two ATF agents. He
told them that approximately two to three months earlier, a local drug dealer known as
“Red” fronted him a quantity of cocaine for which he was to pay $1,500. Stephens was
unable to repay Red because his wife had consumed the cocaine. Stephens heard on the
street that Red intended to kill him because he failed to pay, and later that evening, when
he drove past Red and his associates, someone in the group fired a shot at him. Stephens
retrieved his gun and fired the shots the officer heard at Red’s vehicle, a white Mazda,
when he saw it on the street. Two months after his initial statement to the agents,
Stephens repeated his statement in a proffer to the government. Id.
But when Stephens took the stand in his own defense at trial, he testified that he
had lied to the ATF agents after his arrest and in his proffer. He stated that on the night
in question, he was sitting on his grandmother’s porch when an individual approached
12
and offered to sell him a handgun for $75. Stephens paid $60 for the firearm, and then
walked to a friend’s house where he fired the gun into the air. He explained that he lied
about his association with Red in hopes he would be released on bond, or released so he
could provide information about Red’s drug dealing activities. Stephens denied having
any connection to Red, that he was involved in drug sales, or that he owed anyone for
drugs. Id.
Stephens’ motion for a judgment of acquittal was denied, id. at 672, and a jury
found him guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
of using, carrying, and discharging a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). Id. at 670. But on appeal, this Court reversed,
finding that the evidence was insufficient to corroborate his confession to the ATF agents
and thereby establish his guilt of the offenses. This Court noted that further law
enforcement investigation “might have served to fortif[y]” the truth of Stephens’
confession. But the ATF agent, who was familiar with the city’s drug trade and knew of
a drug dealer named Red who drove a white Mazda, could not establish any connection
between Stephens and Red, and his corroboration of those details from Stephens’
statement did not establish the necessary link between Stephens and Red to prove the two
were engaged in a conspiracy to sell cocaine. Id. at 673.
If Stephens sets the outer bounds of the corroboration rule, the evidence here is
well within it. Here, the government contends that four pieces of evidence corroborate
Rodriguez-Soriano’s confession that he made a straw purchase: (1) the guns he
purchased were no longer in his possession; (2) he lied to the agents about buying the
13
firearms in two separate transactions; (3) he made inconsistent and contradictory
statements about the alleged theft of the guns; and (4) he reaffirmed his confession in a
subsequent interview. The government would have us conclude that under the applicable
standard of review, despite the absence of testimony from the homicide detective and the
other parties involved in the alleged straw purchase, and the government’s failure to
introduce the gun into evidence, it still produced substantial independent evidence that,
together with the evidence as a whole, was sufficient for the jury to find Rodriguez-
Soriano guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. But the government’s argument fails because
all of the evidence the government claims corroborates Rodriguez-Soriano’s confession
arises from his own statements to law enforcement.
At the time Rodriguez-Soriano told the agents he no longer had the guns, Agent
Burkholder had already received information, independent of Rodriguez-Soriano’s
statement, that the gun had been used by a third party in a homicide. But given that
Agent Burkholder’s testimony regarding the use of the gun to commit a murder was not
offered at trial for the truth of the matter asserted, but rather was admitted solely to
explain what prompted the investigation of the gun purchases, the sole evidence at trial
that Rodriguez-Soriano was no longer in possession of the guns arose from Rodriguez-
Soriano’s statement, and therefore was not an independent corroboration of the straw
purchase.
Given the limited purpose for which the jury could consider Agent Burkholder’s
testimony, the remaining evidence the government advances as corroborative is simply
inadequate, as it does not prove that Rodriguez-Soriano knowingly made a false
14
statement. That Rodriguez-Soriano no longer possessed the firearms at the time of the
interview did not itself indicate that he knowingly misrepresented he was the actual
buyer. And while his later, inconsistent explanations as to why he purchased the firearms
or how they were stolen may suggest that he lied to the ATF agents, they do not establish
that he knowingly made a false statement at the time of purchase, as required under
§ 924(a)(1)(A).
The government would also have us construe Rodriguez-Soriano’s statements
made in his subsequent interview as a separate confession, and determine that each
confession corroborates the other. But the government cannot rely on a second
uncorroborated confession as independent evidence corroborating an initial one,
particularly where the second does nothing to “fortif[y] the truth of the confession” by
offering further corroboration that a crime was committed. See Stephens, 482 F.3d at
672-73. And where the only evidence of the corpus delecti is an uncorroborated
confession, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. See Yost, 157 F.2d at 150.
