United States v. Seth Ali , 647 F. App'x 268 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4457
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
SETH KAMOSE ALI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:14-cr-00090-FDW-DSC-1)
Submitted: April 21, 2016 Decided: May 4, 2016
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Anne M. Hayes, Cary, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jill
Westmoreland Rose, United States Attorney, Anthony J. Enright,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Seth Kamose Ali appeals his conviction of assault on a
federal officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2012).
On appeal, Ali asserts two errors. First, he argues that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. Second,
he argues that a clerical error exists in the district court’s
judgment and should be corrected. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm Ali’s conviction but remand to correct the judgment’s
clerical error.
We review de novo a denial of a motion for judgment of
acquittal. United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212, 228 (4th Cir.
2016), petition for cert. filed, __ U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Mar. 22,
2016) (No. 15-8637). “The question is whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). In conducting this analysis, we do
not review credibility determinations, which “are within the
sole province of the jury and not susceptible to judicial
review.” United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 863 (4th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
To violate 18 U.S.C. § 111(a), “a defendant must:
(1) forcibly; (2) assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate,
or interfere with; (3) a designated federal officer; (4) while
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engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties
. . . (5) [with] the intent to do the acts specified in the
subsection.” United States v. Arrington, 309 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C.
Cir. 2002) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the only element in dispute is whether Ali intended to
assault Peachey or whether he accidentally closed the car door
on Peachey’s hand.
Peachey testified at trial that he was behind Ali when he
attempted to throw a subpoena into the car through the car door.
Ali slammed the car door shut, but, with Peachey’s hand between
the door and the car frame, the door could not fully close.
Nevertheless, according to Peachey, Ali did not stop pulling on
the door but maintained strong pressure on it, trapping
Peachey’s left hand. Peachey was forced to use his right hand
to attempt to pull the door open. Ali continued to pull the
door shut on Peachey’s hand in an active “tug of war” with
Peachey.
Based on this testimony, a reasonable jury could conclude
that, when Ali realized the door would not close, he formed the
intent to assault Peachey by continuing to force the door closed
on Peachey’s hand. While Ali’s version of events may be equally
plausible, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of
the Government. Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863. Because a reasonable
jury could have determined that Ali intended to assault Peachey,
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we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Ali’s
motion for judgment of acquittal.
Ali also asserts that remand is appropriate to correct a
clerical error. Courts may “at any time correct a clerical
error in a judgment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. The jury found that
Ali did not use a deadly or dangerous weapon when he assaulted
Peachey, but the judgment states that Ali was convicted of
assault on a federal officer with a deadly and dangerous weapon.
The Government concedes this clerical error and agrees that we
should remand the case to correct it. We therefore remand this
matter for the limited purpose of correcting the clerical error
in the judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm Ali’s conviction. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
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