United States v. Gregory Taylor , 509 F. App'x 205 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4293
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GREGORY SYLVESTER TAYLOR, JR., a/k/a Knowledge Born Allah,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:10-
cr-00297-RWT-1)
Argued: October 26, 2012 Decided: February 8, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge Davis joined.
ARGUED: Meghan Suzanne Skelton, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Adam Kenneth Ake,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
After pleading guilty to four counts of bank larceny, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), Gregory Taylor was given a
variance sentence of 63 months’ imprisonment. He now challenges
the sentence, contending (1) that the government breached its
plea agreement in telling the district court that Taylor’s
pretrial conduct qualified for an obstruction of justice
enhancement; (2) that the district court erred in finding that
an obstruction of justice enhancement was justified; and (3)
that the sentence was substantively unreasonable.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I
On December 29, 2009, Gregory Taylor entered a SunTrust
bank in Upper Marlboro, Maryland, and handed the teller a demand
note stating, “I want all 100’s and 50’s NOW!” The teller gave
Taylor $1,235, and Taylor fled. Taylor used the same modus
operandi to obtain $200 from a Chevy Chase bank in District
Heights, Maryland, on February 23, 2010; $2,250 from a Wachovia
bank in Largo, Maryland, on February 24, 2010; and $500 from a
BB&T bank in Temple Hills, Maryland, on April 2, 2010.
After he was indicted and a lawyer in the Federal Public
Defender’s Office was appointed for him, Taylor refused to
cooperate with his counsel. Also, both before and after counsel
2
was appointed, Taylor undertook a campaign to flood the district
court with frivolous motions and lawsuits. His motions were
laced with terminology evocative of the Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), such as his signing the motions “‘Without Prejudice’
Gregory Sylvester Taylor J©, Authorized Representative d/b/a
GREGORY SYLVESTER TAYLOR J©, DEBTOR” and phrases like “I will
stipulate to all of the facts and accept and return the same for
full settlement and closure in the transaction.” Taylor’s
motions included a motion for an appearance bond or personal
recognizance, a motion for return of property, and a motion for
dismissal of the indictment. He also filed numerous civil suits
in the district court against various governmental bodies and
officials such as the police station, the sheriff’s department,
the district court, and the governor.
Taylor’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel, and
on July 23, 2010, the district court held a hearing on the
motion, which included consideration of Taylor’s wish to
represent himself and his competency to waive counsel. At the
hearing, when addressing the court, Taylor continued to use UCC-
laced terminology, telling the court, “I don’t consent to this
conversation. . . . I’m here to accept the charges for value
and returning for value in exchange for my exemption that the
charges be dismissed.”
3
The court told Taylor that it was “very familiar with the
various movements that assert these various positions that
you’re taking” and noted that Taylor had “filed 14 civil suits
in this court, all of which have been found to be frivolous and
dismissed.” The court warned Taylor that “if you are found
guilty and the time comes for sentencing, I want you to know
that under our sentencing guidelines, if I conclude that you’ve
taken steps to obstruct justice, that that could enhance the
amount of sentence you might be recommended for under those
guidelines.” The court then asked Taylor to directly answer his
questions.
When the court resumed asking Taylor whether he wanted to
proceed without counsel, Taylor told the court at least four
times that he wished to proceed on his own. He then said, “I’m
not here to argue the facts of this case. I’m only here to
request that the charges be dropped and the bond be released to
me at this time.” The court replied, “Sir, what you’re saying
is legal gibberish. It makes no sense whatsoever and it’s not
effective for what you want to do.”
The court again tried to persuade Taylor to accept counsel,
emphasizing the seriousness of the charges that Taylor was
facing. Taylor again declined counsel and told the court that
he wanted to proceed on his own. Taylor then tried to “plead
guilty on behalf of the defendant debtor, but that’s not me.”
4
The court replied that this was “legally nonsensical” and
directed the clerk to enter a plea of “not guilty” on Taylor’s
behalf.
In its subsequent written order, the court granted the
Public Defender’s motion to withdraw, concluding that Taylor had
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel. The court also appointed standby counsel, over
Taylor’s objection.
Shortly after the hearing, Taylor requested counsel and the
court then reappointed counsel from the Public Defender’s
Office.
