Richard Stogsdill v. South Carolina Dep't of Health , 674 F. App'x 291 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1984
RICHARD STOGSDILL; NANCY STOGSDILL, Parent of Richard
Stogsdill, on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated persons; ROBERT LEVIN; MARY SELF, Parent of Robert
Levin, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
persons,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;
CHRISTIAN L. SOURA,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS; CYNTHIA MANN; JOHN DOE 1 THROUGH 20; CMS,
Defendants.
No. 15-1986
RICHARD STOGSDILL; NANCY STOGSDILL, Parent of Richard
Stogsdill, on behalf of themselves and other similarly
situated persons; ROBERT LEVIN; MARY SELF, Parent of Robert
Levin, on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated
persons,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Defendant – Appellant,
and
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS; CYNTHIA MANN; JOHN DOE 1 THROUGH 20; CMS;
CHRISTIAN L. SOURA,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District
of South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (3:12-cv-00007-JFA)
Argued: December 9, 2016 Decided: January 5, 2017
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Patricia L. Harrison, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellants/Cross-Appellees. Damon C. Wlodarczyk, RILEY POPE &
LANEY, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees/Cross-
Appellant. ON BRIEF: Peter M. Balthazor, RILEY POPE & LANEY,
LLC, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees/Cross-Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Richard Stogsdill, Robert Levin, and their parent
caretakers (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal district court
orders dismissing certain of their claims and granting judgment
against them in a complex action pertaining to the South
Carolina Medicaid waiver program. The South Carolina Department
of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”) cross-appeals. For the
reasons given below, we must dismiss both appeals for lack of
appellate jurisdiction.
Stogsdill and Levin are severely disabled individuals who
have been receiving services under South Carolina’s Medicaid
waiver program, established under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c). The
waiver program, administered by DHHS, allows the state to bypass
the requirement that aid recipients live in institutions to
receive certain Medicaid benefits. Instead, eligible persons,
such as Stogsdill and Levin, may avoid institutionalization by
receiving home and community-based services. Among the services
that have been provided to Stogsdill and Levin are personal-care
aide and companion services, respite care, and occupational and
speech therapies.
On January 1, 2010, DHHS implemented changes to the waiver
program, for what it describes as budgetary reasons. As a
result, certain services were capped, while others were excluded
altogether. Both Stogsdill and Levin saw a reduction in the
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services they received. In response, Stogsdill, Levin, and
their caretakers brought this action against DHHS and its
director at that time, Anthony Keck.
Appellants’ complaint raised a long list of claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Medicaid Act, the
Administrative and Procedures Act of the State of South
Carolina, and the Supremacy and Due Process Clauses of the
United States Constitution. Of particular importance here,
included among their ADA claims was an allegation of a general
pattern of retaliation by DHHS against “persons who have either
exposed abuse or neglect in support of waiver participants.”
J.A. 595. Both plaintiffs requested, as relief, an order
“prohibiting Defendants from retaliating against them or persons
who advocate for them in violation of the ADA.” Id. Notably,
both parties to this appeal – the Appellants and DHHS – take the
position that this claim was advanced on behalf of both
Stogsdill and Levin.
Both parties moved for summary judgment on all claims. The
district court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over
Stogsdill’s claims, but allowed some of Levin’s claims,
including those brought under the ADA, to proceed. When
considering Levin’s ADA claims on the merits, however, the
district court considered only whether the 2010 reduction in
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services violated Levin’s rights under the ADA, granting
judgment as a matter of law to DHHS on this issue. Stogsdill,
Levin, and their caretakers timely appealed, and DHHS noted its
cross-appeal from a different portion of the district court’s
ruling.
The parties have not questioned our jurisdiction, but
before we can consider the merits of an appeal, we have an
“independent obligation to verify the existence of appellate
jurisdiction.” Porter v. Zook, 803 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]ur jurisdiction
extends only to ‘appeals from . . . final decisions of the
district courts of the United States.’” United States v. Myers,
593 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1291).
* A final decision must resolve “all claims as to all parties.”
Fox v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 201 F.3d 526, 530 (4th Cir.
2000) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no final order if “it
appears from the record that the district court has not
adjudicated all of the issues in a case.” Porter, 803 F.3d at
696.
In Porter, a habeas petitioner raised two separate claims
regarding juror bias. Id. at 697. The district court dismissed
the petition after disposing of the first claim “without ruling
* There exist only a “few narrow exceptions” to this general
rule. Myers, 593 F.3d at 344. None of those exceptions applies
here. See id. at 345–48.
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on or seeming to recognize” the second. Id. at 698. Because
the court failed to rule on one of the petitioner’s claims, it
never issued a final decision and, consequently, appellate
jurisdiction was lacking. Id. at 699. We accordingly dismissed
the appeal and remanded for consideration of the second juror
bias claim. Id.
The same result is required here. When disposing of
Levin’s ADA claims, the district court considered only whether
DHHS “failed to make reasonable modifications to the home and
community-based waiver programs to allow Levin to stay in his
integrated home-based setting.” J.A. 3436. It granted judgment
as a matter of law to DHHS on this claim, and this claim alone.
It did not “rul[e] on or seem[] to recognize” the retaliation
claim that both parties agree Levin had raised in the complaint.
Cf. Porter, 803 F.3d at 698. Similarly, in determining that it
should abstain as to Stogsdill’s claims, the district court gave
no indication it considered his separate retaliation claim.
As in Porter, we do not fault the district court.
Appellants’ complaint “contains a multitude of claims, some of
which have multiple subparts,” and it is easy to see, in this
complex web, how one thread could be lost. See id. at 699.
Moreover, as defendants argued at a much earlier stage of the
proceedings, there is minimal factual development of the
Appellants’ retaliation claims, which makes them easy to
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overlook. We of course express no opinion as to whether Levin
or Stogsdill’s retaliation claims should survive a motion to
dismiss, but instead remand for the district court to dispose of
the issue in the first instance.
Because the district court did not rule on Levin or
Stogsdill’s retaliation claims, it did not issue a final order
that is reviewable by this court. Accordingly, we must dismiss
these appeals and remand the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
DISMISSED AND REMANDED
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