Hare v. Comcast Cable Communications Management, LLC , 564 F. App'x 23 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1896
GARY HARE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, LLC, a/k/a Comcast,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge.
(1:12-cv-01830-GLR)
Submitted: March 26, 2014 Decided: April 1, 2014
Before GREGORY and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark T. Mixter, THE LAW OFFICES OF MARK T. MIXTER, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Michelle M. McGeogh, Timothy F.
McCormack, BALLARD SPAHR LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Hare appeals from the district court’s orders
denying his motion to compel discovery, denying his motion to
strike Comcast Cable Communications Management’s (“Comcast”)
opposition to the motion to compel, granting attorneys’ fees to
Comcast related to the motions, and granting Comcast’s motion
for summary judgment. Hare alleges that Comcast terminated his
employment on the basis of his race in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e
to 2000e-17 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013). Finding no error in
district court’s rulings, we affirm.
I.
First, Hare challenges the district court’s order
denying his motion to compel discovery and to extend the
discovery deadline. He argues that the testimony he sought was
crucial to his case and that he should not be penalized for
seeking to conduct discovery by consent rather than court order.
District courts are afforded substantial discretion in
managing discovery, and we review a discovery ruling for an
abuse of that discretion. United States ex rel. Becker v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir.
2002). Here, after a lengthy hearing, the district court denied
Hare’s motion to compel, finding that Hare’s failure to depose a
key witness before the discovery deadline was attributable to
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the lack of timely efforts by his own counsel. The court
further found an extension of the discovery deadline was not
warranted because Hare had had several months to secure
discovery, and he failed to seek an extension before discovery
closed. These findings find ample support in the record and
were accordingly well within the lower court’s discretion.
II.
Hare next argues that the district court erred by
denying his motion to strike Comcast’s opposition to his motion
to compel. He contends that certain allegations in the
opposition were not supported by the record and were unrelated
to the motion to compel. Again our review is for abuse of
discretion, see United States v. Coney, 689 F.3d 365, 379 (5th
Cir. 2012), and we find no such abuse in the district court’s
denial of the motion to strike.
III.
Next, Hare challenges the district court’s decision to
award attorneys’ fees and costs for Comcast’s defense of the
motions to compel and to strike, arguing that the motions were
substantially justified. Rule 37(a)(5)(B) provides for an award
of expenses if a motion to compel discovery is denied, unless
“the motion was substantially justified or other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B).
A motion is substantially justified if “a reasonable person
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could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in
law and fact.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565-66 n.2
(1988).
Hare’s motions contained substantial
misrepresentations that went to the heart of his requests to
compel and extend discovery and to strike Comcast’s
opposition. The motions rested on the false and unreasonable
assertion that Hare’s counsel had been denied the opportunity to
conduct the deposition through no fault of his own. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding Comcast its reasonable costs in defending
the intertwined motions to compel and to strike. See Hoyle v.
Freightliners, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 329 (4th Cir. 2011) (standard
of review). In addition, the fee calculations were well
supported by Comcast’s affidavit and detailed hours log, and the
district court did not err in declining to consider Hare’s
untimely opposition.
IV.
Finally, Hare challenges the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Comcast on the Title VII claim. We review
de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710
F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2013). We agree with the district court
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that Hare failed to demonstrate by direct or circumstantial
evidence that race was a motivating factor in his termination.
Nor does the record support Hare’s argument that he was
performing his job in a satisfactory manner at the time of his
termination. See Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d
208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007).
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Hare’s argument that
summary judgment was premature because additional discovery
remained to be completed. As discussed above, Hare had ample
time to complete discovery within the deadline established by a
scheduling order, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion by refusing to extend the time allotted.
V.
Accordingly, we affirm the disputed orders and the
entry of summary judgment for Comcast. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the material before this court and argument will
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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