Even after having counsel reappointed, Taylor continued to
send the court various pro se motions using UCC terminology,
asking, for example, that the case be dismissed because he had
“accepted all charges of the DEBTOR/DEFENDANT . . . and have
returned them to the above courts for offset” and for a chance
to “tender an offer to discharge all old case bonds, bails, or
other obligations with an exchange of my exemption.”
At the hearing on Taylor’s pretrial motions, on December
13, 2010, Taylor’s counsel told the court that Taylor might
change his plea, but would first like to hear the court’s
opinions on his various motions. The court complied, telling
Taylor that the types of suits and motions he filed “have been
classic examples of what . . . [is] referred to at various times
5
as the ‘flesh and blood defense’ or the ‘sovereign man
defense.’” The “flesh and blood” defense, the court explained,
is a theory with “origins in some white supremacist groups and
essentially attempts to do everything it can to jam the
courthouse computers with nonsensical pleadings” and had now
unfortunately arisen in a number of cases in the district. The
court told Taylor that he was “treat[ing] these nonsensical
motions as motions challenging the jurisdiction of this court
and . . . I will overrule and deny them.”
After Taylor conferred with his lawyer, his lawyer informed
the court that Taylor wished to plead guilty. Taylor’s counsel
told the court that “Mr. Taylor . . . has been adamant that I
tell the Court . . . that by filing the motions . . . his
intention was merely to avail himself of what he thought were
means by which to obtain information, discovery, and . . . other
relief.” Then Taylor, through counsel, again asked the court
for its views on the “flesh and blood” defense. The court told
him that the defense “is one that has absolutely no merit” and
was “designed to gum up the machinery of the court.” Taylor
thanked the court, and the court then proceeded with the
rearraignment.
Taylor pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement
with the government. Under the agreement, the parties
stipulated that the base offense level was 7, pursuant to
6
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), and that the offense level was to be
increased to 9 because the thefts were from the person of
another, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(3). The parties also
stipulated that the government “d[id] not oppose” a 2-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a final
offense level of 7. Finally, the parties agreed: “[N]o other
offense characteristics, sentencing guidelines factors,
potential departures or adjustments set forth in the United
States Sentencing Guidelines or in 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) will be
raised or are in dispute.”
After entering his guilty plea, Taylor again sent the court
a letter using the language of the “flesh and blood” defense.
At Taylor’s sentencing hearing on March 3, 2011, the
district court, after discussing the volume of Taylor’s
frivolous motions and suits and the efforts they required of the
U.S. Attorney’s Office and the court, asked the parties whether
Taylor’s motions and suits warranted an upward adjustment for
obstruction of justice. The court heard from defense counsel
and then had the following exchange with the Assistant United
States Attorney (“AUSA”).
THE COURT: I understand the government has an
agreement and is bound by it. But I’m asking you as
an officer of the court whether you believe what I’ve
described does or does not constitute obstruction of
justice for an enhancement of an offense level.
* * *
7
AUSA: Certainly with respect to the filings that were
submitted after the guilty plea. We would have
serious concerns about that . . . given that by that
time as I understand it the Public Defenders office
was in the case and yet the filings continued. I
think as a legal matter the filings do qualify for the
obstruction of justice enhancement, but as a
contractual matter we are not seeking that and I want
to make that clear on the record.
After Taylor’s counsel protested that the AUSA was not familiar
with the documents, as the AUSA was standing in for the assigned
AUSA, the court responded:
I’ve directed him as an officer of the Court to give
me a legal opinion answer, and he’s clearly indicated
that he is standing by the plea agreement. He is not
in violation of the plea agreement. He’s an officer
of the court. He’s obligated to answer me when I ask
him a question.
The court heard additional arguments from Taylor’s counsel and
then decided to impose the enhancement, explaining:
[Taylor] may have been misguided, but being misguided
is not a defense to this kind of behavior. It’s gone
on with a number of people. It’s a plague that I
don’t want to help it spread as being almost a sport
of sending frivolous documents in . . . it’s gotten
pretty bad in some cases. Not as bad in this one, but
this is clearly a case in which there’s been a
systematic effort to thwart the prosecution . . .
[that resulted in] a considerable amount of effort by
staff of this court and by this judge to deal with it.
