Ball v. Memphis Bar B Q Co ( 2000 )


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  • PUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    PETER BALL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    MEMPHIS BAR-B-Q COMPANY,
    No. 99-1261
    INCORPORATED,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    SECRETARY OF LABOR,
    Amicus Curiae.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
    Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.
    (CA-98-1568-A)
    Argued: May 4, 2000
    Decided: September 14, 2000
    Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and
    NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________________________________________
    Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the majority
    opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson joined. Judge Michael wrote
    a dissenting opinion.
    _________________________________________________________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Nils George Peterson, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF NILS G.
    PETERSON, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Edward Dean Sieger,
    Senior Appellate Attorney, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    LABOR, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae. Douglas Michael
    Nabhan, WILLIAMS, MULLEN, CLARK & DOBBINS, Richmond,
    Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Henry L. Solano, Solicitor of
    Labor, Allen H. Feldman, Associate Solicitor for Special Appellate
    and Supreme Court Litigation, Nathaniel I. Spiller, Deputy Associate
    Solicitor, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, Washing-
    ton, D.C., for Amicus Curiae.
    _________________________________________________________________
    OPINION
    NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
    Peter Ball, an employee of Memphis Bar-B-Q Company, Inc., was
    discharged from his employment after he told the company's presi-
    dent that, if he were deposed in a yet-to-be-filed lawsuit under the
    Fair Labor Standards Act that was threatened against the company, he
    would not testify to a version of events suggested by the president.
    Ball commenced this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act,
    alleging that his discharge was retaliatory in that he was "about to tes-
    tify" in a "proceeding under or related to" that Act, in violation of 29
    U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The district court granted Memphis Bar-B-Q's
    motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
    be granted, finding that the Act's anti-retaliation provision was not
    sufficiently broad to protect Ball. For the reasons that follow, we
    affirm.
    I
    During the relevant period, Peter Ball was employed as a manager
    of one of Memphis Bar-B-Q's northern Virginia restaurants. While
    managing the restaurant, Ball learned that one of the waiters
    employed by Memphis Bar-B-Q, Marc Linton, believed that the com-
    pany had deprived him of compensation for hours he had worked by
    "turning back the clock" on the computerized timekeeping system,
    which tracked his hours. Ball also learned that Linton had retained an
    attorney and was preparing to file suit against Memphis Bar-B-Q
    under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA" or"the Act"), 29 U.S.C.
    2
    § 201 et seq. Ball alerted the president of Memphis Bar B-Q, David
    Sorin, to Linton's allegations and told Sorin that Linton was going to
    file suit against the company.
    On or about June 2, 1997, Sorin contacted Ball and, as alleged in
    Ball's complaint, "asked him about how he would testify if he were
    deposed as part of a lawsuit." Sorin then suggested how Ball might
    testify, but Ball indicated to Sorin that he "could not testify to the ver-
    sion of events as suggested by Sorin." Sorin and Ball then talked
    about the potential lawsuit, discussing what documents might be pro-
    duced, who might testify, and what embarrassment to Memphis Bar-
    B-Q might result. A few days later, on June 7, 1997, Memphis Bar-
    B-Q terminated Ball's employment. Ball alleges in his complaint that
    he was discharged because he did not agree to testify as Sorin had
    suggested.
    Ball filed this action, alleging that his discharge was retaliatory in
    violation of § 15 of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 215. In granting Memphis
    Bar-B-Q's motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
    dure 12(b)(6), the district court concluded that because Ball's testi-
    mony had not been requested in connection with a then-pending
    FLSA proceeding, he could not receive the benefit of the testimony
    clause of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
    See Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 
    34 F. Supp. 2d 342
    , 345-46 (E.D.
    Va. 1999). This appeal followed.
    II
    Ball contends that Memphis Bar-B-Q fired him in retaliation for his
    anticipated refusal to testify in a threatened lawsuit as his employer
    wished, in violation of the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA, 29
    U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). That provision makes it unlawful for an employer
    covered by the FLSA
    to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
    employee because such employee has filed any complaint or
    instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
    related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify
    in any such proceeding.
