United States v. Toney Wilson, Jr. , 658 F. App'x 183 ( 2016 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 15-4416
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    TONEY LEE WILSON, JR.,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.   William L. Osteen,
    Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00482-WO-1)
    Submitted:   July 1, 2016                 Decided:   July 29, 2016
    Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Tiffany T. Jefferson,
    Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
    DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.     Ripley
    Rand, United States Attorney, Kyle D. Pousson, Assistant United
    States   Attorney,  OFFICE   OF  THE   UNITED STATES  ATTORNEY,
    Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Toney Wilson, Jr.
    pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm as a
    felon in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1).                       Based on Wilson’s
    prior state felony convictions, the district court imposed an
    enhanced sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment under the Armed
    Career Criminal Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e), (“ACCA”).                          On appeal,
    Wilson    argues   that     his     prior    North      Carolina     convictions   for
    breaking and entering do not qualify as predicate felonies under
    ACCA.      Pursuant to this court’s opinion in United States v.
    Barlow, 
    811 F.3d 133
     (4th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
    136 S. Ct. 2041
     (2016), we conclude that Wilson’s breaking and entering
    convictions     under       North     Carolina       law       constitute    predicate
    felonies under ACCA.           We therefore affirm Wilson’s sentence.
    I.
    After Wilson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a
    convicted felon, the district court applied the ACCA sentencing
    enhancement    based      on    Wilson’s        prior    convictions    under    North
    Carolina law.        Those convictions were the following: (1) a May
    2009    conviction    for      felony   robbery         with   a   dangerous   weapon;
    (2) an October 2009 conviction for felony assault with a deadly
    weapon with intent to kill, inflicting serious bodily injury;
    2
    and (3) four August 2014 convictions for breaking and entering
    in violation of 
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54
    (a).
    At sentencing before the district court, Wilson objected to
    his    convictions      for      breaking    and    entering    serving      as    ACCA
    predicates.         The district court overruled Wilson’s objections
    and sentenced        him    to   180   months’      imprisonment.         This    appeal
    timely followed.
    II.
    A.
    This     court       reviews     de        novo   issues      of     statutory
    interpretation.         United States v. Joshua, 
    607 F.3d 379
    , 382 (4th
    Cir.   2010).        This   includes    issues      involving     whether    a    prior
    state conviction qualifies as a predicate felony under federal
    criminal law.        See United States v. Kerr, 
    737 F.3d 33
    , 35 (4th
    Cir. 2013).
    B.
    When he filed his appeal, Wilson argued that he should not
    have been classified as an armed career criminal, reasoning that
    none   of     his   four    convictions      for    breaking   and   entering      were
    punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, as is required
    under ACCA.         See Appellant’s Br. at 7.            However, as Wilson now
    3
    acknowledges, this argument is foreclosed by our decision in
    Barlow. *
    In Barlow, we held that, as a function of state law, all
    North Carolina felonies qualify as predicate felonies for the
    purposes of ACCA.         811 F.3d at 137.                    North Carolina’s Justice
    Reinvestment      Act     of    2011         mandates          terms     of        post-release
    supervision of at least nine months for all convicted felons,
    except those serving sentences of life without parole.                                       N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 15A-1368.2(a); see 811 F.3d at 137.                                     State law
    regards     the   mandatory     post-release             supervision          as    part   of   a
    felon’s maximum term of imprisonment.                          Id. at 140.           Therefore,
    North     Carolina      law    now        exposes        all     felons       to     terms      of
    imprisonment      exceeding         one    year       for     even     the    least    serious
    felony, such as breaking and entering.                        Id. at 138, 140.
    Applying      Barlow      to    this        case,       Wilson’s    maximum       term     of
    imprisonment      exceeded          twelve       months        for     his    breaking        and
    entering     convictions.            Under           North     Carolina       law,     Wilson’s
    breaking and entering violations carry a term of imprisonment of
    six to eight months, followed by a single nine-month term of
    post-release      supervision,            thus       yielding     a     possible       term     of
    imprisonment of seventeen months.                      Here, as in Barlow, the nine
    * See Appellant’s Supp. Br. at 6. Wilson wished to preserve
    his appeal pending the disposition of the petition for a writ of
    certiorari to the Supreme Court in Barlow.     That petition has
    now been denied. 
    136 S. Ct. 2041
     (2016).
    4
    month term of post-release supervision, as a part of a maximum
    term    of     imprisonment,      qualified   Wilson     for       a     sentence
    enhancement under ACCA.          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm
    the district court’s sentence.
    III.
    We    dispense   with    oral   argument    because   the       facts   are
    adequately     presented   in    the   materials   before    the   court,      and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-4416

Citation Numbers: 658 F. App'x 183

Filed Date: 7/29/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023