Wissam Al-Quraishi v. L-3 Services, Incorporated ( 2011 )


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  •                         PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    WISSAM ABDULLATEFF SA’EED AL-           
    QURAISHI,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    ADEL NAKHLA; CACI                          No. 10-1891
    INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED;
    CACI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY,
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendants.
    EARTHRIGHTS INTERNATIONAL,
    Amicus Supporting Appellee.
    
    2          AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    WISSAM ABDULLATEFF SA’EED AL-         
    QURAISHI,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    ADEL NAKHLA,
    Defendant-Appellant,            No. 10-1921
    and
    L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED; CACI
    INTERNATIONAL, INCORPORATED;
    CACI PREMIER TECHNOLOGY,
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendants.
    
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
    Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.
    (8:08-cv-01696-PJM)
    Argued: October 26, 2010
    Decided: September 21, 2011
    Before NIEMEYER, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
    Reversed and remanded with instructions by published opin-
    ion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Shedd
    joined. Judge King wrote a dissenting opinion.
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED           3
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Ari S. Zymelman, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY,
    LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants. Susan L. Burke,
    BURKE PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
    Eric Delinsky, ZUCKERMAN SPAEDER LLP, Washington,
    D.C.; F. Whitten Peters, F. Greg Bowman, WILLIAMS &
    CONNOLLY, LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
    Shereef H. Akeel, AKEEL & VALENTINE, PLC, Troy,
    Michigan; Joseph F. Rice, Frederick C. Baker, Rebecca M.
    Deupree, Meghan S. B. Oliver, MOTLEY RICE LLC, Mt.
    Pleasant, South Carolina; Susan M. Sajadi, Katherine Haw-
    kins, BURKE O’NEIL, LLC, Washington, D.C.; Katherine
    Gallagher, J. Wells Dixon, CENTER FOR CONSTITU-
    TIONAL RIGHTS, New York, New York, for Appellee.
    Richard Herz, Marco Simons, Jonathan Kaufman, EARTH-
    RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
    Supporting Appellee.
    OPINION
    NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
    Seventy-two Iraqis, who were seized in Iraq by the U.S.
    military and detained at various locations throughout Iraq,
    commenced this action against L-3 Services, Inc., a military
    contractor, and one of its employees, Adel Nakhla (collec-
    tively, "L-3 Services"). L-3 Services was retained by the mili-
    tary to provide translation services in connection with
    interrogations of persons detained at various detention sites in
    the Iraq war zone. The plaintiffs allege that L-3 Services’
    employees and military personnel conspired among them-
    selves and with others to torture and abuse them while they
    were detained and to cover up that conduct.
    The factual context alleged in the complaint is, for purposes
    of the issues before us, the same as stated in Al-Shimari v.
    4          AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    CACI International, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 09-1335 (4th Cir.
    Sept. 21, 2011), which we also decide today. There are, how-
    ever, differences between the allegations in the two cases. The
    complaint here states that L-3 Services was hired by the mili-
    tary to provide translation services in connection with interro-
    gations of Iraqi detainees. It alleges, "L-3 translators have
    admitted . . . to participating in interrogations where detainees
    were hit, kept in stress positions until they collapsed, made to
    do push-ups until they collapsed, kept awake for long periods,
    exposed to extreme temperatures and choked by the throat."
    J.A. 64. Moreover, the plaintiffs here were detained not only
    in Abu Ghraib prison but at over 20 different sites in Iraq, all
    staffed by L-3 Services employees.
    L-3 Services filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
    numerous grounds, including law of war immunity; the politi-
    cal question doctrine; federal preemption under Boyle v.
    United Technologies Corp., 
    487 U.S. 500
    (1988), and Saleh
    v. Titan Corp., 
    580 F.3d 1
    (D.C. Cir. 2009); and derivative
    absolute immunity. The district court denied the contractor’s
    motion, concluding, among other things, that this case was
    essentially a civil tort action against a non-governmental
    entity and "[i]n an ordinary tort suit against a non-
    governmental entity, [t]he department to whom this issue has
    been constitutionally committed is none other than our own—
    the Judiciary, which strongly suggests that the political ques-
    tion doctrine does not apply" (internal quotation marks omit-
    ted). J.A. 852. The court also stated that "[t]he grant of
    immunity outlined in Boyle was limited to the principles
    underlying the ‘discretionary function’ exception to the [Fed-
    eral Tort Claims Act]" and that Boyle did not "suggest that all
    of the [Federal Tort Claims Act] exceptions should be incor-
    porated into government contractor immunity." J.A. 874.
    Finally, it concluded that it was too early to dismiss the com-
    plaint on the basis of derivative absolute immunity because
    discovery might end up supporting the plaintiffs’ position that
    "Defendants were not operating under the authority of the
    Government in committing the alleged acts of torture, but
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED           5
    were instead acting of their own volition. If Defendants are
    found to have been acting outside the scope of their contracts
    and not on behalf of the sovereign when they committed the
    allegedly tortious acts, then they would not be entitled to
    derivative sovereign immunity." J.A. 867. See Al-Quraishi v.
    Nakhla, 
    728 F. Supp. 2d 702
    (D. Md. 2010).
    On the contractor’s appeal, we reverse and remand with
    instructions to dismiss this case for the reasons given in Al-
    Shimari v. CACI International. We conclude that the plain-
    tiffs’ state law claims are preempted by federal law and dis-
    placed by it, as articulated in 
    Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8-12
    .
    As an additional issue in this case, the plaintiffs challenge
    our jurisdiction to decide these issues on L-3 Services’ inter-
    locutory appeal. They contend that all of the requirements for
    collateral order review have not been satisfied. See Will v.
    Hallock, 
    546 U.S. 345
    , 349 (2006). They assert that the dis-
    trict court’s order denying L-3 Services’ motion to dismiss
    based on immunity was tentative and incomplete, as the court
    deferred making a decision until the completion of discovery.