    3
    Ball argues that the term "proceeding" as used in the testimony clause
    of this provision includes not only court proceedings but also proce-
    dures through which complaints are processed within a company.
    Under such an interpretation, Ball maintains, a proceeding was insti-
    tuted in this case when the waiter complained to Ball about the time-
    keeping practices of Memphis Bar-B-Q and continued when Ball
    passed the complaints on to the company's president. Ball asserts that
    a fair reading of his complaint reveals that Memphis Bar-B-Q's presi-
    dent "indicated to Ball that Ball was about to testify in a proceeding
    for recovery of overtime under [the] FLSA."*
    The United States Secretary of Labor, as Amicus Curiae, supports
    Ball's appeal, arguing that Ball's complaint states a valid claim under
    the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision. The Secretary contends that the
    statute's reference to employees who are "about to testify in . . . [a]
    proceeding" protects those "who intend or expect to testify in an
    impending or anticipated proceeding." (Emphasis added). Both Ball
    and the Secretary emphasize that the FLSA's anti-retaliation provi-
    sion should be interpreted expansively to effectuate its remedial pur-
    poses.
    Memphis Bar-B-Q contends that the district court correctly dis-
    missed Ball's action because Ball cannot point to a pending proceed-
    ing in which he was about to testify. Memphis Bar-B-Q argues that
    the term proceeding "naturally assumes the filing of a complaint."
    Because no lawsuit was yet filed when Ball was discharged, Memphis
    Bar-B-Q maintains, its action in discharging him, even if precipitated
    by his anticipated testimony in a contemplated lawsuit, is not covered
    by the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.
    The issue framed by the parties' positions is whether Ball's allega-
    _________________________________________________________________
    *Because Ball did not make a complaint to Memphis Bar-B-Q but
    only communicated Linton's complaint to the company's president, he
    correctly does not invoke the complaint clause of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3),
    relying instead on the testimony clause. We have construed the scope of
    similar complaint-clause language in another context. See Rayner v.
    Smirl, 
    873 F.2d 60
     (4th Cir. 1989) (interpreting complaint clause in the
    Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (repealed 1994), to
    include intra-corporate complaints).
    4
    tion in his complaint -- that he was terminated because he stated that
    he would be unable to testify in the manner suggested by Memphis
    Bar-B-Q's president in a yet-to-be-filed lawsuit-- states a claim
    under the anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA. Articulated other-
    wise, the legal question before us is whether Ball was "discharge[d]
    . . . because [he was] about to testify in any . . . proceeding [instituted
    under or related to the FLSA]." 29 U.S.C.§ 215(a)(3).
    The FLSA was enacted with the purposes of protecting employees
    and imposing minimum labor standards upon covered employers,
    including the payment of a specified minimum wage and overtime
    pay for covered employees. See 29 U.S.C.§§ 202, 206, 207; Mitchell
    v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 
    361 U.S. 288
    , 292 (1960). To secure
    compliance with the substantive provisions of the FLSA, Congress
    "chose to rely on information and complaints received from employ-
    ees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied." Mitch-
    ell, 361 U.S. at 292. The anti-retaliation provision facilitates the
    enforcement of the FLSA's standards by fostering an environment in
    which employees' "fear of economic retaliation" will not cause them
    "quietly to accept substandard conditions." Id. We interpret the provi-
    sions of the FLSA bearing in mind the Supreme Court's admonition
    that the FLSA "must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudg-
    ing manner." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No.
    123, 
    321 U.S. 590
    , 597 (1944).
    While we are instructed to read the FLSA to effect its remedial pur-
    poses, the statutory language clearly places limits on the range of
    retaliation proscribed by the Act. It prohibits retaliation for testimony
    given or about to be given but not for an employee's voicing of a
    position on working conditions in opposition to an employer. Con-
    gress has crafted such broader anti-retaliation provisions elsewhere,
    such as in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
    employer retaliation because an employee has " opposed any practice
    made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because
    he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any man-
    ner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (emphasis added). But the cause of action for
    retaliation under the FLSA is much more circumscribed.
