United States v. Christian Beltran , 550 F. App'x 141 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4407
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTIAN OMAR BELTRAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Danville. Jackson L. Kiser, Senior
District Judge. (4:12-cr-00023-JLK-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2013 Decided: December 31, 2013
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Krysia Carmel Nelson, LAW OFFICES OF KRYSIA CARMEL NELSON, PLC,
Keswick, Virginia, for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United
States Attorney, Ashley B. Neese, Assistant United States
Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christian Omar Beltran was convicted by a jury of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012) (Count One), possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2012) (Count Two), and possession of a firearm
during and in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) (Count Three). Beltran
was sentenced to a total of 168 months of imprisonment. On
appeal, he contends that there was insufficient evidence to
support his § 924(c) conviction and that the district court
erred in denying a two-level sentencing reduction for acceptance
of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 3E1.1 (2012). We affirm.
In February 2012, law enforcement officers conducted a
stop of Beltran’s vehicle. Inside the vehicle officers found a
loaded pistol and a bag containing more than forty pounds of
marijuana. Beltran acknowledged ownership of the firearm, which
had been previously reported as stolen, and admitted that he had
been engaged in the transportation of marijuana for some time.
At trial, Beltran testified that he possessed the firearm solely
for the protection of himself and his family and did not intend
to use it “in furtherance” of his drug trafficking. The jury
convicted Beltran on all three counts.
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At sentencing, the government objected to the
probation officer’s recommendation that Beltran’s acceptance of
responsibility warranted a two-level reduction in his offense
level calculation. The sentencing court sustained the
objection.
Beltran first argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support his § 924(c) conviction. We review the
sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction “by
determining whether there is substantial evidence in the record,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to
support the conviction.” United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83,
93 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2118 (2012). We will not overturn a jury
verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012)
(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 1278 (2013).
To establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the
government must prove that Beltran (1) used, carried or
possessed a firearm (2) in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime or crime of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A);
United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 565 (4th Cir. 2009).
“Furtherance” under § 924(c) means “the act of furthering,
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advancing, or helping forward.” United States v. Lomax, 293
F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). Whether a firearm furthered, advanced, or
helped forward a drug trafficking crime is a question of fact.
Id. Numerous factors might lead a reasonable trier of fact to
find a connection between a defendant’s possession of a weapon
and a drug trafficking crime, including: “the type of drug
activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm,
the type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of
the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is
loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and
circumstances under which the gun is found.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In the present case, Beltran admitted that he was
trafficking over forty pounds of marijuana, which the evidence
established had a wholesale value of approximately $40,000. The
firearm was loaded and was on the passenger-side floorboard,
accessible to Beltran and in close proximity to the marijuana.
Although Beltran had a license to carry a firearm, the pistol
itself was stolen. We conclude that, taken together and in the
light most favorable to the government, sufficient evidence was
adduced at trial to sustain the conviction.
Beltran next argues that the district court erred in
sustaining the government’s objection to an adjustment in his
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Guidelines sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Whether
the district court has the authority to grant such a reduction
is a legal conclusion to be reviewed de novo, United States v.
Hargrove, 478 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2007), but the
determination of whether a defendant is entitled to the
adjustment “is clearly a factual issue and thus reviewable under
a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. White, 875 F.2d
427, 431 (4th Cir. 1989).
Section 3E1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) (2012) provides for a two-level reduction for a
defendant who “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 678
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
held that, “[a]lthough the reduction is not intended to apply to
a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at
trial[,] . . . going to trial does not automatically preclude
the adjustment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see
USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2. However, “[p]ursuant to the Guidelines,
a denial of relevant conduct is inconsistent with acceptance of
responsibility.” Elliott v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 766
(4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). An 18
U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction constitutes relevant conduct for the
purposes of § 3E1.1. Hargrove, 478 F.3d at 201. “[T]he
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
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defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and thus . . . the
determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great
deference on review.” Elliott, 332 F.3d at 761 (internal
quotations omitted).
Our examination of the record convinces us that the
district court did not misapprehend its authority to grant an
acceptance of responsibility reduction, but simply exercised its
discretion to decline to accept the adjustment recommended by
the probation officer. Based on the facts before the district
court, we find no error, clear or otherwise, in the court’s
decision. Therefore, this claim entitles Beltran to no relief.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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