Keith Goodman v. Kim Runion , 676 F. App'x 156 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6733
KEITH D. GOODMAN,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
KIM RUNION; ELTON BROWN, Doctor; KRYM; SPRUILL, Doctor,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
A. DAVID ROBINSON; J. LAFOON; Q. BIRCHETTE; MS. G. F.
SIVELS; G. ROBINSON; CASSANDRA TAYLOR; C. MAYES; C. BAILEY;
PRISON HEALTH SERVICES; GENE M. JOHNSON; HAROLD W. CLARKE;
JOHN JABE; FRED SHILLING; HARVARD STEPHENS, Doctor,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:11-cv-00079-GBL-IDD)
Argued: December 6, 2016 Decided: January 25, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and TRAXLER and DIAZ, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Erik R. Zimmerman, ROBINSON, BRADSHAW & HINSON, P.A.,
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Carlene Booth
Johnson, PERRY LAW FIRM, Dillwyn, Virginia; Gary Christopher
Jones, Jr., SINNOTT, NUCKOLS & LOGAN, P.C., Midlothian,
Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Keith Goodman is an inmate in the custody of the Virginia
Department of Corrections (“VDOC”). He brought this action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against optometrists Dr. Elton Brown and
Dr. David Spruill, (together “Defendants”), claiming that they
were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by refusing
to prescribe him contact lenses instead of eyeglasses to correct
his vision, in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. Goodman appeals the
district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants, as
well as the district court’s denial of his motion for
appointment of an expert witness and for discovery. We affirm.
I.
Prior to his incarceration, Goodman primarily wore contact
lenses to correct his condition of moderate myopia, commonly
known as nearsightedness. From 2005 through 2008, VDOC
optometrists prescribed Goodman contact lenses, rather than
eyeglasses, at his request. According to Goodman, he avoided
wearing prescription eyeglasses because he believed that they
caused him to experience headaches.
In January 2009, Dr. Elton Brown, the treating optometrist
at Brunswick Correctional Center, where Goodman had been
transferred, evaluated Goodman’s vision and refused to prescribe
him contact lenses. Under VDOC policy:
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Contact lens[es] will be supplied when medically
indicated. Offenders wearing contact lens[es] when
entering the system will be evaluated and allowed to
keep the lenses if medically indicated. Offenders not
meeting the criteria for contact lens[es] will be
issued eyeglasses if needed.
J.A. 85. The policy was based upon the VDOC’s understanding
“that there are a few ophthalmologic diseases which are improved
with contact lenses versus eyeglasses.” J.A. 81. Absent that
medical determination, however, “eyeglasses, for the most part,
correct vision disorders, are easier to manage, and are less
expensive” than contact lenses. J.A. 81-82.
Dr. Brown “saw no indication of any medical need for Mr.
Goodman to be prescribed contact lenses, nor any reason why
having eyeglasses instead of contact lenses would cause Mr.
Goodman to have any headaches or discomfort.” J.A. 157.
According to Goodman, Dr. Brown told him that he would check
with the prison warden and see if she would approve the
prescription of contact lenses to correct Goodman’s vision, at
Goodman’s expense, notwithstanding the VDOC policy. However,
that request was denied, and Dr. Brown thereafter prescribed and
fitted Goodman with prescription eyeglasses.
In April 2009, Goodman visited Dr. Brown again and
complained of headaches which Goodman attributed to his wearing
his eyeglasses. Dr. Brown informed Goodman that he “had
excellent vision in both eyes with the correction of his
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eyeglasses, and there was no medical reason for his level of
myopia, with only a minimum difference between the two eyes, to
cause headaches with his prescribed eyeglasses.” J.A. 158. In
Dr. Brown’s judgment, “[t]here was no medical reason for Mr.
Goodman to be prescribed contact lenses instead of eyeglasses,
nor any medical reason for switching Mr. Goodman to contact
lenses from eyeglasses to alleviate any headaches.” J.A. 158.
And “because [Dr. Brown] was unable to verify [Goodman’s]
headaches, he w[as] disallowed from prescribing anything other
than eyeglasses for [Goodman’s] needed vision-correction.” J.A.
39.
In September 2009, Goodman was evaluated by Dr. Krym, the
VDOC optometrist at Green Rock Correctional Center, where
Goodman had been transferred. Goodman alleged that Dr. Krym
likewise informed him that he could not prescribe contact lenses
to correct his vision.
Goodman was subsequently transferred to Greensville
Correctional Center. In March 2010, Goodman was evaluated by
Dr. David Spruill, the prison optometrist at Greensville. Dr.
Spruill also found no medical indication for contact lenses.
