United States v. Travis Corbett ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4246
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRAVIS O’BRIAN CORBETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:17-cr-00074-WO-1)
Submitted: October 17, 2019 Decided: October 21, 2019
Before MOTZ and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Travis O’Brian Corbett appeals from the district court’s judgment imposing a 36-
month, above-policy statement range sentence upon revocation of Corbett’s term of
supervised release. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), asserting there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but discussing whether the
district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence. Corbett did not file a pro se
supplemental brief despite receiving notice of his right to do so, and the Government
declined to file a response brief. Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we first must determine whether the sentence is procedurally or
substantively unreasonable.” Id.
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the . . . Chapter Seven policy statements and
the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors,” id. (footnotes and citation omitted),
and “explain[s] why any sentence outside of the [policy statement] range better serves the
relevant sentencing [factors],” id. at 209 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted);
see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012) (specifying the § 3553(a) factors relevant to supervised
release revocation). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the court
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sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive the
sentence imposed[,]” up to the statutory maximum. Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted). Only if a sentence is either procedurally or
substantively unreasonable is a determination then made as to whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Id. at 208.
We find that the district court did not plainly err when it imposed the 36-month
sentence. To the contrary, the district court appropriately heard the parties’ arguments and
allowed Corbett to allocute at length at sentencing, and the court responded to the parties’
arguments and explained the selected sentence in terms of the revocation-relevant statutory
factors. Although counsel raises the reasonableness of Corbett’s sentence as a possible
issue for review, counsel correctly concedes that Corbett’s sentence, which was below the
statutory maximum, is reasonable. The district court thoroughly explained its rationale for
imposing the above-policy statement range sentence, which included that this was
Corbett’s third supervised release violation and the court’s view that only prison time
would prevent Corbett from using narcotics in the future and protect the public from his
future crimes.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Corbett, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Corbett requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
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that a copy thereof was served on Corbett. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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