    The FLSA proscribes retaliation against an employee because he
    has given testimony in a "proceeding" or because he is "about" to give
    5
    testimony in a "proceeding." In either case, the existence of a "pro-
    ceeding" is essential to the statutory circumstance. The "about" lan-
    guage modifies the giving of testimony, not the existence of a
    "proceeding."
    Moreover, the "proceeding" necessary for liability under the FLSA
    refers to procedures conducted in judicial or administrative tribunals.
    Ball suggests that a proceeding exists upon the making of an intra-
    company complaint, but the Act clearly does not sweep so broadly.
    As used in the Act, "proceeding" is modified by attributes of adminis-
    trative or court proceedings; it must be "instituted," and it must pro-
    vide for "testimony." See 29 U.S.C.§ 215(a)(3). The term "instituted"
    connotes a formality that does not attend an employee's oral com-
    plaint to his supervisor. And certainly, even if such an oral complaint
    somehow were understood to have instituted a proceeding, such a
    proceeding would not include the giving of testimony. Testimony
    amounts to statements given under oath or affirmation. See, e.g., Ran-
    dom House Dictionary of the English Language 1961 (2d ed. 1987).
    By referring to a proceeding that has been "instituted" and in which
    "testimony" can be given, Congress signaled its intent to proscribe
    retaliatory employment actions taken after formal proceedings have
    begun, but not in the context of a complaint made by an employee to
    a supervisor about a violation of the FLSA.
    In light of Congress' clear intent to limit the scope of retaliation
    prohibited by the FLSA, we are constrained to hold that the FLSA's
    prohibition against retaliation does not read so broadly as to apply to
    the circumstances alleged in Ball's complaint. Even though Ball's
    allegations describe morally unacceptable retaliatory conduct, we
    would not be faithful to the language of the testimony clause of the
    FLSA's anti-retaliation provision if we were to expand its applicabil-
    ity to intra-company complaints or to potential testimony in a future-
    but-not-yet-filed court proceeding.
    Ball and the Secretary both argue that the language of the testi-
    mony clause of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision is sufficiently
    ambiguous that we should defer to the Secretary's broader interpreta-
    tion of the clause, as evidenced by the Secretary's litigation position
    in this and earlier cases. The Secretary takes the position in her brief
    that "about to testify in . . . a proceeding" should be interpreted
    6
    broadly to protect employees discriminated against because they "in-
    tend or expect to testify in an impending or anticipated proceeding."
    Br. of Amicus Curiae at 10 (emphasis added). But the grammatical
    structure of the clause does not permit this interpretation. While it is
    enough that the testimony be impending or anticipated, it is not
    enough that the proceeding be impending or anticipated; it must be
    "instituted." We therefore are not persuaded that the interpretation
    urged by the Secretary is a reasonable interpretation of the language
    of the FLSA's testimony clause. Moreover, litigation positions taken
    in briefs, just as agency interpretations of statutes contained in for-
    mats such as opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and
    enforcement guidelines, are "`entitled to respect' . . . only to the
    extent that those interpretations have the `power to persuade.'" Chris-
    tensen v. Harris County, 
    120 S. Ct. 1655
    , 1662-63 (2000) (quoting
    Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
    323 U.S. 134
    , 140 (1944)).
    In finding the alleged conduct to be beyond that prohibited by § 15
    of the FLSA, we do not condone such conduct. Far from it. If the alle-
    gations were proved to be true, such offensive conduct would provide
    an example of why Congress found it necessary in other contexts to
    enact broader anti-retaliation provisions. See , e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
    3(a). But this moral judgment does not justify a conclusion -- con-
    trary to the plain language of the FLSA -- that Ball's complaint states
    a cause of action under the Act.
