United States v. Michael Rankins ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4580
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL RANKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Elizabeth City. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (2:14-cr-00003-FL-1)
Submitted: August 29, 2019 Decided: October 22, 2019
Before FLOYD and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Elisa Cyre Salmon, SALMON LAW FIRM, LLP, Lillington, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina; Brian A. Benczkowski, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew S. Miner,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, William A. Glaser, Criminal Division, UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Rankins appeals from the 135-month sentence imposed upon his guilty plea
to armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2012), claiming that his sentence is both
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
This court “‘review[s] all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly
outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United
States v. Blue, 877 F.3d 513, 517 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007)). This review entails consideration of both procedural and substantive
reasonableness. United States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 528 (4th Cir. 2014). The court
first considers whether the district court committed significant procedural error, such as
improperly calculating the Guidelines range, insufficiently considering the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors, or inadequately explaining the sentence imposed. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In evaluating the district court’s application of the Guidelines, we review factual findings
for clear error and questions of law de novo. United States v. Hawley, 919 F.3d 252, 255
(4th Cir. 2019).
If this court finds no procedural error, it also must evaluate the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, considering the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552
U.S. at 51. A sentence within the correctly calculated Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). The burden rests
with the defendant to rebut the presumption by demonstrating “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-
Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Rankins first argues that the district erred by denying him a two-level reduction in
his offense level for acceptance of responsibility. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 3E1.1 (2016). This court “review[s] a district court’s decision concerning an
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment for clear error[,] . . . giv[ing] great deference to
the district court’s decision because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate
a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239
(4th Cir. 2007) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). To qualify for the two-
level USSG § 3E1.1(a) reduction, “a defendant must prove to the court by a preponderance
of the evidence that he has clearly recognized and affirmatively accepted personal
responsibility for his criminal conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Entry of
a guilty plea does not automatically entitle a defendant to an acceptance of responsibility
adjustment. See USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.3. We have reviewed the record and find no clear
error in the district court’s conclusion that Rankins failed to show that he was entitled to
the reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Next, Rankins argues that the district court improperly applied a two-level
enhancement for obstruction of justice. USSG § 3C1.1. The obstruction of justice
enhancement is appropriate when “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the
investigation . . . of the instant offense of conviction.” USSG § 3C1.1. The enhancement
specifically applies to “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-
defendant . . . directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so”; and “providing a materially
false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the
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official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(A),
(G). Again, our review of the record discloses no error in the district court’s decision to
apply this enhancement, particularly in light of the court’s specific crediting of Rankins’
accomplice’s testimony. See United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 722 (4th Cir. 1993)
(district court has broad discretion at sentencing to weigh credibility).
Rankins also challenges the enhancement applied for his leadership role in the
offense. If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in less-extensive
criminal activity, the court should apply a two-level enhancement in offense level. USSG
§ 3B1.1(c). In determining whether to apply an enhancement for a defendant’s leadership
role, a court should consider: the defendant’s exercise of decision making authority, the
nature of his participation in the offense, recruitment of others, any claimed right to a larger
share of the profits, the degree of participation in planning of the offense, the nature and
scope of the offense, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. United
States v. Agyekum, 846 F.3d 744, 752 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4). We
find no error by the district court in imposing this enhancement.
Rankins also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence, citing his
physical and mental health issues. The district court noted these issues, however, and
ordered that Rankins undergo a comprehensive mental health assessment and
recommended an intensive treatment program for addiction or dependency. Rankins has
not overcome the presumption of reasonableness accorded his sentence. See United States
v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 379.
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Finally, Rankins – who is represented by counsel – seeks to file a pro se
supplemental brief. We have held that “an appellant who is represented by counsel has no
right to file pro se briefs or raise additional substantive issues in an appeal.” United States
v. Cohen, 888 F.3d 667, 682 (4th Cir. 2018).
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Rankins’ sentence. We deny Rankins’ motions
to file a supplemental pro se brief, and we dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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