Accordingly, the court raised Taylor’s offense level 2 levels,
to 9, which, with a criminal history Category III, resulted in a
recommended Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment.
The court then requested argument on what the appropriate
sentence should be.
8
Consistent with the plea agreement, the government
requested a 14-month sentence. Taylor’s attorney asked for a
sentence of 10 months, arguing that the Guidelines already
accounted for Taylor’s criminal history and that any treatment
of Taylor’s previously undiagnosed psychosocial thought disorder
would be most effective if he were not in custody.
Taylor then addressed the court, stating, “I just want to
apologize for . . . filings in your court that, you know, were
deemed frivolous. I didn’t know, again, that these things
were.”
In imposing sentence, the court explained that it had “very
carefully considered” the Guidelines range of 8 to 14 months,
but found it to be “hopelessly, woefully inadequate.” The court
pointed out that Taylor had committed “four different bank
holdups over a relatively short period of time running from
December 2009 to April 2010,” that he was a recidivist, and that
the court had to consider protecting the public. The court
observed that Taylor had earlier received a sentence of 63
months’ imprisonment for a bank robbery that was a “strikingly
similar” “note job” and that he had also received an additional
five months in that case for violating the conditions of
supervised release. Despite those sentences, the court noted,
Taylor had not been deterred from pursuing his criminal conduct.
9
The court also analyzed Taylor’s other criminal history,
including convictions for assault on a law enforcement officer,
for which Taylor received a “relatively trivial slap on the
wrist,” and an unlawful wounding, for which he again received a
“very substantial break.”
The court next considered Taylor’s mental health,
concluding that “to release [Taylor] to the public now, with the
hope that somehow he’ll do what he’s never done in the past, is
not something that I think would be appropriate. I believe that
he needs medical care, including mental health services, in a
structured environment.”
Finally, the court, after observing again that Taylor had
received 63 months in the Eastern District of Virginia “[f]or
virtually the same offense conduct,” expressed the desirability
of punishing the same conduct in a uniform manner. It then
imposed a variance sentence of 63 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal, Taylor raises three issues, contending (1) that
the government, in giving its opinion on the obstruction of
justice enhancement, breached its plea agreement; (2) that the
court erred by imposing an obstruction of justice enhancement,
and therefore the sentence was procedurally unreasonable; and
(3) that the 63-month sentence was substantively unreasonable.
10
II
Taylor contends first that the government breached its plea
agreement not to “raise” or place “in dispute” any Guidelines
factors by “arguing that Taylor’s conduct constituted
obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.”
The government argues that it did not violate the agreement
because it did not argue for the enhancement. Alternatively, it
maintains that if found to be in violation of the agreement, its
conduct would nonetheless have been justified because Taylor
breached his obligations when he continued with his obstructive
campaign even after the plea agreement.
Because plea agreements are “rooted in contract law,” “each
party should receive the benefit of its bargain.” United States
v. Lewis, 633 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United
States v. Dawson, 587 F.3d 640, 645 (4th Cir. 2009)). “It is
elementary that, when a plea rests in any significant degree on
a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said
to become part of the inducement or consideration, such promise
must be fulfilled.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the plea agreement included a “Factual and
Advisory Guidelines Stipulation” by which Taylor and the
government agreed to a set of applicable Guidelines factors,
which did not include an enhancement for obstruction of justice.
The parties also agreed that “[n]o other offense
11
characteristics, sentencing guidelines factors, potential
departures or adjustments set forth in the United States
Sentencing Guidelines or in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) will be raised
or are in dispute.” (Emphasis added). Taylor contends that the
government breached this agreement when the AUSA told the court,
in response to the court’s question, that Taylor’s conduct
qualified for the obstruction of justice enhancement. The
exchange with the AUSA was as follows:
THE COURT: I understand the government has an
agreement and is bound by it. But I’m asking you as
an officer of the court whether you believe what I’ve
described does or does not constitute obstruction of
justice for an enhancement of an offense level.
* * *
AUSA: Certainly with respect to the filings that were
submitted after the guilty plea. We would have
serious concerns about that . . . given that by that
time as I understand it the Public Defenders office
was in the case and yet the filings continued. I
think as a legal matter the filings do qualify for the
obstruction of justice enhancement, but as a
contractual matter we are not seeking that and I want
to make that clear on the record.
