Ronald Emrit v. Office Depot, Inc. , 559 F. App'x 206 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1052
RONALD SATISH EMRIT,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
OFFICE DEPOT, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cv-02297-RWT)
Submitted: February 27, 2014 Decided: March 5, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ronald Satish Emrit, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Satish Emrit appeals the district court’s order
dismissing his civil action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and to comply with a court order.
Finding no reversible error for the reasons that follow, we
affirm.
Emrit filed an employment discrimination complaint
against Defendant Office Depot, Inc., asserting that he had
experienced employment discrimination due to an unspecified
disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113 (2012). The district court
ordered Emrit to particularize his complaint within twenty-one
days to demonstrate that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies and received a “right to sue” letter from the Maryland
Human Rights Commission (“MHRC”) (recently renamed the Maryland
Commission on Civil Rights) or the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). * In response, Emrit filed multiple
pleadings attempting to challenge the exhaustion requirement.
He also amended his complaint as a matter of course, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(1), to clarify that his original claims were
*
This court previously dismissed Emrit’s appeal of this
order as interlocutory. See Emrit v. Office Depot, Inc., __ F.
App’x __, 2013 WL 6153786, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 25, 2013) (No.
13-2141).
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brought under the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006), and to articulate
new claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress
(“IIED”) and alleged violations of the National Labor Relations
Act (“NLRA”), see 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012). The district
court dismissed Emrit’s action for failure to comply with its
prior order and to exhaust administrative remedies.
On appeal, Emrit argues that he should not have been
required to seek administrative review as a prerequisite to
filing his complaint. It is well settled that a plaintiff is
required by statute to exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing suit under Title VII or the ADA. See Sydnor v.
Fairfax Cnty., Va., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012) (ADA);
Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 513 (4th Cir. 2005)
(2005) (Title VII). Emrit asserts in a conclusory fashion that
the exhaustion requirement is “unconstitutional,” but he does
not explain the basis for this claim—including which
constitutional provision the requirement purportedly violates.
Contrary to Emrit’s assertion, he was not required to exhaust
remedies with the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People or the Department of Justice, and neither the
EEOC nor the MHRC were required to represent Emrit in his suit.
Because it is clear that Emrit did not exhaust his
administrative remedies as to his ADA and Title VII claims, and
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he failed to comply with the court’s order directing him to
establish such compliance, we find no error in the court’s
dismissal of these claims.
Emrit’s IIED and NLRA claims, raised in his amended
complaint, were not subject to the same exhaustion requirement
as his employment discrimination claims. However, we may affirm
the district court’s judgment on any basis clearly appearing
from the record. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d
943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992). Insofar as Emrit fairly challenges
the dismissal of these claims, we conclude they clearly lack a
valid legal basis, and the district court committed no
reversible error in dismissing them. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) (2012) (permitting court to dismiss
case sua sponte when it is “frivolous” or “fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted”); see also Manikhi v. Mass
Transit Admin., 758 A.2d 95, 113-15 (Md. 2000) (describing
elements of IIED claim); Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191,
1216-17 (Md. Ct. App. 1986) (requiring showing that conduct was
“so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community” (internal quotation marks
omitted), and recognizing circumstances where workplace
harassment is insufficient to establish IIED).
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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