Sylvester Richardson v. Tracy Ray , 492 F. App'x 395 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-6399
SYLVESTER RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WARDEN TRACY RAY; OFFICER J. BELLAMY; OFFICER INGLE;
CAPTAIN MCCOY; LIEUTENANT DAY; OFFICER A. YAUNCE; OFFICER
MULLINS, (Officer Mullins #2 who wears glasses); OFFICER
BELCHER,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
OFFICER B. MULLINS, (Officer Mullins #1); OFFICER SCOTT;
OFFICER BOYD,
Defendants.
No. 12-6593
SYLVESTER RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WARDEN TRACY RAY; OFFICER J. BELLAMY; OFFICER INGLE;
CAPTAIN MCCOY; LIEUTENANT DAY; OFFICER A. YAUNCE; OFFICER
MULLINS, (Officer Mullins #2 who wears glasses); OFFICER
BELCHER,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
OFFICER B. MULLINS, (Officer Mullins #1); OFFICER SCOTT;
OFFICER BOYD,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior
District Judge; Robert Stewart Ballou, Magistrate Judge.
(7:10-cv-00078-JCT-RSB)
Submitted: July 19, 2012 Decided: August 1, 2012
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
No. 12-6399: dismissed; No. 12-6593, affirmed by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Sylvester A. Richardson, Appellant Pro Se. John Michael
Parsons, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Sylvester A. Richardson appeals from the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants in his 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2006) suit (No. 12-6593). He also appeals from the
denial of his discovery request (No. 12-6399). We have reviewed
the record and the district court’s order and considered
Richardson’s arguments, and we affirm the grant of summary
judgment substantially for the reasons stated by the district
court. See Richardson v. Ray, No. 7:10-cv-00078-JCT-RSB (W.D.
Va. Mar. 21, 2012).
In addition, we note that Richardson raised a claim
that prison officials retaliated against him by writing false
disciplinary charges against him. It appears that Richardson
was in fact convicted of these charges because, in his
grievances, he sought to have the “charge” overturned and his
privileges reinstated. Neither the district court nor the
Defendants addressed this claim.
Nonetheless, we find that Richardson’s allegations
were insufficient to state a claim. First, he asserted that he
was charged and punished for covering the window on his cell.
However, he admits that he did, in fact, cover the window in
order to take a “bird bath.” Richardson presented no support
for his claim that he was permitted to cover his window in such
a situation. Moreover, he could and should have presented his
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claims that the charges against him were false at his
disciplinary hearing. He provides no details of the hearing,
does not assert that it was not conducted in accordance with due
process, and does not state whether he appealed. Absent some
evidence or claim that his disciplinary conviction was
improperly obtained, Richardson’s assertions that the initial
charge was false cannot state a claim. See Moore v. Plaster,
266 F.3d 928, 931-33 (8th Cir. 2001) (retaliatory-discipline
claim may proceed where disciplinary action is not supported by
“some evidence”); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 952-53 (2d
Cir. 1986) (holding that, so long as certain procedural
requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified
evidence or misconduct reports, without more, does not state a
claim).
Next, turning to No. 12-6399, Richardson appeals from
the denial of his discovery motion, seeking a videotape of a
2007 incident where he was extracted from his cell and
challenging the validity of a 2009 videotape that was produced
during discovery. Richardson filed his notice of appeal prior
to entry of a final order in the district court.
We may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders
and certain interlocutory and collateral orders. Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). When a
notice of appeal is premature, the jurisdictional defect can be
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cured if the district court enters a final judgment prior to our
consideration of the appeal under the doctrine of cumulative
finality. Equip. Fin. Group, Inc. v. Traverse Computer Brokers,
973 F.2d 345, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1992). However, not all
premature notices of appeal are subject to the cumulative
finality rule; instead, this doctrine applies only if the
appellant appeals from an order that the district court could
have certified for immediate appeal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
In re Bryson, 406 F.3d 284, 287-89 (4th Cir. 2005). Appeals
from “clearly interlocutory decision[s]” like “discovery
ruling[s] or . . . sanction[s]” cannot be saved under cumulative
finality. Id. at 288. Here, because Richardson appeals the
district court’s order denying his discovery requests, the
cumulative finality rule cannot apply and Richardson’s appeal is
therefore interlocutory. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal in
No. 12-6399.
However, Richardson filed a notice of appeal from the
final order, thereby permitting appeal of all preliminary
orders. Although Richardson only challenges the discovery
rulings in his informal brief in No. 12-6399, liberally
construing his pro se filings, we will consider his challenges
to the discovery rulings on the merits.
We afford “substantial discretion to a district court
in managing discovery and review discovery rulings only for
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abuse of that discretion.” United States ex rel. Becker v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284, 290 (4th Cir.
2002). “A district court abuses its discretion only where it
has acted arbitrarily or irrationally, has failed to consider
judicially recognized factors constraining its exercise of
discretion, or when it has relied on erroneous factual or legal
premises.” L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297, 304 (4th Cir.)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 757 (2011).
Here, Richardson’s requests for the 2007 tape and for
further investigation into the 2009 tape were unsupported. Any
claims arising from the 2007 incident were clearly barred by the
statute of limitations, and Richardson failed to demonstrate how
viewing the 2007 tape would shed light on the validity of the
2009 tape. Further, Richardson’s challenge to the validity of
the 2009 tape was conclusory and unsupported. Given the nature
of Richardson’s request and the deferential standard of review,
we find no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment
as well as the denial of Richardson’s discovery requests. We
dismiss the appeal in No. 12-6399 as interlocutory. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED (No. 12-6593);
DISMISSED (No. 12-6399)
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