Ronald McClary v. Joseph Lightsey , 673 F. App'x 357 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-7332
RONALD MCCLARY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH LIGHTSEY,
Defendant – Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:16-ct-03052-BO)
Submitted: January 17, 2017 Decided: January 23, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald McClary, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald McClary appeals a district court’s order and
judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint as frivolous,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2012), for being duplicative of
a pending action. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate
the court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
In quick succession, McClary filed three lawsuits against
medical personnel at the Polk Correctional Institution. On
December 16, 2014, the district court consolidated the three
lawsuits. On February 8, 2016, the district court dismissed
McClary’s first lawsuit without prejudice, McClary v. Lightsey,
No. 5:14-ct-03039-FL, because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The remaining two lawsuits are still
active.
On February 22, 2016, McClary filed the instant complaint
in which he stated that he was “refiling” his complaint in No.
5:14-ct-03039-FL because he exhausted his administrative
remedies. (Electronic Record at 7). The district court
dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the
complaint was duplicative of one of the pending consolidated
complaints. The court noted that the dismissal counted as a
strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2012).
A district court shall dismiss an action at any time if it
determines that the action is frivolous or malicious. See 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because district courts are not
required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they
may dismiss them as frivolous or malicious pursuant to
§ 1915(e). See Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir.
1992) (finding that § 1915(d), the precursor to § 1915(e),
allowed a district court to dismiss a complaint that was
duplicative of another pending action brought by same party).
Generally, lawsuits are duplicative if the parties, issues, and
available relief are not different from each other. See
Georgia v. McCarthy, 833 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2016).
Here, the district court mistakenly found that McClary’s
complaint was duplicative of a pending action. The court’s
confusion is excusable, given that McClary has filed a number of
lawsuits with overlapping and related claims. Because McClary
was attempting to refile a complaint to show that he had
exhausted his administrative remedies, we vacate the court’s
order. We take no position on the merits of McClary’s claims.
Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order and
judgment and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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