Pledger v. City of VA Beach ( 1996 )


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  • UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    TIMOTHY A. PLEDGER,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                                    No. 95-2295
    CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
    Tommy E. Miller, Magistrate Judge.
    (CA-94-1012-2)
    Submitted: October 29, 1996
    Decided: November 21, 1996
    Before WIDENER, HALL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    Timothy A. Pledger, Appellant Pro Se. Kenneth Michael Golski,
    CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appel-
    lee.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
    Local Rule 36(c).
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    PER CURIAM:
    Timothy Pledger appeals the district court's grant of judgment as
    a matter of law to the City of Virginia Beach (the City) in Pledger's
    action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     (1994), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
    (1994). The district court found Pledger's action barred by the appli-
    cable statutes of limitation. Finding no error, we affirm.
    Pledger alleged that the City exposed him to a racially hostile envi-
    ronment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. He conceded that the
    last overt act of alleged discrimination occurred in May 1992. Yet, he
    failed to file his § 1983 claim until October 20, 1994--more than two
    years after the last overt act of discrimination.See VA. CODE ANN.
    § 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992); Runyon v. McCrary, 
    427 U.S. 160
    , 180
    (1976). Further, he failed to file a claim with the Equal Employment
    Opportunity Commission until July 7, 1993--more than 180 days
    after the last overt act of alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-5(e). Thus, Pledger's claims are time-barred unless he estab-
    lished a continuing violation. See Nealon v. Stone, 
    958 F.2d 584
    , 590
    n.4 (4th Cir. 1992).
    Pledger claimed the City's continual failure to promote him until
    the time of trial constituted a continuing violation. However, he con-
    ceded that the last overt act of discrimination occurred in May 1992,
    and failed to cite any specific instance of discrimination within the
    statute of limitations period. 
    Id.
     The continuing violation theory
    applies only when an actual violation occurred within the limitations
    period. Woodard v. Lehman, 
    717 F.2d 909
    , 915 (4th Cir. 1983). A
    "mere allegation of continuing discrimination without any identifica-
    tion of a discriminatory event within the statute of limitations period
    is insufficient to prove a continuing violation." Nealon, 
    958 F.2d at
    592 (citing Woodard, 
    717 F.2d at 914-16
    ). Thus, Pledger's claims are
    time-barred.
    Accordingly, we affirm the court's decision. We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
    ented in the material before the court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    2