Patrick Jeffers v. Perry Lyons, Jr. , 605 F. App'x 198 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6023
PATRICK TIMOTHY JEFFERS,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
PERRY T. LYONS, JR., Police Investigator; AUSTIN MOON,
Middlesex County, Va. Police Officer; DREW BLAKE, Middlesex
County, Va. Police Officer,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony J. Trenga,
District Judge. (1:14-cv-01390-AJT-TCB)
Submitted: May 28, 2015 Decided: June 2, 2015
Before AGEE, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Patrick Timothy Jeffers, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Timothy Jeffers appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. Jeffers
claims on appeal that the district court erred in finding his
Fourth Amendment claim barred by collateral estoppel. 1 He also
challenges the court’s decision not to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his state law claims. We affirm in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
Jeffers alleged that three Virginia police officers
conducted a warrantless search of his home, which led to his
arrest for possession of child pornography. Jeffers moved in
state court to suppress the seized evidence on Fourth Amendment
grounds. Although the Virginia court held, during criminal
proceedings, that the officers should have obtained a warrant,
it denied Jeffers’ suppression motion, finding that the officers
had acted in good faith. Jeffers pleaded guilty and is
currently serving a state prison sentence.
Jeffers filed this § 1983 action seeking damages for
alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, and asserting related tort claims under Virginia
law. The district court determined that collateral estoppel
1
We grant Jeffers’ motion to file an amended informal
brief.
2
barred Jeffers’ Fourth Amendment claim because the state
criminal court had denied his motion to suppress. The district
court also held that Jeffers had failed to state a Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment claim. 2 In the absence of a federal claim,
the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Jeffers’ state law claims.
Although collateral estoppel can bar a § 1983 plaintiff
from relitigating a Fourth Amendment claim that a state criminal
court decided against him, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
102-04 (1980), we look to Virginia law to determine the
preclusive effect of the Virginia court’s judgment. Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 n.2 (1994); see 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(2012); Allen, 449 U.S. at 96. “In Virginia, the settled rule
is that ‘a judgment of conviction or acquittal in a criminal
prosecution does not establish in a subsequent civil action the
truth of the facts on which it was rendered’ and ‘such judgment
of conviction or acquittal is not admissible in evidence’ in the
civil case.” Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Dean, 355 S.E.2d 579,
579 (Va. 1987) (quoting Smith v. New Dixie Lines, Inc., 111
S.E.2d 434, 438 (Va. 1959)); see also Kane v. Hargis, 987 F.2d
2
Because Jeffers does not challenge this portion of the
district court’s ruling in his amended informal brief, he has
forfeited appellate review of these claims. See 4th Cir. R.
34(b).
3
1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing this rule); United
States v. Turner, 933 F.2d 240, 243 n.2 (4th Cir. 1991) (same).
Because Jeffers’ criminal judgment would have no preclusive
effect in a subsequent civil matter in a Virginia court, it can
have no such effect in federal court. Accordingly, we conclude
that the Virginia court’s denial of Jeffers’ motion to suppress
does not collaterally estop him from raising a Fourth Amendment
claim for damages in a § 1983 action.
We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of
Jeffers’ Fourth Amendment claim and remand for further
proceedings. We further vacate the dismissal of Jeffers’ state
law claims and remand for the district court’s consideration of
whether the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would be
appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012). Finally, we affirm
the remainder of the district court’s judgment. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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