Rupert Stamps v. Paris Capalupo ( 2019 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-6520
RUPERT STAMPS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DETECTIVE PARIS CAPALUPO,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
OFFICER LEROY ROLLINS,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Charles B. Day, Magistrate Judge. (8:17-cv-00830-CBD)
Submitted: September 30, 2019 Decided: October 16, 2019
Before KING and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rupert Stamps, Appellant Pro Se. Edward B. Lattner, OFFICE OF THE COUNTY
ATTORNEY, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rupert Stamps appeals the magistrate judge’s order granting Appellee summary
judgment in Stamps’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action. ∗ “We review de novo a district
court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, construing all facts and
reasonable inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party.” Gen. Ins. Co. of Am. v.
U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 886 F.3d 346, 353 (4th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Here, the magistrate judge granted summary judgment on three grounds: (1) that
Stamps’ claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, (2) that Stamps’ claim was
barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and (3) that Stamps’ claim was
meritless. We conclude that the first two grounds are erroneous. Collateral estoppel does
not bar the claim because the Fourth Amendment violations Stamps alleged in his § 1983
complaint were not “actually litigated” in a prior proceeding. Shader v. Hampton
Improvement Ass’n, Inc., 115 A.3d 185, 193 (Md. 2015); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449
U.S. 90, 96 (1980). The Heck doctrine also does not bar the claim because, based on the
abundance of evidence produced at trial, even if Stamps were successful in his § 1983
claim, the result likely would not render his conviction invalid. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486;
Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 197 (4th Cir. 2015).
∗
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (2012).
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Despite these errors, we affirm the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judgment
because we agree that Stamps’ claim is meritless. Stamps was arrested pursuant to a valid
warrant, so the seizure of his phone, which was on his person at the time of the arrest, was
constitutional. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). Stamps’ phone was then
searched pursuant to a valid search warrant, which was also plainly constitutional. Stamps
argues on appeal that his phone was searched prior to the issuance of the warrant, but there
is no evidence to support this claim.
To the extent Stamps properly challenges the district court’s March 15, 2018,
dismissal order or raises a claim that Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018),
applies to his case, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court, Stamps v. Rollins,
No. 8:17-cv-00830-CBD (D. Md. Mar. 15, 2018), and the magistrate judge, Stamps v.
Rollins, No. 8:17-cv-00830-CBD (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2019), respectively.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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