According to Dr. Spruill, “[a]t no time, did I believe, in my
medical judgment, that anything to do with Mr. Goodman having
been prescribed eyeglasses instead of contact lenses was the
cause of any headaches, nor did I believe that prescribing Mr.
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Goodman contact lenses would alleviate any headaches.” J.A.
227. Goodman subsequently requested that Prison Health Services
clarify to Dr. Spruill that the VDOC policy did not prohibit him
from prescribing contacts if medically indicated to alleviate
Goodman’s headaches. In response, Goodman was advised by the
prison officials that “contact lenses can only be prescribed
when medically necessary. According to your medical record you
do not have a clinical need for contacts.” J.A. 90.
Noting that the optometrist had stated that Goodman’s
headaches “were unrelated to the eyeglasses,” the VDOC medical
officials then referred Goodman to an outside ophthalmologist
“to determine what [was] causing his headaches,” J.A. 79. 1
Goodman was seen by Dr. Gupta in July 2011. Goodman has
provided no medical evidence or other information about the
results of his ophthalmology examination. However, he does not
assert that Dr. Gupta found his headaches to be causally related
1
An optometrist is “a health care provider who examines,
diagnoses, treats, and manages diseases and disorders of the
visual system, the eye, and associated structures, as well as
diagnosing related systemic conditions.” Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary 1331 (32nd ed. 2012). An ophthalmologist is
“a physician who specializes in the diagnosis and medical and
surgical treatment of diseases and defects of the eye and
related structures.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary
1329 (32nd ed. 2012) (emphasis added).
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to his wearing eyeglasses and he continues to assert that he has
been denied contact lenses by the VDOC. 2
Goodman thereafter filed this complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against various prison officials, alleging that they failed
to adequately respond to his vision and headache complaints.
Goodman additionally sued the three optometrists that had
evaluated him - Dr. Brown, Dr. Spruill, and Dr. Krym - alleging
that they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs because they knew that his eyeglasses caused him to suffer
from headaches and nonetheless refused to prescribe him contact
lenses. Goodman did not name Dr. Gupta, the ophthalmologist, as
a defendant.
We previously affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
Goodman’s claims against the prison officials under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim. See Goodman v. Johnson, 524 Fed. App’x. 887 (4th Cir.
2013) (per curiam). Assuming without deciding that Goodman
suffered from a sufficiently serious medical need, however, we
reversed the district court’s dismissal of Goodman’s claims
2 Goodman’s father, a physician specializing in obstetrics
and gynecology, contacted the VDOC to advocate his son’s request
for contact lenses during this time period and has filed an
affidavit on his son’s behalf. However, Dr. Goodman does not
claim to have evaluated or treated Goodman for his myopia, nor
does he specialize in optometry or ophthalmology.
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against the three optometrists because the VDOC policy alone
would not insulate them from liability if their treatment
otherwise rose to the level of deliberate indifference.
On remand, the district court granted summary judgment to
Dr. Brown and Dr. Spruill and denied Goodman’s motion for
summary judgment. The district court dismissed Goodman’s claim
against Dr. Krym for lack of service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
This appeal followed.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, applying the same legal standards as the district court
and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. See Martin v. Lloyd, 700 F.3d 132, 135 (4th
Cir. 2012). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Conclusory or speculative allegations
do not suffice” to defeat summary judgment, “nor does a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving party’s]
case” suffice. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d
645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits prison officials from inflicting “cruel and unusual
punishments” by acting with deliberate indifference to a
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prisoner’s serious medical needs. U.S. Const. amend. VIII;
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). To prevail in a
medical needs case, the inmate must satisfy the two-pronged test
set forth in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
First, the inmate must demonstrate the defendant’s
deliberate indifference to an “objectively ‘sufficiently
serious’” medical need, Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225
(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer, 51 U.S. at 834), “that has
either ‘been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
. . . is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctors’ attention.’” Id.
(quoting Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Second, under the subjective prong, the inmate must prove
that the defendants “acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state
of mind.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The inmate
must show that the defendant “actually knew of and disregarded a
substantial risk of serious injury . . . or that they actually
knew of and ignored a . . . serious need for medical care.”
Young v. City of Mt. Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 576 (4th Cir. 2001);
see also Scinto, 841 F.3d at 225.
“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle,
429 U.S. at 106. “Thus, a complaint that a physician has been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not
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state a valid claim.” Id. And “an inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an
unnecessary and wonton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to
the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 105-06 (internal quotation
marks omitted); Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851 (4th Cir.
1990) (The medical provider’s disregard of the prisoner’s
serious medical needs must have been “so grossly incompetent,
inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be
intolerable to fundamental fairness.”), overruled in part on
other grounds by Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
III.