    They maintain further that any immunity would depend on a
    resolution on the merits of aspects of the case, especially
    whether L-3 Services complied with military instructions and
    commands.
    L-3 Services responds by arguing that the plaintiffs’ argu-
    ments overlook the fact that the district court’s opinion
    included final determinations that "law of war immunity (i)
    does not apply to government contractors, (ii) does not apply
    to suits brought in U.S. courts, and (iii) does not extend to
    violations of the law of war." Moreover, it argues, to deny
    immunity now would subject it to discovery and perhaps trial,
    against which immunity is designed to protect it. See
    McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 
    502 F.3d 1331
    , 1339
    (11th Cir. 2007). In addition, L-3 Services contends that the
    district court’s order denying its motion to dismiss must be
    reviewed now "to avoid judicial interference with military
    6          AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    discipline and sensitive military judgments" (quoting
    
    McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1339
    , 1340 n.7). And with respect to
    its defenses based on separation of powers and nonjusticia-
    bility, it contends that to the extent that these defenses may
    not be characterized as immunity defenses, for which the
    Supreme Court has clearly authorized immediate appeal, the
    defenses are nonetheless inextricably intertwined with its
    immunity claims, giving us pendent appellate jurisdiction
    over those issues. See Jenkins v. Medford, 
    119 F.3d 1156
    ,
    1159 & n.2 (4th Cir. 1997).
    As a baseline for our discussion, we recognize that jurisdic-
    tion of the courts of appeals extends, as a general matter, only
    to appeals from "final decisions of the district courts of the
    United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (emphasis added); but see
    
    id. § 1292
    (listing exceptions). This proscription, however,
    has long been construed to allow appeals from "orders other
    than final judgments when they have a final and irreparable
    effect on the rights of the parties." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
    Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    , 545 (1949). This construction of
    § 1291 is a "practical" one, recognizing that the "authority of
    the Courts of Appeals to review ‘all final decisions of the dis-
    trict courts’ includes appellate jurisdiction over ‘a narrow
    class of decisions that do not terminate the litigation,’ but are
    sufficiently important and collateral to the merits that they
    should ‘nonetheless be treated as final.’" 
    Will, 546 U.S. at 347
    (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    511 U.S. 863
    , 867 (1994)). Thus, under this collateral order doc-
    trine, the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over an interlocu-
    tory appeal of an order that (1) conclusively determines a
    disputed question, (2) resolves an important issue completely
    separate from the merits of the action, and (3) would be effec-
    tively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 
    Will, 546 U.S. at 349
    .
    The collateral order doctrine is intended to be modest in
    scope so as to prevent it from
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED           7
    overpower[ing] the substantial finality interests
    § 1291 is meant to further: judicial efficiency, for
    example, and the "sensible policy ‘of avoid[ing] the
    obstruction to just claims that would come from per-
    mitting the harassment and cost of a succession of
    separate appeals from the various rulings to which a
    litigation may give rise.’"
    
    Will, 546 U.S. at 350
    (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
    v. Risjord, 
    449 U.S. 368
    , 374 (1981)). Thus, the power of
    courts of appeals does not extend to "appeals, even from fully
    consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards
    final judgment in which they will merge." 
    Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546
    . Rather, appeals under the doctrine are generally confined
    to cases involving a "particular value of a high order," includ-
    ing "honoring the separation of powers, preserving the effi-
    ciency of government and the initiative of its officials, [or]
    respecting a State’s dignitary interests." 
    Will, 546 U.S. at 352
    ;
    see also United States v. Myers, 
    593 F.3d 338
    (4th Cir. 2010).
    The Supreme Court has recognized courts of appeals’ juris-
    diction under the collateral order doctrine in a number of con-
    texts. For example, citing separation-of-powers interests, the
    Court has held that denying the President absolute immunity
    is immediately appealable. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 
    457 U.S. 731
    (1982). Similarly, the Court has recognized that denying Elev-
    enth Amendment immunity is immediately appealable
    because appealability is necessary to protect States’ immunity
    from suit and allow them to avoid both the burdens and the
    indignities of suit. Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
    Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
    506 U.S. 139
    (1993). Likewise, the
    denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable where
    it turns on a question of law because of the public interest in
    allowing government officials to take legitimate action "with
    independence and without fear of consequences." Mitchell v.
    Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 525 (1985) (quoting Harlow v. Fitz-
    gerald, 
    457 U.S. 800
    , 819 (1982)). And the Court has held
    that the denial of a double jeopardy claim is immediately
    8          AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    appealable in order to protect the individual from a second
    trial and the abuse of the government’s superior
    power. Abney v. United States, 
    431 U.S. 651
    (1977).
    Consistent with this line of cases, we conclude that the
    interlocutory appeal in this case falls within that "narrow
    class" of cases that are immediately appealable. First, this
    case presents substantial issues relating to federal preemption,
    separation-of-powers, and immunity that could not be
    addressed on appeal from final judgment. The plaintiffs’ com-
    plaint, in essence, alleges that military functions carried out
    conspiratorially in a war zone by military personnel and civil-
    ian contract employees violated rules and norms adopted for
    those functions by the military. Allowing the case to proceed
    would allow judicial scrutiny of military policies and prac-
    tices in a way that could not be remedied in an appeal from
    the final judgment. Second, the district court effectively deter-
    mined conclusively the question of whether state tort law can
    be applied to a battlefield context. Just as immunity from suit
    must be recognized in the early stages of litigation in order to
    have its full effect, battlefield preemption must also be recog-
    nized in order to prevent judicial scrutiny of an active military
    zone. Third, the disputed questions are collateral to resolution
    on the merits. The issues raised both here and in the district
    court are entirely separate from the merits. Indeed, in reaching
    our decisions here and in Al-Shimari v. CACI International,
    we have accepted as true the plaintiffs’ allegations that the
    defendants engaged in a conspiracy with military personnel to
    torture them, abuse them, and cover up those actions. Fourth
    and finally, and perhaps most important to exercising jurisdic-
    tion in this case, we conclude that the federal preemption doc-
    trine underlying our opinion represents a strong public policy
    interest, where wartime actions within a United States mili-
    tary prison are being challenged in a civilian court under state
    tort law.
