United States v. Wayne Scupp , 607 F. App'x 344 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4106
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WAYNE MICHAEL SCUPP,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:09-cr-00524-RBH-4)
Submitted: July 21, 2015 Decided: July 23, 2015
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. William E. Day, II,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea of guilty, Wayne Michael Scupp was
convicted of conspiracy to commit bank fraud and to steal and
possess stolen mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012). He
was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, followed by a 5-year
term of supervised release. Shortly after his release, Scupp
engaged in new criminal conduct, leading to a petition for
revocation of his supervised release. At the revocation hearing,
Scupp admitted the alleged violations. The district court
sentenced him to 12 months of imprisonment, followed by a 1-year
term of supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but seeking review
of the reasonableness of Scupp’s revocation sentence. Scupp was
informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he
has not done so. The Government elected not to file a brief.
Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a
sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States v.
Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation sentence
that “is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In so evaluating a sentence, we assess it for
reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive
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considerations” employed in evaluating an original criminal
sentence. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438 (4th Cir.
2006). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the
district court has considered the policy statements contained in
Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) (2012) factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2012).
Id. at 439. The district court also must provide an explanation
for its chosen sentence, but the explanation “need not be as
detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it
must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence.” United States
v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A revocation
sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court states
a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive
the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Only if we find
a sentence to be procedurally or substantively unreasonable will
we determine whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.
Here, the district court considered the parties’ arguments,
Scupp’s allocution, the statements of his friends and family, and
the relevant statutory factors before sentencing Scupp below the
policy statement range. The district court provided an explanation
tailored to Scupp, focusing specifically on the nature of his
violations of supervised release, his extensive criminal record,
his mental health issues, and his family’s statements to the court.
We therefore conclude that Scupp’s sentence is neither
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procedurally nor substantively unreasonable. We have examined the
entire record in accordance with the requirements of Anders and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the district court.
This court requires that counsel inform Scupp, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Scupp requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Scupp. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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