(Emphasis added). When Taylor’s counsel protested that the AUSA
was standing in for the assigned AUSA and was not familiar with
the documents he was discussing, the court responded:
THE COURT: I’ve directed him as an officer of the
Court to give me a legal opinion answer, and he’s
clearly indicated that he is standing by the plea
agreement. He is not in violation of the plea
agreement. He’s an officer of the court. He’s
obligated to answer me when I ask him a question.
12
We agree with Taylor that inadvertent prosecutorial conduct
can breach a plea agreement, see United States v. Peglera, 33
F.3d 412, 415 (4th Cir. 1994), as can conduct taken in complying
with the directive of the court, see United States v. Keller,
422 F. App’x 273, 275 (4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). But the
plea agreement in this case required that the government not
“raise” an enhancement, nor place one “in dispute.” The
government did neither; it did not argue for or even indicate
its approval of or agreement with the imposition of an
obstruction of justice enhancement. It simply gave the court a
legal opinion in response to the court’s direct request, adding
quickly that it was not requesting the enhancement. This
conduct did not amount to a breach of the plea agreement.
Taylor argues nonetheless that “[his] sentencing presents
facts identical to those in Keller.” But Keller is readily
distinguishable. In Keller, the court concluded that the
government had breached the plea agreement because “the AUSA
specifically advocated for application of the enhancements when
he commented in detail on the strength of evidence supporting
the enhancements.” 422 F. App’x at 275 (emphasis added). In
contrast, the AUSA here did not “advocate” for the enhancement,
nor did he even “comment . . . on the strength of the evidence”
for one. The AUSA merely gave a direct answer to the court’s
request for an opinion, quickly noting that it was not
13
advocating for the type of enhancement on which it was giving an
opinion.
Taylor also argues that “the government’s insistence on
appeal that Taylor’s conduct merited a sentencing enhancement
for obstruction of justice” was also a breach of the plea
agreement. (Emphasis added). Again, we disagree. On appeal,
the government did nothing more than defend the district court’s
sentence, as it was permitted to do. The district court, not
being a party to the plea agreement, was free to apply the
enhancement. Moreover, because the court was not bound by the
agreement and was legally free to impose the obstruction of
justice enhancement, the government has the right to defend the
action on appeal as part of a legal sentence. See Lewis, 633
F.3d at 270 (stating that a district court “always has the
authority to either accept or reject any [plea] agreement”).
The plea agreement did not address such conduct taken on appeal.
Because we conclude that the government did not breach the
plea agreement, we do not reach the government’s alternative
argument that any breach was justified because Taylor’s post-
plea filings were a breach of his obligations under the
agreement.
14
III
Taylor next contends that the district court erred in
applying an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G.
§ 3C1.1 because (1) the court did not clearly find, nor did the
record show, that Taylor willfully obstructed justice; and (2)
in any event Taylor’s conduct did not rise to the level
necessary to constitute an obstruction of justice under § 3C1.1.
He argues that these errors rendered his sentence procedurally
unreasonable.
The government contends that the court’s finding that
Taylor’s conduct was obstructive was not clearly erroneous
because the filing of numerous frivolous pleadings and suits
with the intent to hinder the prosecution can be obstructive
conduct. It also contends that any error was, in any case,
harmless because the court gave Taylor a variance sentence under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which was not tied to the Guidelines.
Before considering the appropriate sentence under
§ 3553(a), the district court increased Taylor’s Guidelines
offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice, pursuant
to § 3C1.1. That section provides, among other things, for an
enhancement if the defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded,
or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or
sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” (Emphasis
15
added). Thus, the defendant must have “consciously act[ed] with
the purpose of obstructing justice.” United States v. Thorson,
633 F.3d 312, 320 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. Romulus, 949 F.2d 713, 717 (4th Cir.
1991)).
Taylor argues that we “cannot be confident that the
district court indeed made a factual finding that Taylor acted
with a culpable state of mind” and suggests that the court
instead “imputed to Taylor a state of mind described by other
decisions in other cases.” But the record does not support this
argument.