    The dissent recognizes that the existence of such a strong
    public policy is "a necessary prerequisite to a collateral order
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED           9
    appeal," but it argues that recognizing the public policy inter-
    est is not the "end of the inquiry." Post, at 13 n.3. Instead, it
    focuses on what it asserts is "‘[t]he crucial question,"
    "‘whether deferring review until final judgment so imperils
    the interest as to justify the costs of allowing immediate
    appeal of the entire class of relevant orders.’" 
    Id. (quoting Mohawk
    Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 
    130 S. Ct. 599
    , 606
    (2009)). Thus, according to the dissent, its position to defer
    final review in this case rests on its conclusion that deferring
    review would not sufficiently imperil the public policy inter-
    est to justify immediate appeal.
    In reaching this conclusion, however, the dissent overlooks
    the fact that the interest presented by this case is not simply
    to prevent liability for government contractors but, more
    broadly and importantly, the "elimination of tort from the bat-
    tlefield, both to preempt state or foreign regulation of federal
    wartime conduct and to free military commanders from the
    doubts and uncertainty inherent in potential subjection to civil
    suit." 
    Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7
    . Relying primarily on traditional
    preemption doctrines and Boyle preemption under the discre-
    tionary functions exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
    post, at 17-18, the dissent fails to recognize that "the nature
    of the conflict in this case is somewhat different from that in
    Boyle," 
    Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7
    . Although the dissent quotes
    from Judge Garland’s dissent in Saleh in order to describe the
    interest at stake, post, at 20-21, the majority opinion in Saleh
    demonstrates that the interest in battlefield preemption is the
    complete eradication of the "imposition per se" of tort law,
    that is the complete removal of even the possibility of suit
    from the 
    battlefield. 580 F.3d at 7
    .
    "Arguments for preemption of state prerogatives are partic-
    ularly compelling in times of war," 
    Saleh, 580 F.3d at 11
    , and
    the interest in freeing military operatives, including contrac-
    tors, from even the specter of applying the different tort laws
    of the 51 States is certainly sufficiently robust to justify the
    costs of allowing an immediate appeal. Just as the immediate
    10         AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    appeal of a denial of qualified immunity is necessary to allow
    public officials to act without fear of consequence and the
    immediate appeal of the denial of a double jeopardy claim is
    necessary to protect an individual from the exertion of an
    unjustified power to prosecute on the part of the government,
    an appeal from the denial of immunity and preemption in the
    battlefield context must be immediately appealable in order to
    insulate the battlefield from the unjustified exertion of power
    by the courts of the 51 States and to free military operatives
    from the fear of possible litigation and the hesitancy that such
    fear engenders. Despite the dissent’s expressed confidence
    that "[t]here is no risk that military personnel will be improp-
    erly haled into court or their depositions taken," post, at 22,
    we do not share this confidence when the complaint alleges
    that these very military personnel conspired with the defen-
    dants in perpetrating the alleged misconduct. We are unwill-
    ing to take that risk when such a compelling interest is
    imperiled.
    For these reasons, we reject plaintiffs’ challenge to our
    jurisdiction; reverse the district court’s order denying L-3 Ser-
    vices’ motion to dismiss; and remand with instructions to dis-
    miss.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    WITH INSTRUCTIONS
    KING, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    Because we lack jurisdiction to decide whether the plain-
    tiffs’ state law torture claims are preempted by federal law, I
    am compelled to dissent. Contrary to the majority’s holding,
    the collateral order doctrine offers no basis for the majority’s
    preemption ruling. Although the district court’s denial of
    immunity to defendant L-3 Services, Inc., under the laws of
    war might afford us jurisdiction to address that discrete issue,
    the majority declines to so resolve this appeal. Rather, the
    majority disposes of the plaintiffs’ state law claims solely on
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED                  11
    the ground that they are preempted by federal law. An inter-
    locutory denial of dismissal for preemption, however, fails to
    satisfy the exacting requirements for collateral order review.
    Moreover, L-3’s assertion of a preemption defense is not suf-
    ficiently interconnected with the immunity issue that both
    ought to be definitively resolved prior to moving forward with
    the litigation. Consequently, the preemption aspect of L-3’s
    appeal should be dismissed.1
    I.
    A.
    The United States military (the "government") contracted
    with L-3 to provide civilian translators to assist with interro-
    gating Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison and approxi-
    mately twenty other government facilities in Iraq. The
    plaintiffs are seventy-two Iraqi citizens who were detained at
    these facilities. According to the operative Second Amended
    Complaint (the "Complaint"), the allegations of which we are
    bound to take as true at this stage of the proceedings, the
    plaintiffs suffered torture and other mental and physical mis-
    treatment at the hands of L-3.
    In particular, L-3’s translators "have admitted . . . to partici-
    pating in interrogations where detainees were hit, kept in
    stress positions until they collapsed, made to do push-ups
    until they collapsed, kept awake for long periods, exposed to
    extreme temperatures and choked by the throat." Complaint ¶
    427.2 In addition, some of the plaintiffs were sexually
    1
    Dismissal obviously would end the appeal without any consideration
    of L-3’s preemption defense. Were I to address the merits thereof, I would
    conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims are not preempted, for the reasons I
    have discussed in my dissenting opinion in our companion case of Al Shi-
    mari v. CACI International, Inc., ___ F. 3d ___, No. 09-1335 (4th Cir.
