United States v. Ikedo Fields , 593 F. App'x 176 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4356
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
IKEDO FIELDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:13-cr-00111-H-1)
Submitted: November 20, 2014 Decided: November 24, 2014
Before KING and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher F. Cowan, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Jennifer
P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ikedo Fields pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B), 846 (2012), and was sentenced to 144
months in prison. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), conceding there are no non-
frivolous issues for appeal, but asking us to review whether
Fields’: (1) guilty plea is valid; and (2) sentence is
reasonable. The Government has declined to file a responsive
brief and Fields has not filed a pro se supplemental brief,
despite receiving notice of his right to do so. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Because Fields did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, the adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P.
11 hearing is reviewed for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 524–27 (4th Cir. 2002). To demonstrate
plain error, a defendant must show: (1) there was error; (2)
the error was plain; and (3) the error affected his substantial
rights. See United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 388 (4th
Cir. 2014). In the guilty plea context, a defendant satisfies
this burden by showing a reasonable probability that he would
not have pled guilty but for the district court’s Rule 11
omissions. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th
2
Cir. 2009). “Even when this burden is met, we have discretion
whether to recognize the error, and should not do so unless the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Aidoo,
670 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Our review of Fields’ Rule 11 hearing transcript leads
us to conclude that the district court substantially complied
with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Fields’ guilty plea
and that any omissions by the district court did not affect
Fields’ substantial rights. Critically, the transcript reveals
that the district court ensured that the plea was supported by
an independent basis in fact, and that Fields entered the plea
knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding of the
consequences. United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120
(4th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, we discern no plain error in the
district court’s acceptance of Fields’ guilty plea.
We also discern no reversible error in the district
court’s decision to impose a 144-month sentence. We review any
criminal sentence, “whether inside, just outside, or
significantly outside the Guidelines range,” for reasonableness,
“under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United
States v. King, 673 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2012); see Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this
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review requires us to ensure that the district court committed
no significant procedural error. King, 673 F.3d at 283.
Procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
“[I]f a party repeats on appeal a claim of procedural
sentencing error . . . [that] it has made before the district
court, we review for abuse of discretion” and will reverse
unless we can conclude “that the error was harmless.” United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). For
instance, if “an aggrieved party sufficiently alerts the
district court of its responsibility to render an individualized
explanation” by drawing arguments from § 3553 “for a sentence
different than the one ultimately imposed,” the party
sufficiently “preserves its claim.” Id. at 578. However, we
review unpreserved non-structural sentencing errors for plain
error. Id. at 576-77. And in the sentencing context, “the
third prong of the plain-error standard is satisfied if there is
a non-speculative basis in the record to conclude that the
district court would have imposed a lower sentence upon the
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defendant but for the error.” See McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 388
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
If, and only if, we find the sentence procedurally
reasonable can we consider the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence imposed. See United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325,
328 (4th Cir. 2009). When a district court imposes a sentence
that falls outside of the applicable Guidelines range, “we
consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with
respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range.” United States v. Hernandez–Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118,
123 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting this review, we “must give
due deference to the district court’s decision that the
§ 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude
that the sentence is both procedurally and substantively
reasonable. We find no error in: (1) the district court’s
calculation of Fields’ Guidelines range, including the career
offender designation; (2) the opportunities the court provided
Fields and his counsel to speak in mitigation; or (3) the
district court’s explanation of the sentence imposed by
reference to Fields’ Guidelines range and the relevant § 3553(a)
factors. See United States v. Chandia, 675 F.3d 329, 341–42
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(4th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that a sentencing court is “not
required to provide a lengthy explanation or robotically tick
through § 3553(a)’s every subsection, particularly when imposing
a below-Guidelines sentence”) (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Finally, Fields’ below-Guidelines sentence
is presumptively substantively reasonable, see United States v.
Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012), and we discern no basis
in the record to overcome this presumption.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with
our obligations under Anders and have found no meritorious
issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Fields, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Fields requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Fields. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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