The facts of this case and other cases like it where the “confessions or admissions
constitute[] the only evidence linking [a defendant] to criminal conduct,” demonstrate the
need for the uncorroborated confession rule – “to prevent confessions to crimes never
committed.” Warszower, 312 U.S. at 347. See Stephens, 482 F.3d at 672 (government
presented no evidence other than defendant’s statement to establish his connection to a
drug conspiracy). In Stephens, this Court noted that further investigation by law
enforcement might have fortified the truth of the defendant’s confession. 482 F.3d at
673. Here, it appears that the prosecutor knew the identities of potential corroborating
15
witnesses, yet we can only speculate as to why evidence corroborating Rodriguez-
Soriano’s alleged offense was not presented at his trial. But regardless of the reason, we
conclude that without the necessary corroboration of the confession, the prosecution has
failed to present sufficient independent evidence that a crime was committed, and where,
as here, the prosecutor’s failure to do so is “clear,” see Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862, the
absence of substantial independent evidence cannot sustain the jury’s verdict and requires
reversal. Stephens, 482 F.3d at 673.
IV.
For these reasons, we find that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
support the jury’s verdict. Given that the evidence was insufficient to corroborate
Rodriguez-Soriano’s confession, and thus insufficient to establish his guilt of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt, we decline to address Rodriguez-Soriano’s claim that the
district court erred in refusing to permit the expert proposed testimony regarding false
confessions. We reverse Rodriguez-Soriano’s conviction and remand with instructions to
enter a judgment of acquittal.
CONVICTION
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Historically, juries have given tremendous weight to defendants’ confessions when
determining guilt, often considering them to be incontrovertible evidence. Juries today
continue to do so. For this reason, under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, a
prosecutor seeking to admit a defendant’s out-of-court confession must provide evidence
showing that the confession is trustworthy. But that evidence need not independently
prove the “corpus delicti”—that is, the “body of the crime”—as American common law
once required. Nor must it corroborate every element of the crime at issue. Rather, the
prosecutor need only offer independent evidence that tends to show that the confession is
trustworthy. My colleagues in the Majority rewrite this rule, reviving and expanding the
old corpus delicti doctrine by demanding evidentiary proof, independent of his many
admissions, that Rodriguez-Soriano violated each element of the crime. I respectfully
dissent.
I.
In the seventeenth century, the English courts established a common law rule
requiring the prosecutor in a homicide case to prove the corpus delicti through evidence
other than a defendant’s out-of-court confession. 1 Known as the corpus delicti doctrine,
1
Roman law similarly provided that a judgment could not rest just on a naked
extrajudicial confession, which was considered to be semiplena probatio (i.e., “half
proof”) unless “voluntarily made, in the presence of the injured party, or, if reiterated at
different times in his absence, and persisted in.” 1 SIMON GREENLEAF & SIMON
GREENLEAF CROSWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 217, at 278 (14th ed.
1883); see also Robert E. Ireton, Confessions and Corpus Delicti, 6 DET. L. REV. 92, 93–
94 (1936).
17
the rule sought to ensure that a defendant would not be punished for allegedly killing
someone who was actually alive but missing. 2 To avoid this result, prosecutors seeking
to prove homicide needed corroboration, and the quintessential example has always been
the body of the victim. But requiring a body in every homicide case would have led to
untenable and unjust results. So the prosecution was not always required to provide a
corpse to prove the corpus delicti of a homicide. Captain Green’s Trial, 14 How. St. Tr.
1199, 1246 (Scot. Adm. 1705); see also United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1290
(C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (Story, J.) (noting that categorically requiring a body “would
amount to a universal condonation of all murders committed on the high seas”).
Ultimately, English courts were cautious in adopting the corpus delicti doctrine: some
rejected it altogether, while others applied it only in murder and bigamy prosecutions. 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2070, at 2778–79 (1904); Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti
Aliunde the Defendant’s Confession, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 638, 640 (1955).
Many American courts enthusiastically adopted the corpus delicti doctrine,
expanding it well beyond its historical roots. For instance, they applied it to nonviolent
crimes. See, e.g., Forte v. United States, 94 F.2d 236 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (knowing
interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle). And they expanded the concept of the
2
Some credit Lord Hale as the originator of the doctrine, as he wrote: “I would
never convict any person of murder or manslaughter, unless the fact were proved to be
done, or at least the body found dead.” 2 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONÆ: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 290 (S. Emlyn ed., 1736). Hale
justified his position on two stories where purported murder victims returned to town,
very much alive, after others had been executed for their “murders.” Id. Both stories,
however, involved prosecutions based on circumstantial evidence rather than false
confessions.
18
“corpus delicti” to include not just the physical facts of the crime, but also criminal
agency; in the example of a murder case, not only must the victim be dead, the evidence
must suggest foul play as opposed to a natural or accidental death. See id. at 243–44.
In 1954, the Supreme Court rejected the expanding corpus delicti doctrine. Opper
v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954); see also United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210,
235 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court resolved this question for federal courts by
rejecting the corpus delicti rule . . . .”). The Court instead adopted a more limited
requirement that the prosecution introduce independent evidence that “would tend to
establish the trustworthiness of the [defendant’s] statement.” Opper, 348 U.S. at 93.