    Sept. 21, 2011).
    2
    The Complaint is found at J.A. 14-85. (Citations herein to "J.A. ___"
    refer to the contents of the Joint Appendix filed by the parties to this
    appeal.)
    12         AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    assaulted and their genitals abused; others were grossly
    humiliated, threatened with death and rape, and subjected to
    mock executions. See generally 
    id. ¶¶ 9-412.
    The plaintiffs
    assert that their torture and mistreatment were the result of a
    conspiracy among myriad persons, including L-3, its employ-
    ees, and other private contractors. See 
    id. ¶¶ 424-44.
    The con-
    spiracy is alleged to have also involved certain government
    personnel, who, according to the plaintiffs, acted indepen-
    dently of and contrary to government directives. See 
    id. ¶¶ 430-56.
    In accordance with Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Fed-
    eral Rules of Civil Procedure, L-3 moved to dismiss the Com-
    plaint, asserting, among other things: (1) that it was immune
    to suit under the laws of war; (2) that it was otherwise entitled
    to immunity derived from its association with the sovereign;
    and (3) that the suit raised a nonjusticiable political question.
    Prior to the hearing on the motion, the district court invited
    argument on a fourth ground endorsed by the District of
    Columbia Circuit in a case arising out of similar circum-
    stances: that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were preempted,
    having arisen in the context of combat activities conducted in
    the federal interest. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 
    580 F.3d 1
    (D.C.
    Cir. 2009).
    Following the hearing, the district court denied the motion
    to dismiss in all respects. See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F.
    Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2010). In so ruling, the court squarely
    rejected L-3’s threshold argument, observing in part that "[a]
    defendant can only claim immunity under the laws of war if
    its actions comport with the laws of war." 
    Id. at 722.
    The
    court noted that the alleged torture and other despicable acts,
    "if proven, clearly exceed the immunities ordinarily afforded
    to belligerents." 
    Id. at 723.
    The court then ascertained that L-
    3’s entitlement to derivative sovereign immunity — predi-
    cated in part upon whether the company acted within the
    scope of its agreement with the government — could not be
    accurately gauged without access to the written contract,
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED                    13
    which was not before the court at the dismissal stage. See 
    id. at 735.
    With respect to L-3’s argument that the case should be
    dismissed as implicating a political question, the district court
    concluded that the dispute was properly justiciable as "an
    ordinary tort suit against a private entity." 
    Id. at 726
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted). Finally, the court declined to follow
    Saleh, disagreeing with L-3 that the plaintiffs’ state law
    claims were preempted by federal law. 
    Id. at 738-39.
    B.
    The majority treats the district court’s interlocutory ruling
    denying L-3’s motion to dismiss as an appealable collateral
    order within the meaning of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial
    Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    (1949). As the majority recognizes,
    such an order must "[1] conclusively determine the disputed
    question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate
    from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreview-
    able on appeal from a final judgment." Will v. Hallock, 
    546 U.S. 345
    , 349 (2006) (alterations in original) (internal quota-
    tion marks omitted). The majority surmises that all three pre-
    requisites are satisfied here. According to the majority, the
    preliminary denial of Saleh preemption "conclusively" strips
    it of its efficacy in relieving L-3 of the burdens of further liti-
    gation. Ante at 8. The majority says further that "the disputed
    questions are collateral to resolution on the merits," 
    id., evi- dently
    on the assumption that the plaintiffs would be entitled
    to recover should their proof match their allegations.3 More-
    over, the majority characterizes this appeal as "present[ing]
    3
    Apparently mindful of the Will Court’s admonition that a collateral
    issue be not only separate but important, the majority stresses that "the
    federal preemption doctrine underlying our opinion represents a strong
    public policy interest, where wartime actions within a United States mili-
    tary prison are being challenged in a civilian court under state tort law."
    Ante at 8. Although the presence of a "substantial public interest," or
    "some particular value of a high order," is a necessary prerequisite to a
    collateral order appeal, 
    Will, 546 U.S. at 352
    -53, the identification of such
    a public interest is not the end of the inquiry. As the Supreme Court
    explained in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, "[t]he crucial question
    . . . is not whether an interest is important in the abstract; it is whether
    deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to justify
    the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of relevant
    orders." 
    130 S. Ct. 599
    , 606 (2009).
    14          AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    substantial issues relating to federal preemption, separation-
    of-powers, and immunity that could not be addressed on
    appeal from final judgment." 
    Id. at 8.
    As to this last point, the majority characterizes the Com-
    plaint as alleging "that military functions carried out conspira-
    torially in a war zone by military personnel and civilian
    contract employees violated rules and norms adopted for
    those functions by the military." Ante at 8. Permitting the case
    to proceed before the district court would, according to the
    majority, "allow judicial scrutiny of military policies and
    practices in a way that could not be remedied in an appeal
    from the final judgment." 
    Id. at 8.
    The majority therefore con-
    cludes that we possess jurisdiction over the district court’s
    denial ruling, and it reverses and remands the cause for dis-
    missal exclusively on Saleh preemption grounds.4
    II.
    The primary problem with the majority’s approach is that
    the lone underpinning of its substantive ruling — Saleh pre-
    emption — affords no basis whatsoever for its exercise of
    jurisdiction. Although the majority cites several instances
    where denials of various forms of immunity have been found
    to constitute appealable rulings for purposes of the collateral
    order doctrine, see ante at 8-9, a preemption defense is not the
    equivalent of an immunity to suit. Indeed, the accepted princi-
    ples attendant to the doctrine plainly demonstrate that recog-
    nizing the denial of L-3’s preemption defense as a new class
    of collateral order reflects an impermissibly indulgent view of
    appellate jurisdiction.
