United States v. Andre Haley , 494 F. App'x 385 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4094
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANDRE HALEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District
Judge. (8:08-cr-00410-AW-1)
Submitted: September 27, 2012 Decided: October 2, 2012
Before KING, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles N. Curlett, Jr., LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Emily Noel Glatfelter, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andre Haley appeals the 100-month sentence imposed on
resentencing 1 following his guilty plea to distribution of fifty
grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006). Counsel for Haley has submitted a brief in
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
certifying that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
requesting that we review the validity of Haley’s conviction and
reasonableness of his sentence. Although advised of his right
to do so, Haley has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
With regard to Haley’s conviction, because Haley did
not challenge the validity of his guilty plea in the district
court, we review only for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524–27 (4th Cir. 2002). Our review of
the record reveals that the district court substantially
complied with the dictates of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and committed
no error warranting correction on plain error review.
Turning, then, to Haley’s sentence, we review a
sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of discretion
1
On the parties’ joint motion, we vacated Haley’s initial
120-month sentence and remanded the case to the district court
for reconsideration of the applicability of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010 (“FSA”).
2
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We
first consider whether the district court committed any
“significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence.” Id. If no procedural error was made, we
review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing]
into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. A
sentence that falls within a properly calculated Guidelines
range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Abu Ali,
528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008); see Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007).
We readily conclude that Haley’s sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. 2 The sentence is
procedurally reasonable inasmuch as the district court properly
calculated the applicable Guidelines range and appropriately
2
The district court’s decision to apply the FSA
retroactively is in accord with the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Dorsey and Hill, which issued more than four months after Haley
was resentenced. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321(2012) (considering the retroactivity of the FSA to pipeline
cases and holding that “the Fair Sentencing Act’s more lenient
penalties [do] apply to those offenders whose crimes preceded
August 3, 2010, but who are sentenced after that date”).
3
explained the sentence in the context of the relevant § 3553(a)
factors. Further, the within-Guidelines sentence is
presumptively substantively reasonable, and we divine no basis
to rebut that presumption.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the amended judgment of the
district court. This court requires that counsel inform Haley,
in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Haley requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Haley. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4