Fandray, N. v. Baum, A. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S73017-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    NITA M. FANDRAY & A BRIGHT FUTURE           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    ADOPTIONS, INC.                                   PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants
    v.
    ALAN S. BAUM, MATIS BAUM O’CONNOR
    (FORMERLY MATIS BAUM RIZZA
    O’CONNOR), & PRO ASSURANCE
    SPECIALTY INSURANCE, INC.
    Appellees                No. 199 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order January 13, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Civil Division at No(s): GD-12-015513
    *****
    NITA M. FANDRAY & A BRIGHT FUTURE           IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    ADOPTIONS, INC.                                   PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants
    v.
    ALAN S. BAUM, MATIS BAUM O’CONNOR
    (FORMERLY MATIS BAUM RIZZA
    O’CONNOR), & PRO ASSURANCE
    SPECIALTY INSURANCE, INC.
    Appellees                No. 200 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order January 13, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Civil Division at No(s): GD-12-015513
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and JENKINS, J.
    J-S73017-16
    MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                           FILED NOVEMBER 17, 2016
    Nita Fandray (“Fandray”) and A Bright Future Adoptions, Inc. (“Bright
    Future”), (collectively “Plaintiffs”), appeal from two orders1 entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County granting summary judgment.
    The first order, in favor of Alan Baum and Matis Baum O’Connor (formerly
    Matis Baum Rizza O’Connor) (“Baum”), and the second, in favor of
    ProAssurance2 Specialty Insurance Company (“ProAssurance”), resulted in
    the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint with prejudice.          After our
    review, we affirm.
    Fandray, a Pennsylvania attorney, owned and operated an adoption
    agency, Bright Future. In 2009, Patrick and Kimberly Hannon filed a lawsuit
    in Lawrence County against another adoption agency, Adoption Related
    Services, Inc., alleging breach of contract, defamation, and intentional
    infliction of emotional distress (“the Hannon suit”).           The Hannon suit
    stemmed from the Hannons’ efforts to adopt two children from Bright Future
    and Adoption Related Services, Inc.            In 2010, Fandray and Bright Future
    ____________________________________________
    1
    See Strausser v. Pramco, III, 
    944 A.2d 761
    , 764 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (where multiple defendants in single action are removed from case in
    piecemeal fashion by separate orders, each separate judgment becomes
    appealable when matter is resolved against final defendant, and appeal of
    those orders may be commenced as to all defendants by single notice of
    appeal taken from order resolving claim against final defendant).
    2
    We note that “Pro Assurance” and “ProAssurance” are                     used
    interchangeably throughout the trial court record and appellate filings.
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    were added as defendants in the suit.      At that time, Fandray and Bright
    Future were insured by ProAssurance.        ProAssurance assigned Attorney
    Baum and his firm to represent Plaintiffs in the Hannon suit.
    On September 17, 2010, ProAssurance notified the insureds, Fandray
    and Bright Future, that Baum would represent them and that they were
    represented under a reservation of rights.     Thus, to the extent that the
    Hannons’ claims were not caused by a “professional incident” as defined in
    the policy, or were specifically excluded from coverage under the policy,
    there would be no coverage for the claims. ProAssurance explained that it
    “reserves the right to deny indemnity for any damages awarded in this case
    for claims excluded from coverage.”    ProAssurance Letter to Policyholders,
    9/17/10.   In essence, if the Hannons suit were successful, there was the
    potential that Fandray and Bright Future would be left to pay a jury award
    out of personal assets.    Notably, the ProAssurance policy contained an
    “eroding liability” limit, so that when defense costs exceeded $100,000.00,
    further defense costs would erode the $100,000.00 indemnity coverage.
    Thus, the longer the action went on, the greater the potential for Fandray
    and Bright Future to be left with little or no insurance money to pay any jury
    verdict, should the Hannons ultimately win at trial or on appeal.
