United States v. Divine Shabazz , 509 F. App'x 265 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-7874
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DIVINE SHABAZZ, a/k/a Lamar Martin,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (3:00-cr-00344-3; 3:06-cv-00067-HCM;
3:06-cv-00518-HCM)
Submitted: February 7, 2013 Decided: February 12, 2013
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Divine Shabazz, Appellant Pro Se. David Thomas Maguire,
Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Divine Shabazz appeals from the district court’s
orders denying his motion to file a relation back amendment to
his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2012) motion and denying his
motion for reconsideration of the denial. Shabazz asserts that
the district court erred when it dismissed his Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c) motion to amend the § 2255 motion because he was not
entitled to relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). We vacate the
district court’s order denying Shabazz’s motion under Rule 15(c)
to amend his § 2255 motion. “[L]eave to amend a pleading should
be denied only when the amendment would be prejudicial to the
opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the
moving party, or the amendment would be futile.” Johnson v.
Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (construing
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
“Delay alone, however, is an insufficient reason to
deny the plaintiff’s motion to amend.” Laber v. Harvey, 438
F.3d 404, 427 (4th Cir. 2006). “For this reason, a district
court may not deny such a motion simply because it has entered
judgment against the plaintiff — be it a judgment of dismissal,
a summary judgment, or a judgment after a trial on the merits.”
Id. “Instead, a post-judgment motion to amend is evaluated
under the same legal standard as a similar motion filed before
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judgment was entered — for prejudice, bad faith, or futility.”
Id.As this court recognized in Laber and reiterated in
Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 470-71 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 115 (2011), the only difference
between a pre- and a post-judgment motion to amend is that the
district court may not grant the post-judgment motion unless the
judgment is vacated pursuant to Rule 59(e) or 60(b). See
Katyle, 637 F.3d at 470; Laber, 438 F.3d at 427. “To determine
whether vacatur is warranted, however, the court need not
concern itself with either of those rules’ legal standards.”
Katyle, 637 F.3d at 471. Rather, “[t]he court need only ask
whether the amendment should be granted, just as it would on a
prejudgment motion to amend pursuant to [Rule] 15(a).” Id.; see
also Laber, 438 F.3d at 426-29 (analyzing whether the district
court erred in denying a post-judgment motion to amend under the
more liberal motion to amend standard, rather than the more
stringent Rule 59(e) standard, and concluding that the district
court erred in denying the Rule 59(e) motion because the
plaintiff did not act in bad faith, the amendment was not
futile, and the defendant would not be prejudiced). We review
for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion to
amend a complaint, regardless of whether that motion is filed
pre- or post-judgment. Laber, 438 F.3d at 427-28.
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The only reason the district court gave for denying
Shabazz’s motion to amend was that the court could not grant
relief on the motion because Shabazz could not establish that he
was entitled to have the district court’s final judgment vacated
under Rule 60(b). The district court did not consider whether
Shabazz’s amended complaint would be prejudicial, futile, or was
made in bad faith. See Johnson, 785 F.2d at 509. We conclude
that the district court’s failure to properly analyze Shabazz’s
motion to amend was an abuse of discretion. See Murrow
Furniture Galleries, Inc. v. Thomasville Furniture Indus., Inc.,
889 F.2d 524, 526 n.3, 529-30 (4th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that
district court’s denial of Rule 59(e) motion effectively denied
the Rule 15(a) motion, but ultimately vacating district court’s
denial of the Rule 15(a) motion because the district court
failed to give a reason for the denial using the standards for
granting a Rule 15(a) motion). Accordingly, there are
sufficient grounds to vacate the district court’s orders denying
Shabazz’s motion to amend his complaint under Rule 15(c) and
denying his motion to reconsider the denial. See Laber, 438
F.3d at 428; see also Matrix Capital Mgmt. Fund, LP v.
BearingPoint, Inc., 576 F.3d 172, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (“A
conclusion that the district court abused its discretion in
denying a motion to amend . . . is sufficient grounds on which
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to reverse the district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, we vacate the district court’s orders denying
Shabazz’s Rule 15(c) motion and motion to reconsider the denial.
We remand this matter to the district court so it may determine,
in the first instance, whether Shabazz is entitled to amend his
complaint under Rule 15(c). We express no opinion on whether
Shabazz is entitled to amend his § 2255 motion under Rule 15(c).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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