    AFFIRMED
    MICHAEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
    I respectfully dissent because the majority's reading of FLSA's tes-
    timony clause is unnecessarily cramped. According to Peter Ball's
    complaint, Memphis Bar-B-Q fired him because the company
    believed he was about to testify against it in a case soon to be filed
    by another employee who was cheated out of overtime pay. The
    majority readily acknowledges that "Ball's allegations describe mor-
    ally unacceptable retaliatory conduct," ante at 6, but the majority
    believes this conduct is beyond the scope of the Act because no "pro-
    ceeding" had been "instituted" when Ball was fired. This reading of
    section 15(a)(3) of FLSA is too narrow, and it frustrates congressional
    purpose.
    7
    Ball's complaint (when taken as true) describes an indisputable
    case of retaliatory discharge. From October 1996 through June 7,
    1997, Ball was the manager at a Memphis Bar-B-Q restaurant in Vir-
    ginia. Ball learned that a waiter was mad at the company because it
    had cheated him out of wages and overtime by "turning back the
    clock . . . in the computerized timekeeping system." Ball also learned
    that the waiter had retained a lawyer and "was preparing to bring suit"
    against Memphis for violation of FLSA. Ball reported what he had
    learned to Memphis's president, and on June 2, 1997, the president
    contacted Ball to discuss the impending lawsuit. The president first
    asked Ball how he would testify in a deposition; the president then
    suggested how Ball "could testify as part of a lawsuit." Ball
    responded, saying that he "could not testify to the version of events
    as suggested" by the president. Ball was fired five days later, and he
    asserts he was fired for saying that he would testify truthfully in the
    waiter's anticipated lawsuit.
    The question is whether these facts establish that Ball was "dischar-
    ge[d] . . . because [he was] aboutto testify in . . . [a] proceeding [insti-
    tuted under FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The more specific
    question is whether Ball's claim fails because the waiter had not filed
    his lawsuit (he was preparing to file it) when Ball was fired. The
    answer depends on whether section 15(a)(3) is read narrowly or
    broadly. The majority reads it very narrowly, holding that "it is not
    enough that the proceeding be impending or anticipated; it must be
    `instituted.'" Ante at 7 (emphasis in original). This interpretation is
    wrong because the words "proceeding [instituted under FLSA]" must
    be read in the context of the entire testimony clause. Moreover, the
    testimony clause must be broadly construed because FLSA is a reme-
    dial statute. As a result, the words in question-- "proceeding [insti-
    tuted under FLSA]" -- simply describe the type of case that triggers
    the protection of FLSA's testimony clause; they do not require that
    a lawsuit actually be filed before retaliation for expected testimony is
    outlawed. Thus, if an employee with a FLSA claim is preparing to file
    a lawsuit, and the employer fires a second employee because he will
    testify against the employer, it is reasonable to say that the second
    employee was "discharge[d] . . . because [he was] about to testify in
    . . . [a] proceeding [instituted under FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).
    The central purpose of FLSA is to achieve certain minimum labor
    standards for covered employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 202; Mitchell v.
    8
    Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 
    361 U.S. 288
    , 292 (1960). The Act,
    for example, provides for the payment of a specified minimum wage,
    provides for increased pay for overtime, and outlaws oppressive child
    labor. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212. The Supreme Court has
    declared these provisions, along with the rest of FLSA, to be "reme-
    dial and humanitarian in purpose." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co.
    v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 
    321 U.S. 590
    , 597 (1944). Employees
    themselves are the backbone of FLSA's enforcement scheme. Thus,
    "Congress did not seek to secure compliance with[FLSA] standards
    through continuing detailed federal supervision," DeMarco, 361 U.S.
    at 292; instead, "it chose to rely on information and complaints
    received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have
    been denied," id. Congress recognized that "effective enforcement
    could . . . only be expected if employees felt free" to register com-
    plaints and provide information and testimony. Id. To foster an envi-
    ronment in which employees are willing to speak out about violations,
    Congress inserted the anti-retaliation provision, section 15(a), that we
    interpret today. Because employees who are willing to report, or pro-
    vide information about, violations must be protected and because
    FLSA is a remedial statute, FLSA "must not be interpreted or applied
    in a narrow, grudging manner." Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co., 321
    U.S. at 597 (emphasis added). Because the Supreme Court has recog-
    nized that broad coverage is essential to employee protection, the
    Court has instructed us to construe FLSA "`liberally to apply to the
    furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction.'" Tony &
    Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 
    471 U.S. 290
    , 296 (1985)
    (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs. , 
    358 U.S. 207
    , 211
    (1959)). Our court has followed that instruction, see, e.g., Roy v.