    On September 21, 2010, Attorney Baum entered his appearance on
    behalf of Fandray and Bright Future. He filed an Answer and New Matter to
    Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, and raised all affirmative defenses Fandray
    believed protected her and Bright Future in the underlying action.         He
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    participated in discovery, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and
    prepared a brief in support of that motion. Fandray, an experienced
    practicing attorney herself, participated in her defense, and she directed
    Attorney Baum to withdraw the motion for judgment on the pleadings. See
    Praecipe to Withdraw Motion, 6/9/11.
    By letter dated May 19, 2011, ProAssurance and its outside counsel,
    Anthony J. Williot, Esquire, advised Fandray that ProAssurance believed a
    settlement with the Hannons was in Fandray’s and Bright Future’s best
    interests.   In mid-June, through direct negotiations between ProAssurance
    and counsel for the Hannons, ProAssurance settled the claim for $62,000.00,
    within policy limits, without Fandray’s consent.
    Thereafter, Fandray and Bright Future filed a legal malpractice action
    against Attorney Baum and his law firm and a breach of contract/bad faith
    action against ProAssurance (“the Fandray suit”). The Fandray suit alleged
    that ProAssurance, in bad faith, needlessly settled the Hannon suit for
    $62,000 because Baum negligently failed to put forth defenses available to
    Fandray and Bright Future, which would have caused them to be dismissed
    from the case. The Fandray suit averred that the unwarranted settlement
    ruined her professionally and financially, devastated her emotionally, and
    destroyed her adoption agency.
    Baum    and   ProAssurance    filed   separate   motions   for   summary
    judgment.    The trial court granted both motions.     Plaintiffs appealed and
    they present the following issues for review:
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    1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in granting summary judgment [and]
    dismissing the complaint against Alan Baum and his
    law firm?
    2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in granting summary judgment [and]
    dismissing the complaint against ProAssurance
    Specialty Insurance Company?
    Appellants’ Brief, at 3-4.
    We review an appeal of the trial court’s entry of summary judgment as
    follows:
    Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or denying
    summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of review is
    clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only where it is
    established that the court committed an error of law or abused
    its discretion. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the
    record clearly shows that there is no genuine issue of material
    fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law. The reviewing court must view the record in the
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all
    doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
    against the moving party. Only when the facts are so clear that
    reasonable minds could not differ can a trial court properly enter
    summary judgment.
    Englert v. Fazio Mechanical Services, Inc., 
    932 A.2d 122
    , 124 (Pa.
    Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    In order to establish legal malpractice, a plaintiff must establish: 1)
    employment of the attorney or other basis for a duty; 2) the failure of the
    attorney to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge; and 3) that such
    negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the plaintiff. Epstein v.
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    Saul Ewing LLP, 
    7 A.3d 303
    , 313 (Pa. Super. 2010); Myers v. Robert
    Lewis Seigle, P.C., 
    751 A.2d 1182
    , 1184 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 states, in relevant part:
    After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as
    not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for
    summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law . . . if,
    after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion,
    including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who
    will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce
    evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense
    which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a
    jury.
    Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(2).
    Count I of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, Negligence/Malpractice,
    avers the following:
    Defendants Baum and the Firm negligently failed to properly
    assert and prosecute in the Suit the absolute defenses available
    to Plaintiffs, said negligence directly and proximately causing the
    damages set forth herein.
    Defendant Baum’s negligence and malpractice was the result of
    his being preoccupied with certain personal, inappropriate
    desires and interests, and the overt expressions of said interests
    and desires to Plaintiff Fandray, followed by her rejection of said,
    said desires and interests being inconsistent with the
    professional duties and obligations he maintained toward
    Plaintiffs.
    Amended Complaint, 11/14/12, at ¶¶ 19, 20 (emphasis added).                  In its
    Answer, Baum denied the averments, stating that at all relevant times
    “Attorney Baum and the Firm exercised the requisite skill, knowledge and
    care required of members of the legal profession and adhered to all
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    applicable professional rules, regulations, laws and guidelines.” Answer and
    New Matter to Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, 2/4/13, at ¶19.               Further,
    Attorney Baum specifically denied “any type of personal or inappropriate
    desires and interests towards Ms. Fandray or that he expressed any interests
    or desires to Ms. Fandray.” Id. at ¶ 20.