This evidence “need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the
corpus delicti.” Id. Instead, it need only “support[] the essential facts admitted
sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth.” Id. Of course, the prosecution must
still produce independent evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt any elements
not addressed by the confession. Id. at 94.
The Court elaborated on the degree of corroboration required in Smith v. United
States, a companion case handed down the same day as Opper. 348 U.S. 147 (1954). It
explained that all “elements of the offense must be established by independent evidence
or corroborated admissions, but one available mode of corroboration is for the
independent evidence to bolster the confession itself and thereby prove the offense
‘through’ the statements of the accused.” Id. at 156. As the Supreme Court would later
explain, “extrinsic proof [is] sufficient which merely fortifies the truth of the confession,
19
without independently establishing the crime charged.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 489 (1963).
The facts of Opper and Smith show just how tenuous this corroborating evidence
can be. In Opper, the defendant was convicted of bribery for paying a government
employee to select his stock of goggles for purchase by the Air Force. The defendant
admitted to the FBI that he had handed the employee cash, but insisted it was merely a
friendly loan. And the prosecution’s independent evidence only proved that the
defendant cashed a check for himself (corresponding to an amount he had admitted he
had given to the employee), that there was contact between the defendant and the
employee, and that the initial rejection of the defendant’s goggles was overturned at the
employee’s urging. This independent evidence tended to support only circumstantially
the defendant’s single admission that he paid the money. The Supreme Court nonetheless
held that there was “substantial independent evidence to establish directly the truthfulness
of [the] petitioner’s admission.” Id. at 93–94. And the jury was therefore justified in
relying on this extrajudicial admission.
The connection in Smith was even more attenuated. There, the defendant was
accused of criminal tax evasion during a five-year period. The government’s case
substantially relied on one statement by the defendant describing his specific net worth at
the beginning of this period—which, if proven, would show that his reported income was
too low to explain his high net worth at the end of this period. The Supreme Court held
that the government had sufficiently corroborated this lone admission in two independent
ways.
20
First, the government had bolstered the admission through his prior tax filings,
which showed only minimal income. 348 U.S. at 157. The Court determined that those
tax filings corroborated another extrajudicial statement by the defendant about his limited
work history, which together adequately corroborated that the defendant had a low net
worth at the beginning of the relevant period. And the general suggestion that he had a
low net worth was enough to corroborate the specific net worth statement to which the
defendant had admitted.
Second, and independently, the Court in Smith held that the government
adequately corroborated his opening net worth by presenting evidence that “tend[ed] to
establish the crime of tax evasion without resort to the net worth computations.” Id. at
158. The government had presented evidence that, during the five-year period, the
defendant and his wife started a business that kept no financial records, opened many
bank accounts, added a lot of money to those bank accounts, and made other substantial
expenditures. The Court noted that these acts “might not, of themselves, suffice to
support a conviction of tax evasion without evidence of a starting point indicating a lack
of funds from which these payments might have come.” Id. at 159. Though these facts
were only loosely related to the net-worth statement that the prosecution sought to
corroborate, the Court still held that this evidence was sufficient. Id.
II.
Here Rodriguez-Soriano was charged with making a false statement about being
the actual purchaser during a firearm purchase in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A).
The elements of this crime require the defendant to (1) knowingly make a false statement
21
or representation (2) to a federal firearms licensee (3) about the information that the law
requires such licensees to keep. Rodriguez-Soriano confessed to all of his conduct in
committing this crime: he admitted that he had agreed to buy two guns for an
acquaintance named Ron, that he bought Ruger and Hi-Point 9mm handguns in July 2015
at Gander Mountain, that he filled out and signed ATF Form 4473 when buying the
handguns (stating that the guns were for himself), and that he gave the two guns to Ron
right after making the purchase.
Evidence independent of his confession confirmed the essential facts to which
Rodriguez-Soriano admitted. This independent evidence confirmed that he did in fact
purchase two guns at the same time, that the guns he bought were Ruger and Hi-Point
9mm handguns, that he did so in July 2015 at Gander Mountain, and that he filled out and
signed ATF Form 4473 when he bought the guns.
Nothing more is required. The independent evidence need not confirm every
detail from the defendant’s admissions. Rather, “independent corroboration of one part
of the statement may corroborate the entire statement.” United States v. Brown, 617 F.3d
857, 863 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Smith, 348 U.S. at 156).
Indeed, we have continually acknowledged that corroborative evidence need not
establish every element of a criminal offense. United States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669,
672 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Waller, 326 F.2d 314, 315 (4th Cir. 1963)).
