Shaun Hayden v. Paul Butler, Jr. , 667 F. App'x 416 ( 2016 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7676
SHAUN ANTONIO HAYDEN,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PAUL G. BUTLER, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
ALVIN W. KELLER; ROBERT C. LEWIS; ANTHONY E. RAND,
Defendants.
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NORTH CAROLINA PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION; NORTH CAROLINA
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION; NORTH CAROLINA COUNCIL OF CHILD AND
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY; UNC CENTER FOR CIVIL RIGHTS; THE UNC
YOUTH JUSTICE CLINIC; FORMER NORTH CAROLINA JURISTS,
Amici Supporting Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-ct-03123-BO)
Argued: May 10, 2016 Decided: August 1, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Thomas E. JOHNSTON,
United States District Judge for the Southern District of West
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Joseph Finarelli, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Benjamin Steed Finholt,
NORTH CAROLINA PRISONER LEGAL SERVICES, INC., Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Roy Cooper, Attorney General,
NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Mary S. Pollard, NORTH CAROLINA PRISONER LEGAL
SERVICES, INC., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee. John R.
Mills, PHILLIPS BLACK PROJECT, San Francisco, California; Narendra
Ghosh, PATTERSON HARKAVY LLP, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for
Amicus Former North Carolina Jurists. Mark Dorosin, Brent
Ducharme, Elizabeth Haddix, Maryam Al-Zoubi, Third Year Student,
UNC Center for Civil Rights, Tamar Birckhead, Barbara Fedders, UNC
Youth Justice Clinic, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF LAW,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Amici UNC Center for Civil Rights
and UNC Youth Justice Clinic. Daniel J. Westbrook, Susan H.
Nelson, Cashida N. Okeke, NELSON MULLINS RILEY & SCARBOROUGH, LLP,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Amici North Carolina Psychological
Association, North Carolina Psychiatric Association, and North
Carolina Council of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying
his motion for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in
part without prejudice Appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and
directing the parties to present a plan for the means and mechanism
for compliance with the mandates of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48(2010). This Court may exercise jurisdiction only over final
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and certain interlocutory and collateral
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545‒46 (1949). The
district court’s order is not a final order because the court
retained jurisdiction to rule on Appellee’s request for injunctive
relief. See Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902
(2015) (“A final decision is one by which a district court
disassociates itself from a case.” (citation omitted)).
Additionally, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the district
court’s order directing the parties to develop a plan is neither
an immediately appealable injunction nor in the nature of such an
injunction, as it does not present serious consequences that can
only be effectively challenged by immediate appeal. * See U.S. ex
* While the district court’s order technically denied
Appellee’s request for injunctive relief, the denial was without
prejudice and the lower court’s intent was clearly to grant
injunctive relief at some later point. Thus, this cannot be viewed
as a refusal of an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
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rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs., P.C., 198 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir.
1999) (“The [Supreme] Court ha[s] . . . delineated two essential
requirements for determining whether an order in the nature of an
injunction should be appealable as an interlocutory order under
1292(a)(1): that the order be of ‘serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence’ and that it can be ‘effectually challenged’ only by
immediate appeal.” (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S.
79, 84 (1981))). Finally, the district court’s order is not an
appealable collateral order because it addressed issues that are
central to the merits of this action. See Will v. Hallock, 546
U.S. 345, 349 (2006) (“[T]he collateral order doctrine
accommodates a ‘small class’ of rulings, not concluding the
litigation, but conclusively resolving ‘claims of right separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action.’” (quoting
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996))). Accordingly, we
dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
DISMISSED
Moreover, neither party challenges the district court’s denial of
injunctive relief in the instant appeal or asserts it as a
jurisdictional basis. Instead, Appellant challenges the lower
court’s order, in part, on the basis that it directs the parties
to develop a plan. Finally, even if Appellant had raised the
denial of an injunction in the instant appeal, this would not be
a basis for jurisdiction because Appellant sought such a denial
before the lower court. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424
U.S. 737, 745 (1976).
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