    4
    The majority concludes specifically "that the plaintiffs’ state law
    claims are preempted by federal law and displaced by it." Ante at 5
    (emphasis added). Accordingly, I do not understand the majority to have
    disturbed that part of the district court’s ruling declining to dismiss the
    plaintiffs’ federal law claims pursuant to the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.
    § 1350. See 
    Al-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 741-60
    .
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED          15
    A.
    The final-judgment rule codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is a
    venerable jurisdictional principle. Although the collateral
    order doctrine imparts a "practical . . . construction" on
    § 1291, Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 
    337 U.S. 541
    ,
    546 (1949), the Supreme Court has charged the appellate
    courts with keeping a tight rein on the Cohen exceptions. We
    are therefore bound to maintain "a healthy respect for the vir-
    tues of the final-judgment rule." Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Car-
    penter, 
    130 S. Ct. 599
    , 605 (2009); see also Will v. Hallock,
    
    546 U.S. 345
    , 350 (2006) ("[W]e have not mentioned apply-
    ing the collateral order doctrine recently without emphasizing
    its modest scope.").
    The Supreme Court’s concern, as expressed through its
    consistent admonitions, is amply justified. First, the appellate
    courts are of limited jurisdiction, and the review of prejudg-
    ment appeals as a matter of course would "undermine[ ] effi-
    cient judicial administration and encroach[ ] upon the
    prerogatives of district court judges, who play a special role
    in managing ongoing litigation." 
    Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605
    (internal quotation marks omitted). A surfeit of interlocutory
    appeals would also subject meritorious lawsuits to "the
    harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from
    the various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from
    its initiation to entry of judgment." Firestone Tire & Rubber
    Co. v. Risjord, 
    449 U.S. 368
    , 374 (1981) (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Moreover, a readily available alternative
    exists: the "safety valve" provided by discretionary interlocu-
    tory review under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is frequently a "better
    vehicle for vindicating [certain] serious . . . claims than the
    blunt, categorical instrument of [a] § 1291 collateral order
    appeal." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 
    511 U.S. 863
    , 883 (1994). Accordingly, the collateral order doc-
    trine should "never be allowed to swallow the general rule
    that a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until
    16        AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    final judgment has been entered." Digital 
    Equip., 511 U.S. at 868
    (citation omitted).
    B.
    1.
    Although a properly appealable collateral order must of
    course satisfy all of the Cohen requirements, its hallmark is
    the encapsulation of a right whose abridgement is "effectively
    unreviewable" should appellate review await final judgment.
    See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press LLC, 
    566 F.3d 164
    , 177
    (5th Cir. 2009) (describing unreviewability as "the fundamen-
    tal characteristic of the collateral order doctrine" (citation
    omitted)). The "critical question" in determining whether the
    right at issue is effectively unreviewable in the normal course
    "is whether the essence of the claimed right is a right not to
    stand trial" — that is, whether it constitutes an immunity from
    suit. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 
    486 U.S. 517
    , 524 (1988)
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Absent an immediate
    appellate review of the denial of an immunity claim, the right
    not to stand trial "would be irretrievably lost." 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). By contrast, if the right at issue is
    one "not to be subject to a binding judgment of the court" —
    that is, a defense to liability — then the right can be vindi-
    cated just as readily on appeal from the final judgment, and
    the collateral order doctrine does not apply. 
    Id. at 527.
    In assessing whether the right sought to be protected consti-
    tutes a true immunity and not merely a defense, "§ 1291
    requires [the court] of appeals to view claims of a ‘right not
    to be tried’ with skepticism, if not a jaundiced eye." Digital
    
    Equip., 511 U.S. at 873
    . As the Supreme Court has cautioned,
    "[o]ne must be careful . . . not to play word games with the
    concept of a ‘right not to be tried,’" Midland Asphalt Corp.
    v. United States, 
    491 U.S. 794
    , 801 (1989), as "virtually every
    right that could be enforced appropriately by pretrial dismissal
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED                     17
    might loosely be described as conferring a right not to stand
    trial," Digital 
    Equip., 511 U.S. at 873
    .
    2.
    The district court’s denial of L-3’s preemption claim falls
    squarely on the side of being a defense to liability and not an
    immunity from suit. In today’s companion case, Al Shimari v.
    CACI International, Inc., ___ F.3d. ___, No. 09-1335, slip op.
    at 8 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011), the majority forthrightly
    acknowledges that the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United
    Technologies Corp., 
    487 U.S. 500
    (1988), from which Saleh
    preemption is derived, "did not rely on any act of Congress
    to animate the preemption" recognized therein. Al Shimari,
    slip op. at 8. Boyle preemption (and, thus, Saleh preemption)
    is, ipso facto, not immunity, which, according to the Supreme
    Court, must be "an explicit statutory or constitutional guaran-
    tee that trial will not occur." Midland 
    Asphalt, 489 U.S. at 801
    (emphasis added).5 Indeed, the only reference to private con-
    tractors in the statute invoked by the majority, the Federal
    Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), expressly excludes such con-
    tractors from the sovereign immunity of the United States. See
    28 U.S.C. § 2671 ("[T]he term ‘Federal agency’ . . . does not
    5
    The Supreme Court has properly dismissed the mistaken notion that
    Midland Asphalt’s "explicit . . . guarantee" requirement is in tension with
    the immediate appealability of an order denying qualified immunity, a
    term that by its inherent equivocalness, appears to connote only an implicit
    guarantee against the burdens of trial. Any tension can only be character-
    ized as chimerical, however, in light of qualified immunity’s "good pedi-
    gree in public law," which more than makes up for its implicitness. Digital
    
    Equip., 511 U.S. at 875
    . The sheer novelty of the majority’s rule deprives
    it of a comparable pedigree. Moreover, the argument that an immunity
    need not be explicit in order for jurisdiction to lie under the collateral
    order doctrine "only leaves [the proponent of jurisdiction] with the unenvi-
    able task of explaining why other rights that might fairly be said to include
    an (implicit) ‘right not to stand trial’ aspect are less in need of protection
    by immediate review, or more readily vindicated on appeal from final
    judgment, than" the right the proponent asserts is an implicit right to be
    free from suit. 