    In    their   Brief   in   Opposition    to   Summary   Judgment,    Plaintiffs
    acknowledge that Attorney Baum in fact did raise the “absolute defenses of
    immunity, privilege, statute of limitations, truth, and the corporate veil to
    the underlying Hannon suit in the Answer and New Mattter he filed.”
    Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to Summary Judgment, 1/4/16, at 4. Further,
    in her deposition, Fandray acknowledged this as well.                  See Fandray
    Deposition Vol. I, 7/16/14, at 35-36.
    The trial court noted that Plaintiffs now state that the legal malpractice
    emanated from Attorney Baum’s failure to “timely prosecute” the defenses
    and successfully terminate the Hannon suit prior to the date ProAssurance
    settled the claim in mid-June 2011.           However, Attorney Baum entered his
    appearance on September 21, 2010 and did, as stated above, file an Answer
    and New Matter containing the absolute defenses.              He also drafted and
    served     interrogatories,      took   depositions   and   defended    depositions,
    participated in strategy sessions with Fandray, drafted and filed a Motion for
    Judgment on the Pleadings, and drafted a brief in support of the Motion for
    Judgment on the Pleadings. Notably, at Fandray’s request, Attorney Baum
    withdrew the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on June 9, 2011. Thus,
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    Plaintiffs claim Baum’s failure to have “timely prosecuted” the defenses and
    won a full and final dismissal of all claims within nine months, before
    ProAssurance settled the claim, fell below the standard of care and thus
    amounted to legal negligence.     As the trial court stated, “It is illogical to
    require the trial lawyer defending the [u]nderlying [a]ction to structure a
    defense based upon some fluid, potential deadline[.]”     Trial Court Opinion,
    4/12/16, at 8.     In fact, Fandray acknowledged in her deposition that
    Attorney Baum was not aware of the settlement until it had occurred.
    Fandray Deposition, 9/29/14, at 169-70. Further, Fandray admitted that it
    was ProAssurance’s decision to settle the case.        Id. at 171. Plaintiffs’
    deadline is arbitrary. We find no abuse of discretion or error of law in the
    trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence of
    facts essential to show breach of duty or causation, essential elements of
    their legal malpractice claim. Englert, 
    supra.
    Next, Plaintiffs claim the court erred in granting ProAssurance’s motion
    for summary judgment.       In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged breach of
    contract and bad faith in connection with ProAssurance’s settlement of the
    Hannon suit. This claim, too, is meritless.
    Under the terms of the policy, Fandray and Bright Future granted
    ProAssurance the right and duty to settle any claims. The policy provides in
    relevant part:
    E. COVERAGE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE DEFENSE OF
    CLAIMS
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    The Company shall have the right and duty to defend any
    claim against the insured even if any of the allegations are
    groundless, false or fraudulent. The Company may make
    such investigation and settlement of any claim,
    professional incident or occurrence which may result in a
    claim, as it deems expedient.
    Social Services Professional Liability Insurance and Commercial General
    Liability Insurance Policy, 12/08, at 2 (emphasis added).
    In mid-June 2011, “through direct negotiations between ProAssurance
    and counsel for the Hannons, ProAssurance had the opportunity to settle the
    [Hannon suit] on behalf of Fandray and Bright Future within the policy limits,
    and therefore without any payment by Fandray or Bright Future.”          Trial
    Court Opinion, supra at 11. The court determined that by the terms of the
    policy, there is no question that ProAssurance had the authority to settle the
    Hannon claim without Fandray’s consent and that ProAssurance acted in
    good faith.   We agree that no reasonable juror could decide otherwise.
    Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law. Englert, 
    supra.
    Orders affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/17/2016
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