The court concluded multiple times that Taylor himself had
acted with the requisite intent. For example, at the sentencing
hearing, the court described the deliberateness of Taylor’s
“efforts outside of this case [in filing frivolous lawsuits] to
interfere with [this case].” The court then described the
deliberateness of Taylor’s efforts inside the case to interfere,
noting, “there are consequences to taking actions designed to
thwart the court system and the proper administration of
justice.” Finally, the court concluded that “this is clearly a
case in which there’s been a systematic effort [by Taylor] to
thwart this prosecution.”
Although the court did recognize the increasing use of the
“flesh and blood” defense generally and the consequent problems
16
it is creating for the justice system, the court did not impute
to Taylor a state of mind derived from those other cases. After
making its observation about the rise of the “flesh and blood”
defense generally, the court turned to the facts of this case
and concluded that “this is clearly a case” with the requisite
intent. (Emphasis added).
Taylor also contends that the record does not show that he
willfully obstructed or impeded the administration of justice.
He argues that, to the contrary, the record shows that he
believed that the “flesh and blood” defense was a valid legal
defense or even that his action was the product of a mental
disease or defect. The district court rejected this claim. The
court found that Taylor deliberately used the defense to
“thwart” the court system and, in particular, his prosecution.
Based on the record, we cannot conclude that the court’s finding
was clearly erroneous.
Finally, Taylor claims that “mounting a ‘flesh and blood’
type of defense is not the kind of conduct that merits a
sentencing enhancement under § 3C1.1.” While it is true that
Taylor’s conduct is not identified in the “Examples of Covered
Conduct” in the Commentary to § 3C1.1, the Commentary makes
clear that the examples given are “a non-exhaustive list.”
Moreover, “the courts of appeals have applied [§ 3C1.1] to a
17
variety of misconduct” beyond the examples given. United States
v. Ashers, 968 F.2d 411, 413 (4th Cir. 1992).
In this case, the district court warned Taylor in open
court about the consequences of his defense strategy:
[I]f you are found guilty and the time comes for
sentencing, I want you to know that under our
sentencing guidelines, if I conclude that you’ve taken
steps to obstruct justice, that that could enhance the
amount of sentence you might be recommended for under
those guidelines.
And the court warned Taylor again when it told him that “I’ll be
very patient with you, but I want to make sure you understand
that when and if you’re found guilty, if that happens, and
you’re presumed to be innocent, that that could affect your
sentence potentially.”
Despite these warnings, Taylor continued to file groundless
motions. And at sentencing, the court found:
[T]his is clearly a case in which there’s been a
systematic effort to thwart this prosecution, both by
actions internal to the case with the pleadings that I
have summarized previously, as well as frivolous suits
that were consistently dismissed by this court after a
considerable amount of effort by staff of this court
and by this judge to deal with it.
It found further that Taylor had “run roughshod over the court
system” by filing a flood of motions and “14 civil suits . . .
all of which have been found to be frivolous and dismissed.”
We conclude that the district court’s factual findings are
not clearly erroneous, and we agree with the court that the
18
disruptive conduct, resulting in the expenditure of
administrative and judicial time and expense, was sufficiently
obstructive to warrant the enhancement under § 3C1.1.
Accordingly, we reject Taylor’s argument that the court’s
application of the enhancement rendered Taylor’s sentence
procedurally unreasonable. We therefore do not reach the
government’s argument on harmless error.
IV
Finally, Taylor challenges his sentence as substantively
unreasonable, arguing that “the court gave more weight to
certain of the § 3553(a) factors than was due, and failed to
make an individualized assessment based on the facts of the
present case.”
Taylor pleaded guilty to four counts of bank larceny, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and convictions under that
statute are punishable by a maximum sentence of 20 years’
imprisonment for each conviction. The government and Taylor
stipulated that the Sentencing Guidelines provide a base offense
level for these offenses of 7, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(a)(1). The district court then increased the offense
level to 9 with application of the obstruction of justice
enhancement, under § 3C1.1. Based on Taylor’s criminal history
Category III, the recommended Guidelines sentencing range was
19
therefore 8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. If the Guidelines for
bank robbery, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1, had been applied, the analogous
Guidelines sentencing range would have been 63 to 78 months’
imprisonment.