    Id. at 875-76.
    18           AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    include any contractor with the United States."). In these cir-
    cumstances, it is impossible to overstate the violence that the
    majority does to the Court’s explicit guarantee requirement.6
    Two of our sister circuits have concluded that preemption
    — animated by either the FTCA’s exception for discretionary
    functions or its exception for combatant activities — does not
    amount to an immunity from suit. See Rodriguez v. Lockheed
    Martin Corp., 
    627 F.3d 1259
    (9th Cir. 2010) (discretionary
    functions exception); Martin v. Halliburton, 
    618 F.3d 476
    (5th Cir. 2010) (combatant activities exception). The collat-
    eral order doctrine is not applicable because the denial of a
    preemption claim is effectively reviewable on appeal from a
    final judgment. That is, because the right recognized by Boyle
    was merely a "defense to judgment" — and not, like qualified
    immunity, a "right not to be required to go to trial" — nothing
    is irretrievably lost by the lack of an immediate appeal from
    an adverse pretrial ruling. 
    Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1266
    . The
    Ninth Circuit emphasized that Boyle did not devise a new spe-
    cies of immunity, but merely recognized that "‘whether the
    facts establish the conditions for the [government contractor]
    defense is a question for the jury.’" 
    Rodriguez, 627 F.3d at 1265
    (quoting 
    Boyle, 487 U.S. at 514
    ).7
    6
    The majority acknowledges, at least implicitly, that Saleh preemption
    is not immunity, but it nonetheless equates the two for jurisdictional pur-
    poses by insisting that "the denial of immunity and preemption in the bat-
    tlefield context must be immediately appealable . . . to free military
    operatives from the fear of possible litigation and the hesitancy that such
    fear engenders." Ante at 10. The majority thus indicates its agreement with
    the Saleh majority that interlocutory appeals in contractor cases promote
    the public interest in the "‘elimination of tort from the battlefield.’" Ante
    at 9 (quoting 
    Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7
    ). It is, however, difficult to see how the
    majority’s decision accomplishes its stated goal. Abu Ghraib, when the
    plaintiffs were there, was not a "battlefield." There are no allegations of
    armed skirmishes taking place in its corridors; indeed, the facility was
    under secure military control. That being the case, it would have been to
    everyone’s benefit had the civilian contractors given some thought to
    being sued, or hesitated in the slightest before torturing the plaintiffs.
    7
    Indeed, the Boyle Court repeatedly framed the preemption it recog-
    nized as creating a mere defense to liability. See, 
    e.g., 487 U.S. at 507
                AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED                   19
    Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Martin concluded that "the
    combatant activities exception is not subject to a sui generis
    exemption from the ordinary jurisdictional requirements for
    denials of preemption 
    claims." 618 F.3d at 487
    . The court
    acknowledged that Boyle preemption is underpinned by "a
    respect for the interests of the Government in military mat-
    ters," but reasoned that those interests can be safeguarded
    without resort to interlocutory review. 
    Id. at 488.
    For exam-
    ple, a district court "should take care to develop and resolve
    such defenses at an early stage while avoiding, to the extent
    possible, any interference with military prerogatives." 
    Id. Additionally, a
    trial court should consider "limiting discovery
    initially to such defenses" and "certifying orders denying [the]
    defense[ ] where the law is unsettled but, after refinement on
    appeal, might warrant dismissing plaintiffs’ claims." 
    Id. 3. The
    majority is mistaken when it insists that Boyle preemp-
    tion "operates more in effect like sovereign immunity," in that
    it "leaves no federal law addressing the claim." Al Shimari,
    slip op. at 8. To the contrary, the Supreme Court confirmed
    that federal common law governed the underlying dispute in
    Boyle. The Court explained that "we have held that a few
    areas, involving uniquely federal interests, are so committed
    . . . to federal control that state law is pre-empted and
    replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content pre-
    scribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts — so
    called federal common 
    law." 487 U.S. at 504
    (emphasis
    ("The imposition of liability on Government contractors [in the military
    procurement context] will directly affect the terms of Government con-
    tracts."); 
    id. at 511-12
    ("The financial burden of judgments against the
    contractors would ultimately be passed through . . . to the United States
    itself."); 
    id. at 512
    ("[S]tate law which holds Government contractors lia-
    ble for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances
    present a ‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be dis-
    placed.").
    20         AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    added). The Boyle Court then articulated the federal common
    law rule providing military contractors with a complete
    defense against design-defect claims, on condition that they
    satisfy a three-part test. See 
    id. at 512
    .
    Even if the majority were correct in drawing parallels
    between Boyle preemption and sovereign immunity, any
    resemblance would be superficial and of no moment. Though
    Boyle preemption, like sovereign immunity, may be invoked
    to bar state law claims, the encapsulated rights serve distinct
    purposes. State law claims are preempted under Boyle simply
    because imposing liability in such situations is irreconcilable
    with uniquely federal interests. Indeed, in Al Shimari, the
    majority describes Boyle preemption as merely insulating
    contractors "from state law liability where such protection
    was necessary to safeguard uniquely federal interests." Al Shi-
    mari, slip op. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
    The right conferred through federal preemption, in other
    words, is the right not to be bound by a judgment stemming
    from state law duties. By contrast, immunity is a limited pro-
    tection against the burden of litigation altogether. See Mitch-
    ell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 525-27 (1985). Further, as the
    Rodriguez court explained, "[a]lthough the source of the gov-
    ernment contractor defense [recognized in Boyle] is the
    United States’ sovereign immunity," the defense is not itself
    a species 
    thereof. 627 F.3d at 1265
    . Instead, it "is only a cor-
    ollary financial benefit flowing from the government’s sover-
    eign immunity." 
