United States v. Llee Terry, Jr. , 547 F. App'x 367 ( 2013 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 13-4124
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    LLEE REON TERRY, JR., a/k/a Llee Devor Terry,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.   N. Carlton Tilley,
    Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:12-cr-00158-NCT-1)
    Submitted:   November 21, 2013            Decided:   December 16, 2013
    Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
    Carolina, for Appellant.   Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
    Andrew C. Cochran, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
    Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Llee    Reon     Terry     pled     guilty,     pursuant    to   a   plea
    agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
    violation     of     18    U.S.C.   §§   922(g)(1),      924(a)(2)     (2012).      The
    district     court        sentenced    Terry      to   180   months’     imprisonment.
    Terry appeals, challenging his enhanced sentence under the Armed
    Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).                             We
    affirm.
    Terry asserts that the district court erred by relying
    on his North Carolina convictions for breaking or entering, N.C.
    Gen. Stat. § 14-54(a) (2011), to designate him an armed career
    criminal.      Because Terry raises this claim for the first time on
    appeal, our review is for plain error.                       United States v. Lynn,
    
    592 F.3d 572
    , 577-78 (4th Cir. 2010).                   To establish plain error,
    Terry must demonstrate that an error occurred, the error was
    plain, and the error affected his substantial rights.                            
    Id. at 577.
    A defendant convicted of being a felon in possession
    of   a     firearm    who     has     three    prior    convictions      for   violent
    felonies or serious drug offenses is subject to sentencing as an
    armed career criminal. *              18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1); U.S. Sentencing
    *
    Terry does not dispute that his two North Carolina armed
    robbery convictions qualify as predicate offenses.
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    Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4 (2011).                    Terry contends that his prior
    North    Carolina       convictions      for      breaking       or   entering      are    not
    qualifying convictions for purposes of the ACCA.                           We have held
    to     the    contrary       on    several     occasions.             United    States     v.
    Thompson, 
    588 F.3d 197
    , 202 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v.
    Thompson, 
    421 F.3d 278
    , 284 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v.
    Bowden, 
    975 F.2d 1080
    , 1084-85 (4th Cir. 1992).                                The Supreme
    Court’s recent decision in Descamps v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2276
       (2013),       does   not    affect     our    conclusion.         Terry’s      North
    Carolina conviction for second-degree burglary also qualifies as
    an ACCA predicate.                The elements of second-degree burglary in
    North        Carolina     clearly      track       the     definition      of       “generic
    burglary.”         
    Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283
    ; State v. Rick, 
    463 S.E.2d 182
    , 188 (N.C. 1995).
    We therefore discern no error, plain or otherwise, in
    Terry’s       armed     career     criminal       designation.          Accordingly,       we
    affirm       his   sentence.          Terry’s        pro    se    motion       to   file    a
    supplemental brief is denied.                     We dispense with oral argument
    because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
    in the materials before this Court and argument would not aid
    the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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