United States v. Antonio Singleton , 546 F. App'x 268 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4383
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO SINGLETON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:12-cr-00731-CMC-1)
Submitted: November 19, 2013 Decided: November 21, 2013
Before DAVIS, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Claude Jendron,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Antonio Singleton appeals from his conviction and
151-month sentence entered pursuant to his guilty plea to
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base. On appeal,
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues
for appeal but questioning the sufficiency of the Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11 hearing and the reasonableness of Singleton’s sentence.
Neither Singleton nor the Government has filed a brief. We
affirm.
Prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct
a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum
penalty, the maximum possible penalty he faces, and the rights
he is relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(1); United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir.
1991). Additionally, the district court must ensure that the
defendant’s plea was supported by an independent factual basis,
was voluntary, and did not result from force, threats, or
promises not contained in the plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(b)(2)-(3); DeFusco, 949 F.3d at 119-20. “In reviewing the
adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this [c]ourt should accord
deference to the trial court’s decision as to how best to
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conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.” DeFusco, 949
F.2d at 116.
Because Singleton did not seek to withdraw his guilty
plea or otherwise preserve any allegation of Rule 11 error, we
review his plea colloquy for plain error. United States v.
Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain
error, Singleton “must show: (1) an error was made; (2) the
error is plain; and (3) the error affects substantial rights.”
United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir.
2009). Whether to correct an error lies in this court’s
discretion, which we will exercise “only if the error seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record indicates that the district
court fully complied with Rule 11 in accepting Singleton’s plea.
Accordingly, we conclude that the plea was knowing and voluntary
and, consequently, final and binding. See United States v.
Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). We first ensure that the
district court committed no “significant procedural error,”
including improper calculation of the Guidelines range,
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
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factors, and inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). If we find the sentence
procedurally reasonable, we also must examine the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, considering “the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy
the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). A
within-Guidelines sentence is presumed reasonable on appeal, and
the defendant bears the burden to “rebut the presumption by
demonstrating that the sentence is unreasonable when measured
against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Because the district court properly calculated
Singleton’s Guidelines range based on his relevant conduct and
criminal history, adequately explained the sentence in light of
the § 3553(a) factors, and explicitly addressed Singleton’s
arguments for a lower sentence, we conclude that Singleton’s
sentence is procedurally reasonable. See United States v.
Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that district
court must conduct individualized assessment based on particular
facts of each case). Further, the sentence, which is at the
bottom of the applicable Guidelines range, is also substantively
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reasonable because Singleton provides no information on appeal
to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.
In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm Singleton’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Singleton in
writing of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If Singleton requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may motion this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state
that a copy thereof was served on Singleton. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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