A.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Goodman, the record
creates no genuine issue of material fact to support Goodman’s
deliberate indifference claim against the Defendants.
Even assuming, without deciding, that Goodman’s need for
vision correction and/or his subjective complaints of headaches
constituted an “objectively sufficiently serious medical need,”
there is no evidence that Defendants denied Goodman medically
necessary treatment or that their failure to provide alternative
treatment in the form of contact lenses was the result of
deliberate indifference on their part.
Goodman has moderate myopia, which Defendants corrected to
20/20 vision by prescription eyeglasses. Goodman subjectively
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complained of headaches and informed Defendants of his opinion
that such headaches were causally related to his wearing
eyeglasses. Defendants independently evaluated and treated
Goodman at two separate prisons, considered his complaint from
the perspective of their field of optometry, and found no
medical basis upon which to believe that Goodman’s headaches
were caused by his eyeglasses or that contact lenses would
alleviate them. According to Goodman’s complaint, a third
optometrist, Dr. Krym, also evaluated Goodman and refused to
prescribe contact lenses. And because the optometrists had
concluded that Goodman’s headaches were not causally related to
his prescription eyeglasses, VDOC medical personnel thereafter
referred Goodman to an ophthalmologist for a follow-up
examination to determine the cause of Goodman’s headaches.
Plainly, Goodman disagrees with the Defendants’ medical
judgment that his headaches were not causally related to his
wearing prescription eyeglasses. For that reason, he also
disagrees with their decision not to authorize the prescription
of contact lenses under the VDOC policy as being medically
indicated to alleviate such headaches. Generally, such
“[d]isagreements between an inmate and a physician over the
inmate’s proper medical care do not state a § 1983 claim.”
Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985); see also
Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975) (per
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curiam) (“Questions of medical judgment are not subject to
judicial review.”).
There is also insufficient evidence to support Goodman’s
theory that Defendants must have actually believed that Goodman
was experiencing headaches caused by his eyeglasses, but would
not say so because prison officials, notwithstanding the written
VDOC policy, had forbidden them from prescribing contact lenses
even if medically indicated. In support, Goodman points to his
factual allegations that Dr. Brown told him that he would
inquire as to whether the prison officials would allow Goodman
to obtain contacts at his own expense and that both Defendants
told him that they could not prescribe him contact lenses under
the VDOC policy and would face consequences if they did.
At best, Goodman’s factual assertions might establish that
Defendants followed the VDOC policy and that Dr. Brown made an
effort on Goodman’s behalf to obtain an exception to the policy.
But there is no evidence that Dr. Brown told any prison official
that, in his medical judgment, contact lenses were medically
indicated under the policy as opposed to simply an appropriate
form of vision correction. Nor is there any evidence that Dr.
Brown or Dr. Spruill were told by the prison officials that,
notwithstanding the VDOC policy, they could not prescribe
contact lenses even if, in their medical judgment, the
prescription was indicated to prevent headaches. Moreover,
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Goodman’s theory is inconsistent with the undisputed fact that,
after both Defendants had concluded that Goodman’s subjective
complaints of headaches were not related to his prescription
eyeglasses, the VDOC referred Goodman to a specialist in
ophthalmology, Dr. Gupta, for evaluation of other possible
causes for his headaches. Accordingly, Goodman’s theory is much
too speculative and conclusory to defeat Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment.
B.
Goodman also appeals the district court’s denial of his
request for discovery and for appointment of an expert witness.
Goodman had sought to inquire into whether Defendants treated
non-prisoners differently than prisoners and he wanted the
opportunity to obtain a medical opinion and develop other
evidence that would refute Defendants’ medical judgments. We
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s rulings.
The discovery and expert opinions that Goodman sought might or
might not have substantiated his opinion that his headaches were
causally related to his wearing prescription eyeglasses, but
they would not have supported his claim that Defendants were
subjectively aware of this causal relationship and yet, with
deliberate indifference thereto, issued medical opinions to the
contrary. Accordingly, we affirm these rulings as well.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s
grant of summary judgment to the Defendants. We also find no
reversible error in the district court’s orders denying Goodman
an expert witness and discovery. 3
AFFIRMED
3 In the event that we reversed the grant of summary
judgment to Dr. Brown and Dr. Spruill, Goodman requested that we
also reverse the district court’s order dismissing his § 1983
deliberate-indifference claim against Dr. Krym for lack of
service and that we instruct the district court to appoint
counsel for Goodman on remand. Because we affirm the grant of
summary judgment to Dr. Brown and Dr. Spruill, we do not address
these issues.
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