    County of Lexington, 
    141 F.3d 533
    , 540 (4th Cir. 1998), at least until
    today.
    Two FLSA cases applying the canon of broad construction of
    remedial statutes, Saffels v. Rice, 
    40 F.3d 1546
     (8th Cir. 1994), and
    Brock v. Richardson, 
    812 F.2d 121
     (3d Cir. 1987), are instructive
    because they have facts somewhat similar to this case. In Saffels and
    Brock the employees were fired because the employer believed that
    the employees had reported FLSA violations to the authorities. As it
    turned out, the employer was mistaken, and the question was whether
    the employees had a claim under section 15(a)(3), which also makes
    it unlawful for an employer "to discharge . . . any employee because
    9
    such employee has filed any complaint." 29 U.S.C.§ 215(a)(3). In
    Saffels the Eighth Circuit noted that a "broad reading" of section
    15(a)(3) was required and held that the employees had a retaliatory
    discharge claim, even though they had not made (or filed) a com-
    plaint. Saffels v. Rice, 40 F.3d at 1549. Earlier, the Third Circuit in
    Brock gave section 15(a)(3) the same broad interpretation, observing
    that "the discharge of an employee in the mistaken belief that the
    employee had engaged in protected activity creates the same atmo-
    sphere of intimidation as does the discharge of an employee who did
    in fact complain of FLSA violations." Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d
    at 125. The Third Circuit went on to hold that "a finding that an
    employer retaliated against an employee because the employer
    believed the employee complained or engaged in other activity speci-
    fied in section 15(a)(3) is sufficient to bring the employer's conduct
    within that section." Id. In the case before us, Ball alleges that Mem-
    phis fired him because it believed he was about to testify in a FLSA
    lawsuit that another employee was preparing to file. This allegation
    states a claim under section 15(a)(3)'s testimony clause, even though
    the lawsuit was simply anticipated but not filed.
    The majority's decision is a hard blow to FLSA's central purpose
    of achieving fair labor standards. The decision undermines FLSA's
    enforcement scheme by stripping protection from many employees
    who witness unfair labor practices. As of today, the testimony clause
    does not protect a potential witness from retaliation until a lawsuit has
    been filed. Employers thus have free rein to retaliate against employ-
    ees who would testify against them, so long as they retaliate before
    any lawsuit is filed. This will surely serve to dry up sources of infor-
    mation, a result that is directly contrary to Congress's obvious intent.
    Moreover, today's decision has negative consequences for our entire
    system of dispute resolution. Many FLSA claims involve relatively
    small amounts of money and should be settled informally (and
    promptly) without litigation. Today's decision will force lawyers to
    consider filing suit immediately in order to protect potential witnesses
    from retaliation. Congress was not aiming for these results when it
    passed FLSA in 1938.
    I recognize that the principle of broad construction of remedial stat-
    utes does not allow a judge to go beyond reasonable bounds or to
    ignore the evident meaning of a statute. See Norman J. Singer, Suther-
    10
    land Statutory Construction § 60.01 (5th ed. 1992). My interpretation
    fits within this framework, particularly in light of the Supreme
    Court's instruction that FLSA is to be construed"`liberally to apply
    to the furthest reaches consistent with congressional direction.'" Tony
    & Susan Alamo Found., 471 U.S. at 296 (quoting Mitchell, 358 U.S.
    at 211). As a result, it is reasonable to say that when Memphis fired
    Ball because he was about to testify in a FLSA suit a company
    employee was preparing to file, Ball was fired "because [he was]
    about to testify in . . . [a] proceeding[instituted under FLSA]." 29
    U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The majority's contrary reading strips the testi-
    mony clause of much of its force.
    I would reverse the district court and allow Ball to proceed with his
    case.
    11