United States v. Roger Lockamy , 613 F. App'x 227 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4084
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROGER LEE LOCKAMY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00096-WO-1)
Submitted: August 20, 2015 Decided: August 24, 2015
Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
Graham T. Green, Assistant United States Attorney, Winston-
Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roger Lee Lockamy appeals his conviction and 180-month
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2012). We affirm.
Lockamy first argues that his sentence is unconstitutional
because the indictment did not allege the existence of his prior
convictions necessary to support an enhanced sentence under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). As he
acknowledges, however, his claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent as well as our own and is thus unavailing. See
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163-64 (2013)
(holding any fact other than prior conviction that increases
statutory mandatory minimum is element of offense that must be
submitted to jury and found beyond reasonable doubt); United
States v. Thompson, 588 F.3d 197, 202 (4th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 302 (4th Cir. 2003).
Next, Lockamy contends that his prior North Carolina
convictions for breaking or entering do not qualify as predicate
felony offenses under the Armed Career Criminal Act. This
argument is also foreclosed by our precedent. United States v.
Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 272 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
734 (2014) (“We therefore conclude that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
54(a), as interpreted by the North Carolina Supreme Court,
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sweeps no more broadly than the generic elements of burglary.”);
United States v. Kerr, 737 F.3d 33, 38-39 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1773 (2014) (holding that court should
consider presumptive range for defendant who was sentenced in
mitigated range to determine if prior conviction is felony).
Finally, Lockamy asserts that § 922(g) is unconstitutional
because it exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce
Clause. We have consistently rejected this argument. United
States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Under
existing circuit precedent, the Government may establish the
requisite interstate commerce nexus by showing that a firearm
was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed
it.”); see United States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215, 223 (4th Cir.
2012).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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