United States v. Jacob Hill , 506 F. App'x 221 ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 12-4524
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JACOB IVAN HILL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.   Frank D. Whitney,
    District Judge. (3:06-cr-00118-FDW-CH-1)
    Submitted:   January 17, 2013             Decided:   January 24, 2013
    Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    D.   Baker  McIntyre,   III,  Charlotte, North   Carolina,  for
    Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jacob Ivan Hill appeals the district court’s judgment
    revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-
    four months’ imprisonment.                       Hill’s attorney has filed a brief
    pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), asserting
    that    there       are        no     meritorious                   grounds     for     appeal,     but
    questioning whether the district court erred in finding that
    Hill committed a Grade A violation.                                 Hill raises essentially the
    same    contention        in    his        pro   se       supplemental          brief.        For   the
    reasons that follow, we affirm.
    We     review           a     district             court’s       judgment        revoking
    supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment for abuse
    of discretion.        United States v. Pregent, 
    190 F.3d 279
    , 282 (4th
    Cir. 1999).       To revoke supervised release, a district court need
    only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by a
    preponderance of the evidence.                            18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006);
    United States v. Copley, 
    978 F.2d 829
    , 831 (4th Cir. 1992).
    Because the standard of proof for a supervised release violation
    is    less   than    that           required      for           a    criminal     conviction,       the
    district     court    may           find    that          the       defendant     has    violated    a
    condition of his supervised release based on its own finding of
    new    criminal     conduct,          even       if       the       defendant    is     acquitted   on
    criminal     charges       arising          from          the       same   conduct,      or    if   the
    charges against him are dropped.                            United States v. Stephenson,
    2
    
    928 F.2d 728
    , 732 (6th Cir. 1991); see also United States v.
    Jolibois,    
    294 F.3d 1110
    ,       1114       (9th    Cir.    2002)    (violation       of
    terms of supervised release is determined based on defendant’s
    conduct and may be found whether defendant was ever convicted of
    any particular offense).
    Hill argues that, at most, he was guilty of a Grade C
    violation.     This contention is not persuasive in light of the
    Government’s       evidence        of    Hill’s       conduct,      which     included       the
    testimony of the investigating detective and video-recordings of
    Hill’s assault on another man.                   The video-recordings depict Hill
    and his associate, Naskahari Williams, violently assaulting the
    victim; particularly, Hill punched the victim in the head and
    restrained     the        victim        while       Williams       pistol     whipped       him.
    Although the district court considered Hill’s claim that the
    assault was precipitated by the victim’s threat to kill Hill and
    Williams, it did not credit that testimony.                              Such a credibility
    determination is not susceptible to appellate scrutiny.                                    Accord
    United   States      v.     Cates,       
    613 F.3d 856
    ,    858    (8th   Cir.      2010)
    (“Witness credibility is quintessentially a judgment call and
    virtually    unassailable           on       appeal”       (internal       quotation        marks
    omitted)).
    A Grade A supervised release violation results from
    “conduct     constituting          a      federal,         state,    or      local     offense
    punishable     by     a     term        of     imprisonment         exceeding        one    year
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    that . . . is a crime of violence.”                      U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
    Manual    (“USSG”)    § 7B1.1(a)(1)(i),                p.s.    (2006).           A    “crime     of
    violence” for purposes of § 7B1.1(a)(1)(i), p.s. includes any
    state    or    federal    crime        that       “has    as    an     element         the    use,
    attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
    person of another” or “is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
    extortion,     involves     use       of    explosives,         or    otherwise         involves
    conduct     that    presents      a    serious         potential       risk      of     physical
    injury to another,” that is punishable by more than a year in
    prison.     USSG §§ 4B1.2(a), 7B1.1, p.s., cmt. n.2.
    We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the
    video-recordings         reflect,          at    minimum,       that    Hill          aided     and
    abetted Williams’ assault with a deadly weapon with the intent
    to   kill     and   causing     serious           injury.        Such       an       assault     is
    classified as a Class C felony under North Carolina law.                                        See
    N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-32(a) (2011).                     Pursuant to North Carolina’s
    Structured      Sentencing      Act,            the   lowest     possible            sentence     a
    defendant convicted of this offense could receive is forty-four
    months’     imprisonment.         See       N.C.      Gen.     Stat.    §    15A-1340.17(c)
    (2011).        We   therefore         readily         affirm    the     district         court’s
    finding that Hill committed a Grade A violation.                                     Finally, we
    note that the State of North Carolina’s decision to dismiss its
    charges     against    Hill    does         not       affect    this     analysis.              See
    
    Stephenson, 928 F.2d at 732
    ; USSG § 7B1.1, p.s., cmt. n.1.
    4
    Although       Hill    does      not        assign    any     error    to    or
    otherwise challenge the twenty-four-month sentence he received,
    because    this   case   is    before      us     pursuant       to    Anders,    we    have
    reviewed the sentence and conclude that it is procedurally and
    substantively reasonable.             The sentence is within the prescribed
    sentencing range and is not plainly unreasonable.                          Accordingly,
    we affirm Hill’s sentence.              United States v. Crudup, 
    461 F.3d 433
    , 438–40 (4th Cir. 2006).
    In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
    record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
    appeal.      We   therefore       affirm     the     district         court’s    judgment.
    This court requires that counsel inform Hill, in writing, of his
    right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
    further review.      If Hill requests that a petition be filed, but
    counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
    counsel    may    move   in    this    court       at    that    time     for    leave   to
    withdraw from representation.                Counsel’s motion must state that
    a   copy   thereof   was      served    on       Hill.     We    dispense       with    oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before this court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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