Isaiah v. WHMS Braddock Hospital Corp. , 343 F. App'x 931 ( 2009 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 08-1930
    ISAAC ISAIAH, M.D.,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    WMHS BRADDOCK HOSPITAL CORPORATION; MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND
    MEDICAL CENTER OF CUMBERLAND, INCORPORATED,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Baltimore.     J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
    (1:07-cv-02197-JFM)
    Submitted:    July 31, 2009                 Decided:   September 1, 2009
    Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Conrad W. Varner, VARNER & GOUNDRY, P.C., Frederick, Maryland,
    for Appellant. Jack C. Tranter, Sarah Downing Howard, GALLAGHER
    EVELIUS & JONES LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Isaac    Isaiah,     M.D.,     appeals     an    order    granting    summary
    judgment    against     him   in    an    action     he   brought    against    WMHS
    Braddock Hospital Corp., et al. (collectively “WMHS”).                     Because
    Dr. Isaiah does not challenge one of the bases for the decision
    against him, we affirm.
    Dr. Isaiah initiated the present action alleging several
    state     claims   against      WMHS      arising     from    the    precautionary
    suspension and subsequent revocation of his medical privileges
    at WMHS.      Federal jurisdiction is based on diversity.                   See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    .
    The    district    court      considered      both   parties’    motions    for
    summary judgment, and granted WMHS summary judgment upon two
    distinct and independent grounds, (1) immunity under the federal
    Health Care Qualified Immunity Act (“HCQIA”), 
    42 U.S.C. § 11112
    ,
    et al., and (2) immunity under the Maryland statutes providing
    immunity for peer review activity, 
    Md. Code Ann., Health Occ. § 14-502
     and Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-638.                     The district court’s
    order granting summary judgment to WMHS is based accordingly.
    On    appeal,     although     Dr.    Isaiah    challenges      the   district
    court’s ruling on the issue of immunity under the HCQIA, he does
    not challenge the district court’s determination that WMHS was
    entitled to immunity under the Maryland statute.                       Dr. Isaiah
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    does not mention the judgment of immunity under Maryland law in
    his statement of issues or anywhere else in his brief.
    WMHS contends that because Dr. Isaiah failed to challenge
    this separate, but equally dispositive, ruling, he has waived
    the right to challenge it on appeal.                   We agree.
    Federal       Rule    of    Appellate       Procedure    28(a)(9)(A)      requires
    that the argument section of an appellant’s opening brief must
    contain the “appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them,
    with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on
    which       the     appellant      relies.”         Failure    to    comply     with   the
    specific         dictates    of    this   rule     with   respect    to   a    particular
    claim triggers abandonment of that claim on appeal.                             See 11126
    Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George’s County, 
    58 F.3d 988
    , 993 n.7 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).                         Furthermore, Federal
    Rule       of    Appellate    Practice     28(a)(5)       requires    a   statement     of
    issues          presented    for   review,     but    Dr.     Isaiah’s    statement     of
    issues does not raise any claim of error as to the district
    court’s judgment of immunity under Maryland law.                              Because Dr.
    Isaiah failed to challenge the district court’s ruling as to
    immunity under the Maryland statutes, he has waived the right to
    review of that ruling on appeal. *
    *
    Despite this specific point being raised in the Appellees’
    brief, Dr. Isaiah did not file a reply brief, and the time for
    filing it has long passed.    Even if he had addressed the issue
    (Continued)
    3
    Immunity under the HCQIA is a separate legal analysis from
    the grant of immunity for peer review actions under the Maryland
    statute.       In Imperial v. Suburban Hospital Ass’n, 
    37 F.3d 1026
    (4th    Cir.    1994),       we   observed       that    the   Maryland     statute   is
    “broader in scope than the immunity granted by the [HCQIA],” and
    noted    that       the   state    statute   extends      immunity    to    “all   civil
    liability” and is based on whether an individual “acts in good
    faith and within the scope of the jurisdiction of a Medical
    Review     committee.”            
    Id.
       at    1031-32      &   1031   n.*    (emphasis
    omitted).       Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals has stated:
    [B]ecause the Maryland statute requires that a member
    of a review committee act in good faith, while the
    HCQIA employs objective standards of reasonableness,
    “the State law . . . may, in some circumstances,
    provide additional immunity or protection to medical
    review bodies.    The State law is preempted by the
    Federal only to the extent that it provides less
    immunity than the Federal, not to the extent it
    provides more.”
    Goodwich       v.    Sinai    Hosp.,    
    680 A.2d 1067
    ,   1082     (Md.    1996)
    (emphasis omitted).               While a person is only exempt under the
    HCQIA when the objective standards set forth in that statute are
    satisfied, a person who does not meet those objective standards
    in a reply brief, the Court will generally not consider issues
    raised for the first time in that manner, United States v.
    Brooks, 
    524 F.3d 549
    , 556 n.11 (4th Cir. 2008), or in oral
    argument.   Goad v. Celotex Corp., 
    831 F.2d 508
    , 512 n.12 (4th
    Cir. 1987).
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    may still be entitled to immunity under the Maryland statute if
    those actions “were nonetheless taken in good faith.”                         Bender v.
    Suburban Hosp., Inc., 
    758 A.2d 1090
    , 1104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
    2000).
    Because the Maryland statute provides an independent basis
    for the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to
    WMHS, and because Dr. Isaiah has abandoned any challenge to that
    determination on appeal by failing to raise it in his opening
    brief, there is no reason to consider the underlying merits of
    his HCQIA-based claim.              Dr. Isaiah had to challenge both bases
    for the district court’s judgment in order to prevail on appeal.
    See, e.g., Atwood v. Union Carbide Corp., 
    847 F.2d 278
    , 280 (5th
    Cir.     1988)    (holding      that     where     an    issue     “constituted      an
    independent ground for [the disposition] below, appellants were
    required to raise it to have any chance of prevailing in [their]
    appeal”).        Even    if   Dr.    Isaiah’s    appeal    were    successful,      the
    alternate basis for the district court’s judgment would stand,
    and Dr. Isaiah’s appeal would be of no effect.
    Because     Dr.   Isaiah      has   waived       review    of    the    district
    court’s independent and alternate ground for its judgment, we
    conclude    that    oral      argument     would   not    assist       the    decisional
    process.    For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district
    court’s order granting summary judgment to WMHS.
    AFFIRMED
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