Alexis Flynn v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Dec 11 2019, 10:07 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Denise L. Turner Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
DTurner Legal LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Jesse R. Drum
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Alexis Flynn, December 11, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1958
v. Interlocutory Appeal from the
Lawrence Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable William G. Sleva,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
47D02-1810-F5-1600
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-1958 | December 11, 2019 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] Police responded to a domestic disturbance at Alexis Flynn’s apartment on
October 1, 2018. While there, officers conducted a protective sweep of the
apartment for the purpose of confirming that it was safe and that any threat to
Flynn was abated. Once inside, they observed contraband sitting in plain view.
The officers immediately exited the apartment and obtained a search warrant.
After obtaining a search warrant, the officers re-entered and conducted a search
of the apartment, finding drug paraphernalia, methamphetamine, and
marijuana. The State subsequently charged Flynn with Level 5 felony
possession of methamphetamine, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, Class B
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia. Prior to trial, Flynn moved to suppress the evidence recovered
during the search of her apartment. This interlocutory appeal follows the denial
of Flynn’s motion to suppress. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On October 1, 2018, members of the Indiana State Police and the Mitchell
Police Department, including Mitchell Police Sergeant Michael Williams,
responded to a domestic disturbance at Flynn’s apartment. Upon arriving at
the apartment, Sergeant Williams made contact with Flynn. Flynn indicated
that she “and her male half had gotten into an argument.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. Flynn
“didn’t know where the male was located. She thought he could possibly be in
the residence, and then she said he might not be and she kept going back and
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forth on her answers.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. Sergeant Williams approached the
apartment and noticed that “the door was cracked open slightly.” Ex. Vol. p. 7.
He could hear a television on inside. Sergeant Williams “knocked on the door
and made an announcement” identifying himself and the other responding
officers as police officers. Ex. Vol. p. 7. The officers “then went into the
residence to perform a protective sweep to make sure that the individual was
not in the residence.” Ex. Vol. p. 7. During the sweep of the apartment, the
officers observed, in plain view, “two methamphetamine smoking pipes” and
what appeared to be a scale in the living room. Ex. Vol. p. 7.
[3] The officers immediately exited the apartment, and Sergeant Williams
requested permission from Flynn to search the apartment. Flynn declined, so
Sergeant Williams obtained a search warrant. During the subsequent search,
the officers recovered the above-mentioned paraphernalia and found
methamphetamine and marijuana as well.
[4] On October 2, 2018, the State charged Flynn with Level 5 felony possession of
methamphetamine, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent, Class B
misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia. On January 3, 2019, Flynn filed a motion to suppress “all
statements made by [Flynn] and any evidence collected as a result of” the
search of the apartment. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 28. The trial court
conducted a hearing on Flynn’s motion on July 2, 2019. On August 14, 2019,
the trial court denied Flynn’s motion to suppress. At Flynn’s request, the trial
court certified the matter for interlocutory appeal.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] Flynn challenges the denial of her motion to suppress. “In reviewing a trial
court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we determine whether substantial
evidence of probative value exists to support the trial court’s ruling.” Duran v.
State, 930 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ind. 2010). “We do not reweigh the evidence and
consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling.” Id.
[6] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens
from state intrusions into their homes. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
“The Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure
has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.” Weis v.
State, 800 N.E.2d 209, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[7] The United States Supreme Court has said that the physical entry
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed. The fundamental purpose of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect the legitimate expectations of
privacy that citizens possess in their persons, their homes and
their belongings. Thus, searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.
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Id. (internal quotations omitted). “However, on occasion the public interest
demands greater flexibility than is offered by the constitutional mandate of the
warrant requirement.” State v. Straub, 749 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001) (internal quotation omitted). “Accordingly, there are some carefully
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” McDermott v. State, 877
N.E.2d 467, 473 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “One exception allows police to
dispense with the warrant requirement in the presence of exigent
circumstances.” Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930, 936 (Ind. 2006). “The warrant
requirement becomes inapplicable where the exigencies of the situation make
the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 936–37.
[8] “Among the well-known exigent circumstances that have justified a warrantless
search or seizure are entries (1) to prevent bodily harm or death; (2) to aid a
person in need of assistance; (3) to protect private property; and (4) to prevent
actual or imminent destruction or removal of incriminating evidence before a
search warrant may be obtained.” McDermott, 877 N.E.2d at 474.
A 911 call generally details emergency or exigent circumstances
requiring swift police action. In these cases, the officers are
responding to rapidly changing or escalating events, and their
initial response is often based on limited information. The
officers cannot properly assess the complaint and the dangers to
those threatened without some limited access to the involved
parties. It is unrealistic to expect officers to wait for threats to
escalate and for violence to become imminent before intervening.
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Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. 2011), adhered to on reh’g, 953 N.E.2d
473 (Ind. 2011).
[9] In Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1068 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), police
responded to two 911 calls for a domestic disturbance. When officers arrived,
they were informed by the alleged victims that Lundquist, the perpetrator, was
thought to be hiding on the property. Id. at 1068–69. Given the nature of the
emergency calls, officers completed a protective sweep of the property in an
attempt to locate Lundquist. Id. at 1069. While conducting this sweep, officers
found marijuana plants growing near the house. Id. Upon review, we noted
that “[a]lthough [the officers] invaded the curtilage of Lundquist’s residence,
[their] intention in doing so was not to search for marijuana, but merely to find
Lundquist. Moreover, the deputies reasonably believed Lundquist was hiding
on the property.” Id.
[10] Similarly, in this case, when the officers entered Flynn’s apartment, their
intention was not to search for drugs or contraband, but merely to ensure
Flynn’s safety by finding the co-participant in the domestic disturbance, who
they reasonably believed could be hiding in the apartment. Again, the officers
responded to Flynn’s apartment because of a reported domestic disturbance.
When they arrived, they were informed that the co-participant in the domestic
disturbance “could possibly be in the residence” but “he might not be.” Ex.
Vol. p. 7. Reasonably believing that Flynn’s co-participant in the dispute could
be inside the apartment, the officers conducted a protective sweep of the
apartment. They entered the apartment for the sole purpose of confirming that
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the apartment was safe and that any threat to Flynn was abated. Once inside
the apartment, the officers observed contraband in plain view. They then
immediately stopped their protective sweep, exited the apartment, and obtained
a search warrant. Only after obtaining the search warrant did officers re-enter
and search the apartment.
[11] We believe that the officers acted reasonably in their efforts to protect Flynn
from potential harm. The facts of this case created an exigent circumstance
sufficient to justify the officers’ warrantless entry into Flynn’s apartment. As
such, we conclude that substantial evidence of probative value exists to support
the trial court’s ruling and affirm the trial court’s denial of Flynn’s motion to
suppress.1
[12] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Robb, J., and Altice, J., concur.
1
We are unconvinced by Flynn’s claim that officers may only conduct a protective sweep following an
arrest. While a protective sweep may, under some circumstances, be an acceptable way to ensure public and
officer safety following an arrest, in this case, the protective sweep was intended to ensure Flynn’s safety after
she was reportedly involved in a domestic disturbance. Requiring officers to refrain from attempting to locate
the co-participant in the domestic disturbance until an arrest has been made would be impractical and
contrary to the general public policy of ensuring the safety of individuals involved in such disturbances.
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