United States v. Robin Perry , 478 F. App'x 1 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4485
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ROBIN SNIPES PERRY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:10-cr-00032-WO-1)
Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: May 3, 2012
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
C. Scott Holmes, BROCK, PAYNE & MEECE, PA, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, Acting United States
Attorney, Frank J. Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robin Snipes Perry appeals her jury conviction on four
counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West
2000 & Supp. 2011), based on her alleged scheme to defraud her
employer, Becton, Dickinson & Company (“BDC”). On appeal, Perry
argues that the district court erred in denying her Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for acquittal, abused its
discretion in denying her pretrial motion in limine, and abused
its discretion in admitting a prior consistent statement.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Perry finds fault with the district court’s denial of
her motion in limine and admission of a prior consistent
statement. Perry’s motion in limine sought to exclude evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Rule 404(b), however,
applies only to evidence of extrinsic acts, not evidence of
those acts that are intrinsic to the charged offenses. United
States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 326 (4th Cir. 2009). Upon
review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the evidence of Perry’s uncharged
conduct was intrinsic to the charged offenses or in denying the
motion in limine. See United States v. Hornsby, 666 F.3d 296,
309 (4th Cir. 2012) (providing standard of review).
Turning to the remaining evidentiary issue, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
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admitting a witness’ prior consistent statement to rebut the
implication on cross-examination that he fabricated his trial
testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B); United States v.
Johnson, 617 F.3d 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard
of review).
Finally, Perry challenges the denial of her motion for
acquittal. We review de novo the district court’s denial of a
Rule 29 motion. United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150, 160
(4th Cir. 2006). A jury verdict must be upheld “if there is
substantial evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Id. “[S]ubstantial evidence is
evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). We consider both circumstantial and direct evidence,
drawing all reasonable inferences from such evidence in the
government’s favor. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333
(4th Cir. 2008). However, “[w]e may not weigh the evidence or
review the credibility of the witnesses [because] [t]hose
functions are reserved for the jury.” United States v. Wilson,
118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal citation omitted).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we
conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence from
which the jury could conclude that Perry committed mail fraud.
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See United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659, 666 (4th Cir. 2001)
(providing elements of mail fraud); see also Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (stating that scheme to defraud
must involve material misrepresentation). Thus, the district
court did not err in denying the Rule 29 motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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