    Id. Accordingly, Boyle’s
    "government
    contractor defense does not confer sovereign immunity on
    contractors," and as such, the denial of the defense is not
    immediately appealable. 
    Id. at 1265
    (internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    It is no answer for the majority to raise the specter of a
    more generalized conflict stemming from the FTCA’s comba-
    tant activities exception. First, any such conflict is not attrib-
    utable to some inherent tension between state law claims and
    AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED                    21
    federal interests, but rather only to the specific test the major-
    ity chooses to adopt. That is, assessing preemption based on
    "the degree of integration that, in fact, existed between" con-
    tractors themselves and the military, rather than simply based
    on the contracts and the military’s regulations, "invite[s] the
    wide-ranging judicial inquiry . . . that the court rightly
    abjures." Saleh v. Titan Corp., 
    580 F.3d 1
    , 34 (D.C. Cir.
    2009) (Garland, J., dissenting).
    Second, assessing collateral order appealability in a cate-
    gorical sense, as the law requires, leads me to conclude that
    the denial of a preemption claim stemming from the comba-
    tant activities exception would not invariably (or even fre-
    quently) entail significant scrutiny of sensitive military issues.8
    Fundamentally, there is little intrusion because the court’s
    inquiry focuses on whether the contractor complied with the
    government’s specifications and instructions, and not the wis-
    dom or correctness thereof. The Boyle and Saleh decisions
    themselves well illustrate the lack of intrusion that would
    result from deferring review until after entry of a final judg-
    ment. Boyle, for example, involved an appeal from a jury ver-
    dict for the plaintiff, while "the two appeals in Saleh reached
    the D.C. Circuit using the normal machinery of §§ 1291 and
    1292(b)." 
    Martin, 618 F.3d at 488
    .
    Indeed, the district court in Saleh had conducted extensive
    discovery "regarding the military’s supervision of the contract
    employees as well as the degree to which such employees
    were integrated into the military chain of 
    command," 580 F.3d at 4
    , with none of the ill effects foretold by the majority.
    It is striking that the government — which presumably can
    8
    Whether to recognize an order as collateral is not "an individualized
    jurisdictional inquiry," but rather is based "on the entire category to which
    a claim belongs." 
    Mohawk, 130 S. Ct. at 605
    . It follows that "the issue of
    appealability under § 1291 is to be determined . . . without regard to the
    chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular justice
    averted, by a prompt appellate court decision." Digital 
    Equip., 511 U.S. at 868
    .
    22           AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    and will look after its own interests — has not sought to inter-
    vene in this litigation. Quite the contrary: the Solicitor Gen-
    eral, writing at the Supreme Court’s invitation in the Saleh
    certiorari proceedings, expressed ambivalence toward the
    Saleh decision, describing it as "unclear and imprecise and,
    depending on how it is read, potentially misguided." Br. of
    United States as Amicus Curiae Opposing Certiorari at 7,
    Saleh v. Titan Corp., No. 09-1313 (U.S. May 2011), cert.
    denied, 
    79 U.S.L.W. 3727
    (June 27, 2011). Notably, despite
    significant discovery in Saleh as to the contractor-military
    relationship, the Solicitor General did not assert that discov-
    ery regarding whether a state law claim is preempted would
    so imperil federal interests as to justify collateral order review.9
    Third, even if sensitive government interests were impli-
    cated here, they would fail to warrant collateral order review.
    As the Fifth Circuit explained in Martin, a district court pos-
    sesses a variety of tools by which it can prevent undue intru-
    sion: limiting discovery to the preemption defense; resolving
    the defense as early as possible; and, where appropriate, certi-
    fying appeal of an order denying the preemption defense for
    appellate review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). There is no
    risk that military personnel will be improperly haled into
    court or their depositions taken in suits against private con-
    tractors, because "[w]here discovery would hamper the mili-
    9
    The majority’s fear that not permitting L-3 to pursue an immediate
    appeal will result in impermissible judicial scrutiny of government poli-
    cies is unfounded. This fear appears to stem from the plaintiffs’ allegation
    of a conspiracy between L-3, its employees, and certain military person-
    nel. The conspiracy allegation, however, does not transform this civil
    action into a challenge to the government’s policy or interests, or into an
    attempt to hold its contractors liable for acting in accord with governmen-
    tal decisions. Just as in Saleh, where some of the plaintiffs alleged a simi-
    lar conspiracy, "there is no allegation, and no evidence, that" the "low-
    level soldiers" alleged to be acting in conspiracy with contractor personnel
    "had any control, de jure or de facto, over the" contractor 
    personnel. 580 F.3d at 20
    (Garland, J., dissenting). As such, these proceedings — like
    Saleh — constitute direct challenges only to "the unlawful and unautho-
    rized actions of private contractors." 
    Id. AL-QURAISHI v.
    L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED                     23
    tary’s mission, district courts can and must delay it." 
    Saleh, 580 F.3d at 29
    (Garland, J., dissenting) (citing, inter alia,
    Watts v. SEC, 
    482 F.3d 501
    , 508-09 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). Other
    procedural and substantive rules, such as Rule 45 of the Fed-
    eral Rules of Civil Procedure and the state secrets doctrine,
    also adequately safeguard protect military interests. See 
    id. at 29
    n.18 (Garland, J., dissenting). Accordingly, just as the
    majority’s concern "does not require across-the-board pre-
    emption," 
    id., even less
    so does it require the recognition of
    a new class of collateral order.
    III.
    A.