An element of the crime may be proven entirely based on the defendant’s confession so
long as the confession is otherwise corroborated. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d
110, 118 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that a defendant’s “confession, if proven reliable, may
22
serve as the only evidence reaching the corpus delicti”); United States v. Fujii, 301 F.3d
535, 541 (7th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that “some elements of the offense may be
proven entirely on the basis of” the corroborated confession); United States v. Gravitt,
484 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir. 1973) (“If there is extrinsic evidence tending to corroborate
the confession, the confession as a whole is admissible; and some elements of the offense
may be proven entirely on the basis of a corroborated confession.”); United States v.
Wilson, 436 F.2d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1971) (“[T]o corroborate a confession or admission, it
is unnecessary for the prosecutor to introduce substantial independent evidence of each
element of the offense with which the defendant is charged.”). The independent evidence
need only reinforce the credibility of the defendant’s statement, not independently
establish each element of the offense.
The Majority dismisses all of this, concluding that “[t]here is no corroboration
demonstrating that the transaction was a straw purchase . . . .” Majority Op. at 11. 3 In
doing so, the Majority requires corroboration of Rodriguez-Soriano’s mental state (i.e.,
that he intended to buy the guns for another person). This misconstrues the correct
standard, instead describing a new rule that requires formal proof of a crime’s every
element. But only the essential facts of the confession must be corroborated, not every
3
The Majority’s language is telling: it variously complains that the corroborative
evidence does not “demonstrat[e],” “prove,” and “establish.” Majority Op. at 11, 15. But
the Supreme Court has held that the corroborative evidence need not itself “establish”
anything—it is enough if it “tends to establish” the trustworthiness of the confession by
bolstering its essential facts. Opper, 348 U.S. at 93 (emphasis added); see also Warring
v. United States, 222 F.2d 906, 911 (4th Cir. 1955) (noting that “corroboration is needed
only to allay suspicion of the veracity of the admission”).
23
element of the offense. It is thus of no consequence that he engaged in “a facially legal
purchase.”
And even if corroboration of Rodriguez-Soriano’s mental state is required, we in
fact have independent corroborative facts that tend, though only weakly, to show that he
did not buy the guns for himself. First, consider the simple fact that a 23-year-old
simultaneously bought two inexpensive, interchangeable handguns for over $500. Next,
Rodriguez-Soriano did not produce the guns when the agents arrived to ask about them—
tending to show that he no longer had them, and accordingly, that he never intended to
keep them in the first place. The Majority contends that the prosecution needed
Rodriguez-Soriano’s admission to prove this fact. Not so. It is an objective fact that
agents visited Rodriguez-Soriano and that he did not produce the guns. His admission
was unnecessary to prove that point. Cf. Smith, 348 U.S. at 159 (finding a defendant’s
lack of business records to be corroborative evidence of the crime of tax evasion).
Finally, ATF Form 4473 indirectly corroborates his confession by tending to show the
story he first gave the agents—that a friend broke into his house and stole the guns—was
false. That is because the form shows that he bought both guns together, something he
initially lied about but later admitted. Cf. id. at 157–59 (using a corroborated admission
to corroborate another admission).
Despite all this, the Majority suggests that United States v. Stephens compels us to
overturn the jury’s guilty verdict. Stephens involved a man who confessed to buying
drugs and shooting at a certain drug dealer’s car after being arrested near where several
gunshots were heard. 482 F.3d at 671. But at trial, the man testified that he had lied to
24
law enforcement about shooting at the drug dealer, and instead that he had merely fired a
gun into the air to test it. He was convicted both of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and
of using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. This Court reversed his
convictions, reasoning that there was inadequate corroborative evidence linking him to
the drug trade (or linking him to the drug dealer specifically): there was only evidence
connecting him to the firearm. Id. at 673. We concluded that the evidence that the man
fired a gun outside did not sufficiently support the essential facts of the drug crimes for
which he was convicted. And as such, we found his confession to be uncorroborated.
But while the prosecution in Stephens provided practically no evidence to help establish
the trustworthiness of the man’s initial confession, and no evidence at all that he was
involved in the drug trade, the prosecution here provided independent evidence that
corroborated all of Rodriguez-Soriano’s conduct in committing the crime: the only thing
the prosecution purportedly failed to corroborate was his mental state when he filled out
ATF Form 4473. This corroborating evidence was more than enough to help establish
his candor, and accordingly, his confessions properly supported his conviction.
* * *
A defendant may not be convicted based solely on an uncorroborated confession.
But the law does not require a prosecutor to convict a defendant before a jury may hear
his confession. Instead, the law takes a middle ground between these two extremes,
merely requiring evidence that tends to establish the trustworthiness of the confession.
This rule helps to ensure that defendants are not convicted based on false confessions,
while also not hampering the search for truth with an unreasonable evidentiary burden.
25
As the evidence offered here adequately corroborated Rodriguez-Soriano’s confessions, I
respectfully dissent.
26