After recognizing the applicable Guidelines range of 8 to
14 months’ imprisonment, the court observed that a sentence
within that range for four bank heists was “hopelessly, woefully
inadequate to provide punishment that is sufficient to take into
account all of the factors in Section 3553.” The court then
conducted a systematic analysis of the relevant factors under
§ 3553(a) and determined that it was necessary to impose a
variance sentence of 63 months’ imprisonment.
Among other § 3553(a) factors, the court considered (1) the
seriousness of the crime -- “four bank holdups over a relatively
short amount of time”; (2) Taylor’s criminal history, which
included a bank robbery in Virginia that had a “striking
similarity” to the holdups here; (3) the leniency of Taylor’s
past sentences and Taylor’s failure to be deterred, including
Taylor’s violation of his supervised release conditions for his
prior bank robbery conviction; (4) the need to protect the
public; and (5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities because Taylor had been prosecuted, albeit for
robbery, for “virtually the same offense” in the Eastern
District of Virginia and received a 63-month sentence.
20
We review every sentence “‘under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard,’ regardless of whether the sentence imposed
is ‘inside, just outside, or significantly outside the
Guidelines range,’” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41
(2007)), and determine whether it was reasonable based on “the
totality of the circumstances,” id. at 164 (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 51).
Taylor makes three points to argue that his sentence was
unreasonable. He argues that the § 3553(a) analysis was flawed
in that: (1) the court did not make an individualized
assessment because it imposed a sentence equal to his prior
sentence for robbery; (2) it gave excessive weight to Taylor’s
criminal history; and (3) it improperly weighed Taylor’s mental
health in calculating the sentence.
As to the first point, Taylor asserts that his sentence was
based on an “improper analogy to a prior dissimilar offense”
because Taylor’s prior conviction was for bank robbery and here
he pled guilty to bank larceny. The district court, however,
was following the Supreme Court’s direction to “maintain[] a
strong connection between the sentence imposed and the
offender’s real conduct.” United States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d
556, 564 (4th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246
21
(2005)). In explaining why it believed that 14 months was an
inadequate sentence for four bank heists, the court pointed to,
among other things, the 63-month sentence that the district
court had given Taylor “for virtually the same offense conduct.”
This is not a case like United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244,
1260 (10th Cir. 2007), where the court sentenced the defendant
“for an entirely different, and far more serious, crime.”
Rather, as the court concluded in this case, the facts of the
offense at issue and the facts in Taylor’s past robbery were
virtually the same. We conclude that the district court did not
err when considering “the nature and circumstances of the
offense,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and analogizing this case to the
earlier case.
Taylor’s second point is that the court “emphasized
Taylor’s prior [criminal] history, to the exclusion of other
factors.” But this claim is simply not supported by the record.
As described above, the court carefully walked through numerous
relevant § 3553(a) factors and properly considered Taylor’s
criminal history as one among many of those factors that
influenced it. Taylor also argues on this point that “the
Guidelines already account for [his] criminal history.” While
it is true that the Guidelines take into account a defendant’s
criminal history, § 3553(a) allows a district court to consider
a defendant’s criminal history in making the determination of a
22
variance sentence. We therefore conclude that the district
court did not err in considering Taylor’s criminal history when
determining the appropriate sentence under § 3553(a).
Finally, Taylor argues that the court “did not sufficiently
consider the need to provide Taylor with medical care in the
most effective manner, and misunderstood the deterrent effect
that medical treatment would have.” The sentencing transcript,
however, shows to the contrary -- that the district court knew
about and carefully considered Taylor’s psychosocial disorder
diagnosis. On this point, Taylor also claims that the court
impermissibly considered rehabilitation, in violation of the
proscription of the Sentencing Reform Act that “a court may not
impose or lengthen a prison sentence to enable an offender to
complete a treatment program or otherwise to promote
rehabilitation.” Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2393
(2011). The record, again, belies the argument. The record
shows that the court did not determine the length of an
appropriate sentence based on a need for treatment. To the
contrary, it declined to shorten Taylor’s sentence based on his
asserted mental health needs. It simply and permissibly
expressed its hope that Taylor would take advantage of mental
health services while incarcerated. “A court commits no error
by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison
23
or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs”).
Id. at 2392.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Taylor’s sentence.
AFFIRMED
24