    Of the remaining grounds for dismissal before the district
    court, only the denial of immunity under the laws of war
    could afford a basis for L-3 to appeal. The interlocutory
    denial of derivative sovereign immunity did not conclusively
    resolve that issue, in that the court reserved final judgment
    pending production of the contract. See Will v. Hallock, 
    546 U.S. 345
    , 349 (2006) (confining review of non-final orders to
    important issues conclusively determined, separate from the
    merits, and effectively unreviewable if not immediately
    appealed).10 The district court’s rejection of L-3’s political
    10
    Before jurisdiction can be invoked under the collateral order doctrine,
    a district court must issue a "fully consummated decision" that constitutes
    "a complete, formal, and . . . final" resolution of the issue. Abney v. United
    States, 
    431 U.S. 651
    , 659 (1977). In other words, the ruling must be "the
    final word on the subject addressed." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop
    Direct, Inc., 
    511 U.S. 863
    , 867 (1994). An issue has not been conclusively
    determined where a district court "ma[kes] clear that its decision [is] a ten-
    tative one, . . . and that it might well change its mind" after further pro-
    ceedings. Jamison v. Wiley, 
    14 F.3d 222
    , 230 (4th Cir. 1994).
    Fundamentally, a court is entitled to have before it a proper record, suffi-
    ciently developed through discovery proceedings, to accurately assess an
    immunity claim. And a party, even one that eventually is shown to be enti-
    tled to an immunity by such discovery, must submit to the burdens of liti-
    24           AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    question defense fails to satisfy the Will threshold in a differ-
    ent regard, in that the court’s decision is subject to effective
    review following final judgment. See Doe v. Exxon Mobil
    Corp., 
    473 F.3d 345
    , 351 (D.C. Cir. 2007).11 The political
    question defense, albeit premised on the fundamental precept
    of separation of powers, is no different from any other
    defense for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. An order
    denying its applicability at the dismissal stage is appealable
    only if it implicates an immunity from suit. See 
    id. (citing Midland
    Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 
    491 U.S. 794
    , 801
    (1989)).
    B.
    Assuming, arguendo, the appealability of the district
    court’s denial ruling on laws-of-war immunity grounds, we
    yet lack pendent jurisdiction to decide the viability of the
    Saleh preemption defense. See United States v. Wampler, 
    624 F.3d 1330
    , 1335 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he [Supreme] Court
    gation until a court is sufficiently informed to rule. Notwithstanding the
    broad preemptive principle of Saleh v. Titan Corp., 
    580 F.3d 1
    (D.C. Cir.
    2009), the court must have before it the contract to determine whether the
    plaintiffs’ claims are preempted. See Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 
    728 F. Supp. 2d
    702, 741 n.11 (D. Md. 2010) (reasoning that contract could show that
    "‘federal wartime policy-making’ was not behind Defendants’ alleged
    actions," in which case plaintiffs’ "state law claims [would] not intrude
    upon the preempted field").
    11
    In Doe, the D.C. Circuit was confronted with the same argument the
    majority makes here: that the denial of a dismissal motion premised on the
    separation of powers falls under the collateral order doctrine because an
    immediate appellate review "is necessary to protect the executive branch
    from judicial intrusion into sensitive foreign policy matters" that could not
    be remedied on appeal from final 
    judgment. 473 F.3d at 351
    . The D.C.
    Circuit squarely rejected such a mistaken notion, however, explaining that
    while the Supreme Court has "identif[ied] ‘honoring the separation of
    powers’ as a value that could support a party’s interest in avoiding trial,
    [the Court has] only d[one] so while discussing cases involving immu-
    nity." 
    Id. AL-QURAISHI v.
    L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED           25
    has told us that every issue presented in an interlocutory
    appeal must fall within Cohen’s collateral-order exception
    before we may review its merits; the courts of appeals possess
    no ‘pendent’ jurisdiction permitting them to decide collateral
    issues that fail to meet Cohen’s test.") (citing Abney v. United
    States, 
    431 U.S. 651
    , 663 (1977) (quotation marks omitted)).
    As we reiterated most recently in Rux v. Republic of Sudan,
    
    461 F.3d 461
    , 475 (4th Cir. 2006), we have "consistently lim-
    ited [our] application of pendent appellate jurisdiction to the
    two circumstances outlined in" Swint v. Chambers County
    Commission, 
    514 U.S. 35
    , 50-51 (1991). That is, we may
    properly exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction only "(1)
    when an issue is inextricably intertwined with a question that
    is the proper subject of an immediate review[,] or (2) when
    review of a jurisdictionally insufficient issue is necessary to
    ensure meaningful review of an immediately appealable
    issue." 
    Id. Promoting judicial
    efficiency is, in and of itself,
    simply not enough. See 
    id. Neither Swint
    scenario presents itself here. Preemption is
    not "inextricably intertwined with" the question of L-3’s
    immunity under the laws of war because those inquiries are
    wholly distinct. The parties have framed the latter issue as
    prompting an evaluation of the plaintiffs’ status as enemy
    aliens or ordinary foreign nationals, and also necessitating a
    determination of whether wartime immunity may be claimed
    by a defendant alleged to have violated international norms.
    Such considerations stand in stark contrast to those involved
    in resolving the preemption defense, which requires us to dis-
    cern the intent of domestic lawmakers, identify and weigh dis-
    crete state and federal interests, and explore the degree to
    which both may be accommodated. Manifestly, we could
    decide whether the laws of war shield L-3 from submitting to
    further proceedings without having to resolve whether it ulti-
    mately cannot be held liable to the plaintiffs in that the federal
    government’s need to effectively wage war trumps Mary-
    land’s interest in governing the conduct of its citizens.
    26        AL-QURAISHI v. L-3 SERVICES, INCORPORATED
    IV.
    Inasmuch as we are unquestionably bereft of jurisdiction —
    either through direct or corollary means — to reach the pre-
    emption question, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s
    decision to reverse the district court’s judgment on that
    ground.